Reconstructing a Cycle of Protest: Protest and Politics in Turkey, 1971-1985

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by Selin Bengi Gümrükçü

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and Prof. Dr. Ayşen Uysal

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List of Abbreviations

ANAP	Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)
AP	Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*)
Basın-İş	Press, Media, Graphic Design and Packaging Industry Workers' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Basın, Yayın, Grafiker ve Ambalaj Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası*)
BD	Peace Association (*Barış Derneği*)
CHP	Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)
CGP	Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*)
CKMP	Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)*
DDKO	Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*)
DEV-GENÇ	The Federation of Revolutionary Youth Organizations (*Devrimci Gençlik Dernekleri Federasyonu*)
Dev-Sol	Revolutionary left (*Devrimci Sol*)
Dev-Yol	Revolutionary Path (*Devrimci Yol*)
DGM	State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi*)
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Workers (*Devrimci İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu*)
DP	Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*)
FKF	Federation of Idea Clubs *(Fikir Klüpleri Federasyonu*)
Hak-İş	Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (*Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
HP	Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti*)
İKD	Progressive Women's Association (*İlerici Kadınlar Derneği*)
KMD	Associations for Struggle with Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri*)
KUK	National Liberation of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşu*)
Lastik-İş	Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Industry Workers' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Petrol, Kimya ve Lastik Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası*)
MBK	National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*)
MDD	National Democratic Revolution *(Milli Demokratik Devrim*)
MDP	Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*)
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)
MİSK	Nationalist Workers' Union Federation

	(*Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
MNP	National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*)
MSP	National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*)
MTTB	National Turkish Students' Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği)*
PEA	Protest Event Analysis
PKK	Kurdish Workers' Party (in Kurdish: *Partiya Kerkoran Kurdistab*)
Pol-Bir	Police Union (*Polis Birliği*)
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
SDP	Socialist Revolution Party (*Sosyalist Devrim Partisi*)
TEP	Turkish Labor Party (*Türkiye Emek Partisi*)
THKO	People's Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu*)
THKP/C	People's Liberation Front-Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Parti-Cephesi*)
TİKKO	Workers Peasants Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu*)
TİP	Turkish Workers' Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*)
TİS	Turkish-Islamic synthesis' (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*)
TMMOB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (*Türk Mühendi ve Mimar Odaları Birliği*)
TMTF	National Student Federation of Turkey (*Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu)*
TÖB-DER	Association of All Teachers Unity and Solidarity (*Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği*)
TÖS	Teachers Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası*)
TSİP	Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi*)
Türk-İş	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
Türkiye Gıda-İş	Union of Food Industry Workers of Turkey (*Türkiye Gıda Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası*)
Türkiye Maden-İş	Mineworkers' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası*)
Ülkü-Bir	Association of Idealist Academicians and Teachers (*Ülkücü Öğretim Üyeleri ve Öğretmenler Derneği*)
ÜOB	Union of the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Birliği*)
ÜOD	Association of Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Derneği*)

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Part I

Theoretical framework, context, and method

Chapter 1

Introduction

On December 5, 1970, the ongoing tension between left and right wing students of İstanbul Çapa Higher Teacher Education School caused armed conflict between these groups. 2 left-wing students died as a result. Friends of these students took an oath for revenge. On 31 January, 1976 around two thousand women participated in a demonstration, "End Our Grief of Losing Our Children", against violence organized by women who lost their children during conflicts. The same year, on September 16th, workers left a black wreath to Taksim monument and announced "general mourning" against the then government and State Security Courts (Ersel et al. 2002).

These are only some examples of protest events organized in Turkey in 1970s. By the late 1960s, students in Turkey, as in many other countries over the world, were demonstrating for their demands on the streets. This was also the starting point of a long wave of collective action that rose and fell from the late 1960s until September 1980. It can be claimed that social movements of mid-1960s in Turkey basically followed a similar path with their counterparts in Western Europe since the movements of 1968 diffused through Turkey and the repertoire of action was imported by these (Uysal 2009). People demanding new rights, access to power and sometimes revolution started to appear in the streets employing direct, confrontational and/or violent collective action. By doing so, these people opposed the elites, attacked the authorities and disrupted the institutions (Tarrow, 1989: 1). Students, mainly the university youth, were the early risers of the sixties in Turkey, as in Western Europe as well as other parts of

the world. While the protests in Turkey started in a peaceful environment, especially after the early 1970s, they entered in a new and extremely violent phase. This was also the case for some other countries in Europe such as Italy and Germany. However, the situation was far more severe in Turkey: the number of fatalities witnessed in Turkey in a week during early 1980 was more than the number of fatalities that happened in Italy and in Germany during the entire decade (Sayarı, 1987: 21; 2010: 198) and widespread political violence became an ordinary and daily feature of politics in Turkey. Talking about the wave of protest in Western Europe, Tarrow (1989:1) writes that "disorder contributed to the broadening of democracy where it was strong and to its consolidation where it was weak". However, in contrast to this observation about Western societies, the wave of protest in 1970s in Turkey and its aftermath did not contribute to the consolidation of Turkey's weak democracy: the outcome in the Turkish case was a military regime established with the coup d'état held on September 12, 1980 and lasted for three years until the general elections held in 1983.

Besides the difference in the nature of the repertoire used (i.e. widespread and intense use of violence) the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s reveals different characteristics with regards to the actors compared to its Western counterparts: While the wave in Turkey started with peaceful left-wing student actions demanding university reform, it soon expanded to other segments of the society who adapted various ideological stances and was able to mobilize workers, peasants, teachers, Kurdish society, etc.

Departing from these points the present study focuses on the protests which took place in Turkey in the 1970s and early 1980s; to be more precise it covers a 15 years period, from March 1971 to January 1986. This study aims at

two things: the first aim is to reconstruct the wave of protest while focusing on the institutionalization and radicalization dynamics, which are discussed to occur together over the course of a cycle or wave of protest (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Tarrow 1989; Koopmans 1993; Kriesi et al. 1995; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). The second aim, on the other hand, is to make a contribution to theoretical debates in social movements literature by applying the political process approach to Turkey, a "non-Western" society and less developed country. I am intending to do so by focusing on the mutual relation between regime changes and mobilization, an area that is less-studied.

What happened in Turkey in 1970s is still an important part of the political agenda and frequently becomes an issue of discussion in news media and press. The reason behind this fact is argued to be the "wounds that are not scabbing" of these years (Ergüden 2012). Whatever the reason is, it is obvious that these years still occupy a significant place in contemporary Turkish history and politics. The actors of those years, both from the right and left wings, today, claim that they have to make self-criticism with regards to their mobilization and action dynamics, mainly referring to the violent repertoire used in these years. Some of the left-wing organizations, for example, claim that they have "abandoned" the repertoire of action of 1970s and adopted more peaceful ways to protest. The last military coup held in Turkey was on September 12, 1980 and it still has a persistent legacy in the state through the 1982 Constitution and the related laws such as the Law on Elections (issued in 1983). The coup also has its reflections on the streets: in 2000s people are still protesting against that military intervention in politics. In addition, the constitutional referendum held in September 12, 2010, on the 30th anniversary of the military coup can be understood as another example of the

significance of the military coup and its legacy for Turkish society, as it aimed at removing some articles in the Constitution remained from that era including the ones providing judicial immunity to the leaders of the 1980 military coup.[1] All these facts and references made to those years while speaking about contemporary mobilizations, demonstrate us the importance of the 1970s in Turkey. Despite this importance, 1970s in Turkey remain as an under-studied decade. As it is mentioned in a recent special volume of a prominent journal published in Turkey, *Toplum ve Bilim* (2013, no.127), 1970s are accepted as a "dark" and/or "lost" era and represent the "darkest" period with regards to the numbers of studies covering this period.

Some scholars advanced the notion of a "movement society" (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Rucht and Neidhardt 2002) and argue that "repertoire of political participation has expanded from electoral activities (e.g., voting, working on political campaigns) to include activities typically associated with social movements (e.g., protest, demonstrations)" (Soule and Earl, 2005: 345) and thus the protests became a "normal" part of politics. However, it is rather difficult to maintain that it is the case for Turkey: the level of mobilization in Turkey is relatively low compared to Western European countries[2], and protests are not accepted as "normal" ways of doing politics and participating. I would argue that one of the reasons for this is going back to the pre-coup (pre-1980) period and is related to the collective memory of the society related to this specific period of contemporary history of Turkey. In addition, the coup itself changed the nature of politics in Turkey by creating (at least aiming at) a demobilized society and a new generation who is not interested in politics. Thus, I would claim that what

[1] See Arato (2010) and Kalaycıoğlu (2012) for further details on the referendum and the debates about it.
[2] Uysal (2006:82) indicates that the average level of protest events in Turkey per year is 1700.

happened in those years changed the nature of "the political", at least in Turkish society and for Turkish politics.

Departing from these points, I would argue that the first aim mentioned above is going to serve as a basis to understand contemporary dynamics of the "street", protests and "the political" in Turkey since the wave of protest and elites' reactions to it conditioned how the next wave of conflicts would be fought.

Most of the academic work based on the political process approach in social movements literature mainly focuses on advanced industrialized democracies. In order to broaden the scope of the political process approach, we should look beyond Western democracies (Tarrow 1999, Meyer 1999). In this regard, Turkey is a good case to study effects of regime change on social movements since it witnessed two coups d'états, a memorandum and two other military interventions, which all implied dimensions in the POS. From 1971 to 1986, Turkey was governed by 14 different governments, eight different prime ministers (some of them acted as the prime minister in several governments) and three different presidents (and two different acting presidents). Moreover, Turkey witnessed one interim regime and an overt military regime in this period: the interim regime started on March 12, 1971 with a military memorandum, after which three leftist militants were executed by hanging, and lasted until the national elections held on October 14, 1973. The overt military regime, on the other hand, was established by the coup d'état on September 12, 1980 and lasted until the national elections held on November 6, 1983. The remaining period, from October 14, 1973 to September 12, 1980, and from November 6, 1983 to December 31, 1985 can be considered as "normal" periods of governmental regime. However, still, these "normal" periods of governmental regime also

represent different characteristics as the former period was characterized by coalition governments[3] and the latter saw the single party rule after a long period of chaos and military rule. Thus, the concept of "regime change" would be useful in order to understand Turkish politics. While the concept is generally referred to transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy, in some cases the country can be founded as a "democratic" (or semi-democratic) state and then this democracy could be suffered, as in the Turkish case. In this study, the term 'regime change' will be used in its broadest sense including transitions from single-party rules to coalition governments and vice versa. It will also cover the periods of transition from democratic regimes to authoritarian ones and vice versa, by taking the military coups and interventions as the indicators of this change. Table 1.1 shows the division of the period into four episodes:

Table 1.1: Periodization of Turkish politics, 1971-1986.

Period	**Regime Type**
March 12, 1971 - October 14, 1973	Interim regime established after military memorandum
October 14, 1973 - September 12, 1980	Civilian rule, period of coalition governments[4]
September 12, 1980 - November 6, 1983	Coup d'état, military rule for 3 years
November 6, 1983 - December 31, 1985	Civilian rule, single party period

[3] See Heper and Başkan (2001) for a detailed analysis of coalition governments in Turkey between 1961 and 1999.
[4] A general amnesty is announced during this period, on May 1974.

Although there are several studies on social movements related to the political context in general and political opportunity structures (POS) in particular, such as the works of Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Kitschelt (1986), Tarrow (1989), or Kriesi et al. (1995), the number of studies focusing particularly on the effect of regime changes on the social movement dynamics are limited. Nevertheless regime changes had important effects on political mobilization, and thus on social movements, especially in regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. I suppose that by focusing on regime changes within a country that witnessed two coups d'états, a memorandum and two other military interventions my research can make a significant contribution to the literature. On the other hand, existing literature on the effects of regime change on social movements considers regime change as a transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes (for example Pickvance 1999) because of the general understanding of non-existence of social movements under authoritarian regimes. The present study is focusing on periods preceding and following both authoritarian and democratic regimes.

As several social movements scholars mention, analyzing the cycle of protests is also useful to study political violence, as violence is frequently one of the outcomes of a cycle of protest (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 190; Della Porta, 2008: 222). This is a valid proposition also for Turkey. Apart from the political instability, this period of contemporary Turkey is marked with political polarization and violence which almost became a daily routine especially from mid-1970s until the military coup. The reason that legitimated military interventions in the eyes of their perpetrators and wider public was the use of extreme violence; several people were killed from both left-wing and right-wing groups per day and newspapers were publishing the number of deaths regularly.

This fact makes Turkey a good case to study the use of violence as an action repertoire.

All these facts and changes witnessed in the political system in this time period in Turkey, in my view, make the country a very good case to test hypotheses related to the relationship between the political system, violence and social movements and thus, I think, the Turkish case deserves much more attention than it has received in the past. [5]

In short, it can be claimed that the cycle of protest in Turkey produced counter movements, violence and demobilization, differently from its European counterparts and the country manifested the distinctive effects of its particular history and politics.

Moreover, studying Turkey can make a contribution to the social movements literature and the literature on Turkish politics itself since there are very few studies on Turkey from a social movements perspective. With regards to the former, this study is aiming to handle the protests in Turkey in the pre-coup period within the political process approach and threat the period as a wave of protests. However, the political process approach and the concepts that it's using to analyze social movements and protest phenomena are mainly developed in and for explaining developments in "Western" societies and states. Thus, applying it to a non-Western society as in Turkey will also help us to understand the limits of the theory itself. I am intending to do this departing from the radicalization and institutionalization processes which are debated to be the main outcomes of a wave (or cycle) of protest in the literature. With regards to the literature on Turkey and social movements in Turkey, while there are several studies on different

[5] The existing literature on Turkey about the mentioned period and cycle is mainly consisted of personal memoires, biographies and organizational or ideological histories.

movements in Turkey, such as the student movements (Taylak 1997, etc.), youth movements (Kabacalı 2007; Feyizoğlu 1993, etc.), labor movement (Sülker 1968; Güzel 1993, etc.), Islamist movement (Narlı 1999; Bayramoğlu 2001, etc.), these studies are not framed in a social movements' approach. Besides, there are several studies depending on the memoires of political activists or the observations of journalists, or bibliographies (Feyizoğlu 2000; Soner 2009; Çubukçu 1996, Çobanlı 2008, etc.). On the other hand, there exists a literature on social movements in Turkey regarding different kinds of movements, and different aspects of social movements such as the works of Şimşek (2004) who examined the 'new' social movements in Turkey after 1980, Uysal (2003, 2005, 2009) who studied anti-globalization movements in respect to a particular social movement organization and diffusion of protest, Baykan and Lelandais (2004) who elaborated the emergence of anti-globalization movements in Turkey, etc. In recent years two scholars applied the political process approach to study social movements in Turkey: while Mello (2007) wrote about the labour movement in Turkey from 1945 to 1980, Alper (2009, 2010) focused on the student movement in Turkey respectively from 1960 to 1971 and the cycle of protest in the 1968-1971 period. In spite of this literature, there is a lack of work on the mobilizations of 1970s whose effects are still significant for social movements in Turkey, and a lack of systematic work trying to elaborate the relationship between the political opportunity structures and social movements.

The time period selected for this research is a period of 15 years, from 1971 until the end of 1985. Since the aim of the research is to analyze waves of protest, I propose to start from 1971, a year when Turkey witnessed a military intervention, in the form of a memorandum. This memorandum actually achieved

its goal to end the political mobilization in Turkey that had started in mid-1960s, at least for a while. The military junta, came to power with a coup d'état on September 12, 1980, and left the government to civilians on November 1983. The covered period is terminated at the end of 1985, because I believe it is important to demonstrate the effects of a transition to a democratic regime from a military one on social movements.

Ergüden (2012: 82) points out that when we are talking about the 1970s in Turkey, we actually talk about the period between 1974 and 1980 due to the military intervention of 1971 and the interim regime that lasted until the elections held in late 1973. This is confirmed by the data presented in this study as we do not observe widespread mass protests under the interim and military regimes. However, I did not want to limit my research to this 6-year period since evaluating the times preceding and following a wave of protest can give us more information about its development and it is possible to "relate the parabola of mass mobilization to the creation, the strategies, and the development of movement organizations and to the responses of the parties and interest groups they challenge" (Tarrow, 1989: 10).

The study is divided into four main parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) elaborates on the theoretical arguments, and methodological tools. Thus, this part presents the conceptual toolkits required to develop a dynamic understanding of a cycle of protest, and how it can be empirically examined. The second part (Chapter 4) focuses on the political, economic and social developments in Turkey in 1970s in order to provide a better understanding of the political opportunity structure in this particular state. The third part (Chapters 5,6 and 7) reveals empirically the features of the cycle of protest respectively focusing on the actors

of the cycle, their repertoire of action and the issues raised by several groups during the protests. The fourth and the last part (Chapters 8 and 9) deals with the dynamics of the cycle by focusing on the changes during its life course and interaction between the state and the protestors. The individual chapters consider different features of protest and politics in Turkey in 1970s. In the following, I will briefly summarize them.

Chapter 2 focuses on the theories of social movements, and the debates in the literature. At first, it clarifies what is meant when talking about social movements and protests. The chapter also discusses different theoretical approaches (classic and structural approaches) to the study of social movements and collective action. By doing so and focusing on the political process approach, the chapter traces the concepts central to this approach, such as the concept of political opportunity structures. Repertoires of action and cycle of action are two other concepts that constitute core of the study and are clarified in this chapter. Following the clarification of these concepts, and thus presentation of the theoretical toolkit of the study, the chapter portrays the main hypotheses of the study based on the theories of social movements.

Chapter 3 concludes the first part by presenting the main research method used in the study to trace protest politics: Protest Event Analysis (PEA). Considered as one of the major advances in social movement research during the last decades, this specific method, mainly based on newspaper data, has also sparked methodological debates in the literature (see for example Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Oliver et al. 2003; Earl et al. 2004). After describing the method and briefly mentioning the discussions in the literature, the chapter provides

information about the data collection, generation and coding procedures used in this study.

Chapter 4, constituting the second part of the study, provides information on the state of politics and economics in Turkey in 1970s. It has two aims: first to present background information on several developments that shaped the socio-politics and economics in those years in Turkey to the readers who are not familiar with Turkish politics. Secondly, by doing so, the chapter aims at characterizing the features of the political opportunity structure in Turkey. Finally, it gives brief information on the protest politics in Turkey in the years covered by this study.

As the first chapter of Part II, Chapter 5 opens up the empirical analysis of protest politics in Turkey in 1970s by focusing on the actors that were active in the mentioned period. In this regard, information is provided on the emergence and development of the student movement, the labor movement and the radical right movements in Turkey. The analysis is supported by the data presenting the evolution of the protests organized by these groups. In addition, the chapter presents the organizational structures of movements and involvement of various forms of organizations in protest events.

Chapter 6 empirically examines the repertoire of action used by the actors explained in Chapter 5. By doing so, a closer look at the strategies of social movements in Turkey is provided. As explained in the chapter, excessive use of violence stigmatized the collective memory of those years in Turkey. Departing from this fact, Chapter 6 analyzes the reasons lying behind the use of violence by diverse actors. However, the chapter does not solely focus on violence; the

dynamics of use of other conventional and unconventional forms of actions are also covered in Chapter 6.

Chapter 7 adds another piece of information and examines the issues raised by collective political actors involved in protest politics. Departing from the newspaper data analysis, the chapter depicts the major issues that triggered people to take the streets.

Chapter 8 opens up Part IV of the study by examining the dynamics of the cycle of protest and how it evolved in time. More specifically, the chapter analyzes the processes of institutionalization and radicalization of collective action in Turkey, based on the organizational structures and repertoires of actions employed. These two processes are accepted as the main ones that occur hand to hand through the end of a cycle of protest, as explained in detail in Chapter 8. Based on the empirical analysis, the chapter traces these processes in Turkey in order to test if the Turkish case fits in this general assumption.

Chapter 9 provides information on the most apparent aspect of the interaction between state and social movements, repression. Presenting empirical data on the issue, the chapter traces the dynamics of repression in Turkey in 1970s by focusing on the different forms of repression employed and its effects on two dimensions: 1) the level of mobilization in Turkey during the 15-years period, and 2) the repertoire of action used.

Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the present study by summarizing the main results. In line with the structure of this introduction, the results are presented chapter by chapter. In addition, broader questions and concerns about the political use of streets and social movements in Turkey are discussed with respect to the relationship between state and social movements and historical ruptures and

continuities. Chapter 10 suggests that future research should even more systematically study the mechanisms that contributed to the continuity and diffusion process since the reasons caused rupture are more clear-cut.

Chapter 2

Theory, Operationalization & Hypotheses

Starting with the definitions of social movements and protests, this chapter aims at laying the theoretical ground for this study by focusing on the theoretical approaches and concepts within the social movements literature.

2.1. Defining Protests and Social Movements

Protest events are of significant importance for social movements as they are "perhaps the fundamental feature that distinguishes social movements from routine political actors" (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 263). Various definitions are provided for protests in the social movements and collective action literature. Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 263), for example, define a protest narrowly as "the collective use of unconventional methods of political participation to try to persuade or coerce authorities to support a challenging group's aims". Goodwin and Jasper (2003:3), on the other hand, provide a broader definition which covers both conventional and unconventional methods inferring that a protest should not solely be collective. According to them a protest is "the act of challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural

beliefs and practices by some individual or group" (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003:3). Instead of focusing on some particular forms of protests, the current study focuses on collective protests, carried out by more than one person, in which both conventional and unconventional forms of actions are used.

There are also different definitions of social movements provided in the literature. This is mainly caused by different theoretical approaches of scholars working on the issue. As the representatives of the resource mobilization theory, which will be explained in detail below, McCarthy and Zald (1977), for example, defines a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society". According to Tilly (1984: 306), on the other hand, a social movement is a "sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support". In a similar manner Tarrow (1998: 4) defines social movements "as collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities". Another definition is provided by Snow et al. (2004: 11): "social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part". Despite different focuses of these

definitions, and many others in the literature[6], it is possible to claim that most definitions include the following elements: collective action, some degree of organization, change-oriented goals or claims, some degree of temporal continuity and some extra or non-institutional collective action (Snow and Oliver, 1995: 571; Snow et al., 2004: 6).

Besides various definitions of social movements, the literature consists of various different explanations on why and how of social movements. Before explaining the approach, concepts and hypotheses that are employed for the current study, in the following, I give a brief discussion of the literature on theories of social movements.

2.2. Theoretical Approaches in Social Movements Literature[7]

2.2.1. Classical Approaches to Social Movements

Why and how of social movement emergence and development, besides the reasons lying behind individual participation to social movements have long been a question to be answered by scholars working on the issue. Mass society theory, relative deprivation, and collective behavior theories are among the traditional/classical approaches in social movements literature. These approaches depart from the same point that physiological dispositions produced by some structural constrains such as unemployment, industrialization, etc. cause people to engage in extreme behaviors (McAdam 1982). Based on individual behaviors, these approaches tend to see social movements "as the manifestation of feelings

[6] For a detailed analysis of various definitions in the social movements and collective action literature see Opp (2009).

[7] In this part of the dissertation, I focus on classical and contemporary approaches, however social constructivist approaches (focusing on the concepts of framing, identity, emotions) are not covered, since providing and summarizing the whole literature on each approach on social movements is beyond the limits and aims of this study. This is why my focus is on political process approach which also constitutes the base for this study, and other theoretical approaches preceding it.

of deprivation experienced by individuals in relation to other social subjects, and of feelings of aggression resulting from a wide range of frustrated expectations" (della Porta and Diani, 2006:7). According to classical approaches, those individuals affected by economic crises, an unfair distribution of welfare, social rights, and normative breakdown, engages in spontaneous, irrational, expressive and often violent outbursts of collective action in reaction to felt grievances, discontent and anomie (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 22). Rare movement participation, irrational participants, transitory discontents and sharp distinctions between movements and institutionalized actions are listed as some of the shared assumptions of these classical approaches by Jenkins (1983:528).

2.2.2. Structural Approaches

With the escalating social movement activity in 1960s both in United States (US) and in Europe, the classical approaches became increasingly inadequate in explaining social movements. These approaches based on deprivation, constraints and grievances fell short in explaining the mobilizations of that period as the period was preceded by steady growth in economy and in welfare departing from their major concepts as. In this regard, new explanations sought to explain social movement activity. As a result, the 1970s saw the emergence of structural approaches in the US which "shifted attention from deprivation to the availability of resources, political opportunities and mobilizing structures to explain the rise of social movements" (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 23). Scholars following these approaches took issue with the idea of irrational and reactive collective action emphasized by the theorists such as Smelser (1962) and Gurr (1970). Instead, the stress was put on the processes and the resources

which may facilitate mobilization, and social movements are considered as part of "normal" political life. These scholars share the assumptions that "collective movements constitute an extension of the conventional forms of political action; the actors engage in this act in a rational way, following their interests; organizations and movement 'entrepreneurs' have an essential role on the mobilization of collective resources on which action is founded" (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 14). In this regard, they were successful in drawing attention away from state and breakdown theories as the main source of social movements' emergence by emphasizing the role of activists' success in movement activity (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 277).

"Resource mobilization", emphasizing the "distribution of resources and the organizational characteristics of social movements", and "political process" focusing on "contextual factors such as the political and institutional environment" are two main paradigms in the structural approach (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 23-24). In the following, I will elaborate these approaches and the concepts central to them.

2.2.2.1. Resource Mobilization Theory

The resource mobilization approach distinguished itself sharply from the classical approaches by accepting social movements as "normal" ways of participation and the individuals involved as "rational". This approach also made a contribution to the literature by putting the grievances in the second place and emphasizing the importance of resources available for mobilization. What is examined by the resource mobilization approach is "the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of

movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1212). These resources that the approach is based on can vary from "material resources – jobs, income, savings and the right to specific goods and services – to non-tangible resources, such as authority, leadership, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills and habits of industry" (van Sketelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 24). Some arguments are central to the resource mobilization perspective. First of all, according to this approach the combination of resources such as money and labor are essential for understanding the social movement activity. Another distinctive feature of this perspective is its direct focus on the social movement organizations. Thirdly, this perspective accounts for the involvement of individuals and organizations outside the collectivity, represented by a social movement as an indicator of a movement's success. They also apply supply and demand model for the flow of the resources to a social movement, and uses costs and benefits to explain individual or organizational involvement to a social movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1216).

The resource mobilization approach received criticisms based on several points: the language that it borrowed from economists (using concepts such as costs and benefits, movement entrepreneurs, supply and demand), for marginalizing ideology, inability to explain grassroots mobilization, etc. (Buechler 1993; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009), and the weakness of its explanatory power (Opp, 2009: 159).

2.2.2.2. Political Process Approach and Political Opportunities

A major advance in the relevant research area came in the 1980s "when researchers found that social movements develop and succeed not because they emerge to address new grievances" (Della Porta, 2008: 223). The result was the emergence of the "political process approach" which became the key instrument to explain the transformation of structure into action (Tarrow, 1988: 428), to an extent that some scholars claimed that it became "the hegemonic paradigm among social movement analysts" (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 28). While this approach shares the "rationality" view on collective action with the resource mobilization theory, it differentiates itself from it by focusing on the external factors such as the political and institutional environment in which the social movements operate (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 16) instead of focusing on the internal resources of social movements and social movement organizations.

The main emphasis of this approach is on a broadly defined concept of political context that sets the grievances and conditions which activists mobilize around, emphasizing that activists do not make decisions in a vacuum (Meyer, 1999: 82: Meyer, 2004: 127). Accordingly, it is suggested that it is not the existence of new grievances that help social movements to develop and succeed, but some developments "in the larger political context that allows existing grievances to be heard" (della Porta, 2008: 223). The timing and fate of social movements depend on the opportunities provided by shifting institutional structures and the structure of power (McAdam, 1996: 23). In the words of Armstrong (2005:165), "political process models are intended to analyze how actors respond to political environments in flux". It can be stated that there are three ideas that are central to this approach: "first, a social movement is a political

rather than a psychological phenomenon; second, a social movement represents a continuous process from its creation to its decline rather than a discrete series of developmental stages; and third, different forms of action ('repertoires of contentions') are associated with different spatial and temporal locations" (Tilly in van Sketelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 26).

The proponents of the approach mention the fact that it "provides a framework for the study of social movements, that is, a general conceptual toolkit that helps analysts to generate the questions that need to be addressed in studying social movements and to delimit the field of research" (Kriesi, 2004: 69). Despite these advantages of the approach, it also received several criticisms. Goodwin and Jasper (1999), for example, made one of the major criticisms to the political process approach claiming that the major strands within it are "tautological, trivial, inadequate, or just plain wrong". The disagreement on the definition of political opportunity structure, bias towards some specific kinds of movements, flattening of culture are among the main concerns of the scholars with regards to the political process tradition and the political opportunity structure approach. Tarrow (1999: 75) replied to this criticism by pointing out that the political process scholars "try to explain movements as the outcome of a combination of structural and cultural as well as long-term and contingent factors and of the interactive logics of the political struggle".

A summary of the classical and contemporary approaches to collective action with regards to the motives lying behind protests, actors of it, and forms of actions is provided in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Classical and contemporary approaches to collective action

	Classical Approaches	**Contemporary Approaches**	
	Mass society Coll. behavior	***Resource mobilization***	***Political process approach***
Why people protest?	Grievances, discontent, anomie Class conflict	Resources, opportunities, social networks efficacy	Political opportunities (Cognitive Liberation)
Who protests?	Alienated, frustrated, disintegrated, manipulated marginalized	Well-organized, social networks, professional, resourceful Embeddedness	Coalitions between challengers /political elites Embeddedness
Forms of protest	Spontaneous, irrational, expressive, violent (Panics, fashions, mobs, crime)	Rational, planned, instrumental (Institutional politics, lobbying, interest groups)	Rational, instrumental, polity-oriented (Elite contention lobbying, Indigenous minority disruption i.e. sit in strikes)

Source: van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009: 20).

In order to understand the mobilization process in Turkey during the period between 1971 and 1986, this study employs the political process approach and concepts central to it. "New" social movements did not exist in Turkey during those years and the main cleavage was the traditional class cleavage. Thus, the political process approach, among the contemporary ones, could be more useful to understand the clearly instable political environment of the years covered by this study, and the response of mobilizing groups to this changing political life. In other words, the political environment in which the social movements were operating changed several times over those years due to military interventions that took the forms of memorandums and coups; interventions that were followed by

changes in the constitution and several laws related to people's participation and collective action, economic crises and changing political power relations within the dominant political parties and third parties. It is this changing political environment that provided some "space" to political organizations and social movements, for example as a result of the changes introduced by the 1961 Constitution, and facilitated mobilization, by, for example, triggering people's engagement due to relatively less costs of participation.

According to Tarrow (1988: 428), with the development of the political process approach, "attention shifted from the heavily macrostructural explanations of the 1970s to more differentiated analyses" of social movements and thus, "European and American perspectives increasingly meet around a set of concepts (…) connecting collective action to politics". While the "political opportunity structure" is the core concept of the approach, repertoires of action and cycles of contention are also significant concepts used to understand movement activity. These three concepts that I shall also employ to analyze the social movement activity in Turkey from 1971 to 1986 are explained in detail in the following.

2.2.2.2.1. Political Opportunity Structure

As pointed out, rather than focusing on the internal factors, the political process scholars focus on the importance of external factors for mobilization. Defined as "the set of environmental opportunities and constrains available to social movements" (Della Porta, 1995: 10) "political opportunity structures" (POS) are central to the political process approach and have had the greatest success in defining the properties of the external environment relevant to the development of social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 16). First introduced by Eisinger

(1973) in an article examining the role of political structure on protest events in American cities, the concept of POS is further developed by several prominent scholars of collective action such as Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1983). The openness or the closure of the political system, determined by the strength of the opponents and the possibility for them to ally with third parties, constitutes the core of the concept. Comparative research, on the other hand, contributed to the study of POS by introducing other aspects of it. Research of Kitschelt (1986) on anti-nuclear movements in France, Sweden, West Germany and the United States, for example, suggested that the capacity of policy implementation of a system and the openness or closure of it should be defined by the institutional variables such as the capacity of legislature, intermediation between executive branch and interest groups and the number of political parties or factions which can easily articulate different demands in electoral politics. On the other hand, comparative research of Kriesi et al. (1992; 1995) showed that besides the institutional aspects there are also other factors affecting the structure of political opportunity. According to these researchers, for example, the informal strategies of national elites to deal with the challengers can also affect the social movements operating in a society. Tilly (2008: 12) also showed the different aspects of the POS which "consist of opportunities and threats posed for claim making on the part of one or many actors by changes in regime openness, coherence of the national elite, stability of political alignments, availability of allies for potential claimants, and regime repression or facilitation with respect to possible forms of claim making. Finally, sketches of strategic situations close in on the positions and relations of crucial actors as they approach the making of collective claims".

Several dimensions of political opportunity structures can be conceptualized according to one's study, case and research questions. By synthesizing various variables of the POS developed by above mentioned researchers and having in mind that the peculiarity of Turkish case comes from the Turkish state's repressive strategies, the present study mainly focuses on two dimensions: (1) İnstitutional structures and prevailing strategies and, (2) presence or absence of elite allies.

The political opportunity model has been criticized for disregarding the activists and more importantly for my research, to "fail to appreciate the complex and sometimes contradictory ways in which political structures influence movement mobilization" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 37). Thus, for dealing with this problem and trying to stay away from a "mechanistic" understating of the social movements, I will set my research in a motivational theory proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995), drawing from Tilly (1978). This approach is helpful to understand the relationship between political opportunity structures and mobilization.

Institutional structures and prevailing strategies

Being deeply embedded in the political heritage of a given political system (Kriesi et al., 1995: 26), institutional structures and prevailing strategies compose significant dimensions of POS. Among these two sets of elements of POS, institutional structures constitute a more formal dimension, while prevailing strategies are more informal. Based on the formal institutional structures of states, which "determine to a large extent the openness of access to the state, as well as its capacity to act", Kriesi et al. (1995: 27) make a classification between strong and weak states: "*strong states* are at the same time autonomous with respect to

their environment and capable of getting things done, whereas *weak states* not only lack autonomy but also the capacity to act". Being aware of the fact that states' institutional structures might be domain or period specific, Kriesi et al. (1995: 27) mention that "the rough distinction on the macrolevel of analysis between strong and weak states is useful for conceptualizing the general outlines of the national political context in which social movements operate". It is mentioned that "the strength of state is (…) a function of two general structural parameters (…): the degree of the state's (territorial) *centralization* and the degree of its (functional) *separation of state power*" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 28). Accordingly, "the greater the degree of decentralization, the wider is the degree of formal access and the smaller the capacity of any one part of the state to act" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 28). With regard to the first parameter, it can be claimed that Turkey has a "historical legacy of an extremely centralized and overpowering patrimonial state" (Öniş, 1992: 19). This fact contributed to the lack of multiplication of actors that have access to formal politics and decision making processes. In addition, thanks to this centralized structure of Turkey, the political context within the social movements are operating is confined mainly to the national governments, and military juntas in coup periods.

The second structural parameter determining the strength of state is separation of power, as mentioned above. It can be claimed that "the greater the separation of power between the different arenas- that is, between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary- as well as within arenas, the greater the degree of formal access and the more limited the capacity of the state to act" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 28). As the principle of "separation of power" was introduced in the 1961

Constitution, it would not be wrong to categorize Turkey as a strong state in this regard.

Following Kitschelt, Kriesi et al. (1995) also focus on the parliamentary arena and take number of parties, factions, and groups and the formation of viable policy coalitions as significant parameters. The number of parties is a function of the electoral system and the national conflict structures (Kriesi et al., 1995: 29). With its proportional electoral system introduced in 1961, in which the administrative provinces are the constituencies (Hale, 1980: 404), with a 10 percent threshold designed to keep out minor challengers, the Turkish system does not allow smaller parties to be represented in the Parliament. This system contributes to the more general lack of access for challengers.

With regard to the parliamentary arena, one might also consider the process of coalition formations, as it is also determined by the number of political parties (Kriesi et al., 1995: 30). Even though, only a number of parties were able to find themselves a place in the Parliament thanks to the 10 percent threshold, Turkey has been mostly governed by coalition governments since 1965. This was also the case for the covered period. On the other hand, "leader domination and the absence of effective intraparty democracy" (Öniş, 2007: 257) have been among the characteristics of Turkish political parties. In this case it is possible to claim that Turkey provides a case of multiparty governments with relatively disciplined parties.

The amount of resources at the disposal of administration, the structure of interlocutors in the system of interest intermediation and the structural agreements between the interlocutors and the administration determine the formal access and the capacity to act within the administrative arena (Kriesi et al.,1995: 31). In this

regard, the central and highly bureaucratized structure of public administration in Turkey presents a example of strong administration, as the "centralist mentality covers all the fields of public policy formulation from very start to end without giving any substantial reference to other actors like local elected ones or non-governmental organizations even if the policy is directly related to them" (Karkın and Çalhan, 2012: 108). Thus, it prevents challengers from having access to state. Turkey also failed to establish a structured interest groups system. As Heper and Keyman (1998: 262) write "in the making of policies, political responsiveness to, let alone regular consultations with, organized interests have remained alien to the Turkish scene".

To assess the institutional strength of the state, Kriesi et al. (1995: 32) also consider the direct-democratic arena, as "formal access is a function of the degree to which direct-democratic procedures are institutionalized". The lack of direct-democratic access in decision making processes in Turkey allows the country to be called as a strong state in this regard.

In sum, following the distinction of Kriesi et al. (1995) of strong and weak states, I identify Turkey as a strong state based on high degree of centralization, low degree of separation of power, centralized structure of public administration, electoral system that prevents challengers to enter the parliament and lack of direct-democratic procedures .

Besides the institutional structure, Kriesi et al. (1995) also consider the informal strategies as a part of the POS. Focusing on the "procedures that members of the political system employ when they are dealing with challengers" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 33), they differentiate exclusive and integrative prevailing strategies of the political elite. While the exclusive strategies are repressive,

confrontational, polarizing, the integrative strategies are facilitative, cooperative, assimilative (Kriesi et al., 1995: 34). The state in Turkey has a long tradition of authoritarianism (see Heper 1985). According to Keyder (1997: 45), "the gap between the modernizing elites (…) and the voiceless masses gradually emerged as the axis around which the subsequent history of Turkish society was played out." In this regard, "authoritarianism became the necessary corollary to reliance on collectivist nationalism as the legitimating principle of the state" (Keyder, 1997: 46). The state in its early years repressed Islamists, especially Sufi groups (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 235) and Kurds, a practice that lasted long while its scope was expanded. Given this fact, it would not be wrong to claim that the prevailing strategies of political elites in Turkey have been exclusive and repressive since the early Republican era.

In the light of the political process approach, my central argument is that certain political developments occurred in Turkey starting from the 1950s shaped the mobilization in late 1960s and in 1970s. Given its high degree of centralization, strong public administration, electoral system depending on D'Hondt method, with a 10 percent threshold and lack of institutionalized direct-democratic procedures, Turkey can be considered as a strong state with exclusive prevailing strategies. However, certain moments of openings in the political system led the way to mobilization and radicalization processes. Tilly (1978: 100) used the terms *repression* and *facilitation* to explain the effect of other parties on mobilization: "*repression* is any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action. An action which lowers the group's cost of collective action is a form of *facilitation*". In the Turkish case, state and/or countermovement were the source of repression targeting the left-wing students,

who were the early risers of the cycle as explained in detail in Chapter 5. This repression was a reason for the escalation of violence in the course of the protest wave. On the other hand, certain groups' activities were facilitated by their allies among the ruling parties. The dynamics of repression and facilitation might also influence the level of mobilization.

Considering the level of mobilization and given the repressive character of military juntas, the number of protests can be expected to be lower under military regime when compared to "normal" periods of political life:

H1: The level of mobilization will be lower under a military (repressive) regime than in a democratic regime.

As mentioned earlier, prevailing strategies of political elites in Turkey is generally repressive and exclusive. However, these strategies may vary from time to time and from group to group. Thus, while the activities of a group which shares similar ideological features and goals with the political elite would be facilitated, an opposing group is likely to be repressed. Different branches of the state such as military, police, secret police etc. can play different roles with respect to the mobilization of protest. Even the attitudes of the same branch can differ from one movement to another. For example, it can be observed that in the pre-1980 period, the attitudes of the police who were members of left and right-wing police organizations differed according to the context of protest or protesters. However, given the conservative structure of the security forces in Turkey and the fact that right-wing groups are closer to them with regards to the ideological terms, security forces are expected to be more repressive against left-wing groups.

H2: Security forces in Turkey are much more repressive with respect to the left than with respect to the right.

Alliance structure and the presence or absence of elite allies

The second dimension of the POS to be elaborated in this study is related to the certain aspects of the configuration of power of a political system. The presence or absence of elite allies, in this regard, is an aspect of the changing political context, thus a less stable aspect of the political opportunity structure. The presence of elite allies might facilitate mobilization, thus increase the level of it on the one hand, and might affect the choice of repertoire of a certain movement on the other. A political realignment or a split in the government might be accepted as examples of alliance structures (Kriesi et al., 1995: 211).

Ideological position of the ally and its role in the political arena are two significant features that would identify the nature of the alliance structure. The proximity in the ideological stance between a political organization and a social movement might allow an alliance between the two. While the influence of the ideological position on the alliance structure is obvious, the support of the ally "depends on whether it participates in government or not, and if it does so, on its position in government" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 59).

Based on the new social movements, that are generally left leaning, Kriesi et al. (1995) focused on the structure of the old and new left in Western Europe and claimed that movements can count on parties of the left especially when they are not in government. This is caused by the fact that while in government, political parties "operate under constraints of established policies and pressures from dominant societal forces (industry, finance, technocracy)" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 59). In addition, they tend to act in a manner to be reelected and make concessions accordingly. On the other hand, the social movements with an ally in

the government are expected to have a lower level of mobilization, because of the expected chances of reform in the favor.

However, it might be argued that a strong ally in the government might be beneficial for a social movement. While the ally might provide the movement with more space for higher levels of mobilization, having an ally in the government might provide protection against legal and penal sanctions as the ally might have its cadres in relevant state apparatus. In the Turkish case, the strong relation between the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – MHP) and the far-right movement in Turkey is evident. The Grey Wolves are mostly referred as the youth movement of the MHP. It is widely accepted that infiltration of the police and other security forces by the sympathizers of MHP, especially during the period between 1974 and 1977 when the MHP was a strong partner in the coalition government, provided protection for the Grey Wolves (Nell 2008).

The presence of allies may also influence the repertoire of action of the group. It is generally expected that protest events of a group with strong allies are less violent than those of competing groups without allies since they have more access to formal politics. On the other hand, one might also expect the opposite, i.e. it might be expected that well connected groups use more radical and violent types of actions since their allies can provide them more room for the use of a more radical repertoire. In the period covered in this study, the right wing groups were more likely to find allies, as all the governing parties except one had nationalist-conservative tendencies. Two competing hypotheses are employed on this issue:

H3a: The radical right protesting groups are more likely to employ lower levels of political violence than the left-wing groups since they have stronger allies and more access to the political system.

H3b: The radical right protesting groups are more likely to employ higher levels of political violence than the left-wing groups since their strong allies might overlook their radical activities.

2.2.2.2.2. Cycle of protest

Besides the political opportunity structure, "cycle of protest"[8] is another core concept that this study relies on. Defined as "a phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system" (Tarrow, 1994: 153), the concept is employed to analyze the evolution of movement participation and levels of mobilization. Providing the opportunity to consider the role of time and space in contentious politics, this concept allows considering contention as a multi-actor process without focusing on one actor (Koopmans, 2004: 40).

A cycle of a protest has some features that distinguish it from other periods of mobilization. These common, distinguishing features, according to Tarrow (1994: 153) are: "a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened phase of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution".

[8] Koopmans (2004: 21) proposes the concept of protest "waves" instead of "cycles", mentioning that a "cycle" untenably refers to a "a periodically recurring sequence of phenomena", while a "wave" "simply refers to the strong increase and subsequent decrease in the level of contention" without making an assumption about regularity. "Waves" and "cycles" of protests are used interchangeably in this study.

Departing from the definition and common aspects of the concept, one of the main arguments of this study is the need to consider 1970s in Turkey as a cycle of protest. Figure 2.1 presents the monthly distribution of protest events in Turkey in the covered period.

Figure 2.1: Numbers of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



Based on the data presented in Figure 2.1 it is possible to claim that Turkey witnessed a heightened phase of conflict that started in 1974 and lasted until the military coup in September 1980. While the analysis in this study starts from 1971, 1968, referred as the year that rocked the world (Kurlansky 2004), has also been an important year for Turkey in terms of the emerging student movements. These students that started to mobilize in late 1960s were also the pioneers of the cycle of protest of 1970s in Turkey. As it is explained in detail in the following chapters, student mobilization led to the mobilization of other segments of society. Various forms of actions were used during the protest events organized by these groups, but violence came to the fore due to several reasons. As violence is frequently one

of the outcomes of a cycle of protest, analyzing the cycle of protests is also useful to study political violence (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 190; Della Porta, 2008: 222), which also dominated the streets in Turkey in 1970s. It is also possible to trace intensified interactions, especially in the form of repression, between challengers and authorities.

This cycle evolved in time and continued till the military coup d'état on 1980, as mentioned above. However, the impacts of this cycle were witnessed after long years. For example, some radical organizations evolved into institutionalized organizations, and most of the actors continued their political life in these. Thus, analyzing this cycle of the protest is also significant to understand the contemporary dynamics of street politics in Turkey.

During a cycle of protest, even new and institutional actors to take the streets to make their claims as collective action diffuses. In addition, "the growing polarization in the party and the corporatist systems expands the opportunities of new alliance and adversary structures between challengers and established actors" (Hutter and Giugni, 2009: 234). In this regard, we can expect to see higher participation of external allies such as labor unions and professional organizations as the cycle of protest takes off:

H4: High participation of external allies is expected during heightened phases of conflict.

2.2.2.2.3. Repertoires of Action

Taylor and Dyke (2004: 263) write that protest is perhaps the main characteristic of social movements for distinguishing them from institutionalized and established political actors. Various kinds of actions ranging from conventional

forms (such as lobbying, voting, etc.) to unconventional forms which include demonstrations, confrontational actions and violent acts can be used in protests. The essential concept in social movements literature addressing these issues is "repertoire of contention", a contribution of Charles Tilly (1978) to the literature. By using this concept, he identified historical variations in types of protest and the changes occurred in the forms of protest as a result of the emergence of modern capitalist societies and nation-state: parochial and patronage-dependent repertoire of the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century was replaced by a national, autonomous and modular repertoire with the French Revolution (Tilly 1984; Tarrow 1994).

In order to analyze the repertoire of contention/action used in Turkey in 1970s, we should first further elaborate the concept which is "(…) at once a structural and a cultural concept, involving not only what people *do* when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they *know how to do* and what others *expect* them to do" (Tarrow, 1994: 30). In Tilly's own words (1995: 26), the concept identifies "a limited set of routines that are learnt, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice". According to Tilly (1995) repertoires are learnt cultural creations and they emerge from struggle. However, the repertoires are limited in a given time, so people "learn only a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively" (Tilly, 1995: 26). Crossley (2002: 48-9; 2005:270) points out five important points that can be detected from Tilly's definition. These five points, that provide with a better understanding of what constitutes a repertoire of action, are: (1) a suggestion that repertoires constrain behavior and choice, (2) the know-how or acquired competence involved in specific forms of protest, (3) the emphasis upon the practical constitution of

repertoires, (4) a notion of deliberate but constrained choice, (5) the identification of repertoires with specific historical periods.

As mentioned before, Turkey can be characterized as a strong state. Facing a closed institutional context and being a strong state are not facts that would contribute to the facilitation of social movements. In this regard, it can be inferred that the repertoire of action used in the 1970s would not be moderate, but radical since the opportunities provided do not allow for institutionalized actions:

H5: The repertoire of action used in the 1970s will be rather radical than moderate.

It is generally expected that the number of radical and violent actions would decline under military regimes because of the high costs of mobilization. However, regarding the effect of *success chances,* referring "to the likelihood that collective action will contribute to the realization of a movement's goals" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 38), it can be assumed that "if the success chances are high, a movement will be able to reach a given level of goal attainment with less pressure on the authorities than is necessary in less favorable circumstances" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 40). Thus, it can be asserted that since the possibility of moderate mobilizing is also low under military regimes, the mobilizing groups would resort to more radical actions to increase their success chances:

H6: Violent acts are more likely under the military (repressive) regime.

2.3. Summary

This chapter of the dissertation elaborated on the theories of social movements. After providing brief explanations of the classical approaches in the literature, the chapter has claimed the significance of political process approach and political

opportunities model in studying the social movement mobilization in Turkey in the 1970s. Based on the motivational theory proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995), the chapter has suggested the use of concepts such as repression, facilitation, threats and success chances to understand the dynamics of the protest wave.

Furthermore, the chapter has elaborated on and operationalized the two dimensions of the POS in Turkey, namely the institutional structures and prevailing strategies and the alliance structure and the presence or absence of elite allies. In this regard, the chapter claimed Turkey to be a strong state with exclusive prevailing strategies based on its high degree of centralization, strong public administration, electoral system depending on D'Hondt method, with a 10 percent threshold and lack of institutionalized direct-democratic procedures. In contrast to the suggestion of Kriesi et al. (1995) based on new social movements in Western Europe that movements would benefit more from allies when they are not in government, in this chapter it is suggested for the Turkish case in the 1970s movements would benefit more from strong allies when they are in government as it is expected from the allies to provide various forms of protection for the activities of movements.

In addition, cycles of protest and repertoires of action, two concepts that are also central to the political process model and the political opportunity structure approach are elaborated on in this chapter.

Six hypotheses are generated and presented in this chapter based on the theoretical model adopted and the conceptual tools used for this study.

Chapter 3

Methodology- Protest Event Analysis

The present study relies on protest event analysis (PEA) as an empirical basis for the analysis of protests in Turkey during the period between March 1971 and January 1986. In the following, I first provide some information about the method used and introduce the main features of this type of data, and then I provide information about the data generation process in this particular study.

3.1. Protest Event Analysis

In order to analyze the state of protests in Turkey in the 1970s, this study relies on PEA which is a quantitative content analysis method developed to analyze protest events. PEA is used to "systematically map, analyze and interpret the occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis, using sources such as newspaper reports and police records" (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002: 231). As Fillieule and Jiménez (2003: 258) wrote, with the increase in the use of this method, "it has almost become a sub-field within the sociology of social movements, with its own theoretical debates, epistemological issues, methods, and even vocabulary". It is even called one of the most important trends in social movement research by Oliver et al. (2003).

This significant method of social movement research has a long tradition in the study of social movements. Rucht et al. (1998:9) identify three generations

of PEA research from the 1960s to the mid-1990s, which can be respectively labeled as "initiators", "expanding the field" and "broadening sources and controlling for selectivity". While the first generation of researchers (Tilly et al. 1975 among others) used PEA to handle various numbers of variables for large numbers of countries or for social and political change processes, the second generation (Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982 among others) tended to use the protest data more extensively for case-studies in carefully designed cross-national studies. They paid more attention to source selection and coding procedures, but did not work much on qualifying the bias of newspaper sources used. In order to fill this gap, the third generation (Francisco 1996; Imig and Tarrow 2001 among others) invested more time on systematizing newspaper data and used electronic approaches for selecting and coding protest related articles. As Hutter (2011) writes, today we can talk about the fourth generation that is unpacking single protest events on the one hand and broadening unit of analysis on the other, as illustrated by the studies of McPhail and Schweingruber (1998) and Tilly (2008).

3.1.1. Sources Used for Protest Event Analysis and Source Selection

Koopmans (1995a: 254) claims that newspapers are clearly the best choice among the possible sources of quantitative data on protests, as official records of social movement activities are usually absent, and even if they exist, their criteria of selection and categorization are often unclear and subject to changes over time. Police archives are usually considered as the most powerful alternative to newspapers. However, newspapers are still the main source due to some comparative advantages such as ease of access, reliability, continuity and ease of

coding (Rucht and Neidhardt, 1998: 71). As Koopmans (1995a: 253) writes "it is the poverty of the alternatives that makes newspapers so attractive".

For the specific case of Turkey, it was hard to rely on other sources. While the number of biographical works, or works relying on memories are increasing, this kind of sources are written by the members or militants of the most prevalent and mass movements/social movement organizations and the existing written material of the period such as leaflets, etc. are limited to the organizations that have bureaucratic structures (Ergüden, 2012: 82); a fact that makes these documents biased. Thus, newspaper archives emerge as one of the most useful "documents" for the Turkish case. Relying on theoretical reasons mentioned above and the difficulty to access other sources, such as police or social movement organization archives, this study is based on data collected from newspapers.

The data used for this study relies on one national daily newspaper published in Turkey. The objectives of quality and quantity are combined in choosing the newspaper to be coded. The criteria provided by Koopmans (1995a: 255) that are applicable to the Turkish case, namely continuity, quality, national scope and political color are employed in order to determine the newspaper. The four main national newspapers published during the taken period are *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet, Hürriyet* and *Tercüman.* Among these newspapers *Milliyet,* published since May 3, 1950, seemed to be the best source for this study. Compared to the other newspapers, it can be regarded as being at the center of the political spectrum. During the 1970s, the circulation of this daily was between 182000 and 189000, and it was the fifth among the newspapers with high circulation. Moreover, it was the daily with the largest number of pages (about 13-14 pages

during the analyzed years). The main topics of the daily were the domestic events and sports (Kejanlıoğlu, 1995: 241), which makes it an important resource for protests in Turkey.

3.1.2. Sampling and Data Collection

In order to collect newspaper based data on protests and apply PEA, one should have an operational and clear understanding of what "protest" is. Instead of adapting one definition provided in the literature (see Chapter 2), the present study covers a broad and detailed list of action forms including both "conventional" and "unconventional" forms ranging from demonstrative (mass demonstrations, gatherings, etc.) and confrontational (boycotts, hunger strikes, occupations, etc.) forms to violence (clashes, threatening, bombing, etc.).

In order to represent the diversity of the protests carried out during the covered period, this study does not rely on a specific motivation (i.e. political) behind the protests, but also covers culturally, economically, etc. motivated events.

Considering the previous studies using PEA, sampling procedures are used in order to restrict the costs of data collection. A very common way of sampling used for the newspapers published in Europe is to code Monday issues only, since these newspapers are not published on Sunday (see for example Kriesi et al. 1995). However, this is not the case in Turkey; newspapers are published seven days a week. Thus, in order to determine the sampling procedure that can be applied to this study and to estimate the number of protest events that will be coded, a pilot test covering a three months period (the first three months of 1977) was carried out. A total of 401 events were coded for these three months, which already shows

the intensity of the events in Turkey during this period. Based on the pilot test, Figure 3.1 shows the number of events according to the days.

Figure 3.1: Number of events according to the days (first three months of 1977).



As can be observed from Figure 3.1, weekdays Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday are the ones with higher numbers of events, in addition to Sunday. This fact shows that both weekdays and weekends are important with regards to mobilization in Turkey. Thus, it has been hard to decide whether to choose weekdays or weekends for reviewing and coding. Due to this reason and to be able to represent the variety and diversity of the protests in Turkey, every issue of the daily *Milliyet* are reviewed for the fifteen years period starting from March 13, 1971, Saturday until the end of 1985 using the daily's digital archive that is covering the period from 1953 to 2004.

I made an additional test in order to determine the keyword string for the selection of the articles. In this test, the original newspaper archive was used as the starting point. One issue of *Milliyet* was reviewed per week for the first three months of 1977, again, in order to determine the articles containing information about any protest. After identifying the articles, a pre-test was done with the

internet based digital archive of the newspaper. First of all, a keyword string including the verbs and nouns used commonly for protest research such as "protest", "strike", "rally", "demonstration", "march", etc. is created and run to see whether the articles found by search engine of the digital archive match with the ones identified in the original archive or not. The result showed that there were some articles missing, in other words the search engine could not find some of the articles that were detected in the original archive. As a next step, a few new keywords (e.g. anarchy) from the articles that the engine could not find were added to the string. The digital archive was searched again this time using the new key string and this time all the articles matched. The last version of the keyword string is: "strike, rally, demonstration, march, protest, *eylem* (action in Turkish), conflict, boycott, riot, attack, leaflet, struggle, meeting, manifestation, congress, banner, campaign, anarchy". Using this key string, 3521 articles are collected for the entire period.[9] Figure 3.2 shows the yearly distribution of articles collected.

Figure 3.2: Number of articles collected according to years.



[9] 48 newspaper issues were missing in total.

Newspaper articles reporting on any collective action with any purpose (might it be political, cultural, etc.) carried out anywhere (streets, closed places, etc.) were collected. However, articles giving information about a planned event were not collected since some of these events tend to be delayed or do not take place at all.

3.2. Coding Procedure

The amount of information that can be derived from the systematic reviewing and coding of newspapers is limited. Kriesi et al. (1995: 266) give two main reasons for this: "First, (…) newspapers can only be used for relatively 'hard'[10] features of protest. Second, even in regard to these aspects, newspaper reports tend to be highly disparate in the amount of information and detail they contain: some actions are extensively covered, but many are dealt with in a few lines providing only basic information". Because of this reason, one should be very precise and careful about the variables to be coded. In order to make the most benefit out of the collected articles, the coding scheme used for this study is focusing on a number of variables, which are identified as common and available for most of the events based on the result of the pilot test. The variable list of Kriesi et al. (1995) is modified to formulate the coding scheme of this study. The final list is composed of 30 variables: *Number, day, month, year, front page, frame of reference, region, city, actor, political organization of actors, political orientation of actors, goal, summary of form of action, form of action, number of participants, repression, source of repression, type of repression, number of custody, number of*

[10] The authors borrow the distinction of 'hard' and 'soft' news from Tuchman (1973, in Kriesi et al. 1995). Hard features of protests are the factual aspects, such as the timing and locality of protest events, the number of participants, the stated goal of the protest, the forms of action and the numbers of wounded and arrested people, etc. (Kriesi et al., 1995: 254).

arrested, other reactions, who reacts?, goal of reaction, form of reaction, number of injured, number of death, material damage to, target of action, political organization of target, political orientation of target.

Data generation from the newspaper articles is done by manual article coding, according to the codebook prepared for this study. While no sampling methods were applied during the archive reviewing process, due to the intensity of the events in the period covered and the fact that most of the articles report more than two events, a sampling method to code every other article is employed. As a result, a total of 1761 articles have been coded with the help of the *Filemaker* database software. Overall, the design resulted in a data set of 5361 protest events in Turkey in 15 years period, from 1971 to 1986.

In order to provide detailed information about the data set of this study, some rules that have been applied during the coding procedure will be provided in the following in order to make the data collection and coding procedure more comprehensible for the reader.

As mentioned above, some of the collected articles contained information on several protest events. As a result, not all the events are reported in the same detailed way. For example, some articles included statements such as: "one person is dead and two are wounded in other events that happened in Ankara" or "two are arrested as a result of the events that happened in the State Academy of Engineering and Architecture". This kind of information has not been coded, since the information provided on the actor, type, goal, etc. of the event are not provided.

Some other articles reported that some people, students, etc. were "caught", but no further information about these arrestments was provided. In such cases,

the people mentioned are coded as taken under custody since being "caught" generally refers to that. On the other hand, both custody and arrests are coded as repression whatever the form of action is, in order to not to avoid any information provided. Investigations conducted by security forces are also coded as repression because of the same reason.

In the late 1970s in Turkey, bombings have happened to be one of the most frequent forms of action. In articles in which bombings of cars or houses of teachers, judge, factory managers, etc. are reported, the target of the action is coded as teacher, judge, factory manager, etc. and car or house as the element referring to the material damage. Thus, I coded the people as the target of the action if relevant information was provided, since these are not random cars left on the streets or random houses targeted by a random bombing action. In addition, if the political orientation of the teacher, factory manager, etc. is given, this information is also coded because it provides information also about the political orientation of the perpetrator. This rule is applied to coffeehouse bombings as well; if the political orientation of the owner or the general clients of the coffeehouse is given.

Boycotts, especially those organized by students, are another one of the frequent forms of action. The targets of the boycotts or the boycotted objects are important since they provide us with the information on the reason for the action. However, in most of the articles about student boycotts, no information about the target of the action was given. Such kinds of boycotts were coded as boycotts of classes, since it is reasonable to think that the main aim of the students actions are school system and/or education related.

It is well known to the wider public that some of the organizations active in those years used burglaries as well, in order to provide some financial resources for their activities. However, since it would have been extremely difficult to differentiate an ordinary crime from a politically motivated event based on the newspaper articles, information reporting on burglaries where no ideological stance was mentioned has not been coded.

The actors of the cycle of protest in Turkey were much diversified. More than 600 organizations and about 200 groups were listed. In order to make a meaningful analysis, these organizations are classified into significant groups. Doing this was much easier with organizations since they can be grouped under institutionalized units such as associations, political parties, unions, chambers etc. It was more difficult to place some student organizations, some revolutionary or far-right organization that employed violence, or some groups organized around some journals. In this regard, I differentiated illegal organizations which were not framed within existing laws and mainly adopted guerilla tactics and violence and legal SMOs founded according to the law and employing various forms of legal protest actions.

However, on the other hand, it was far more difficult to group categories of individuals since they included a very broad variety from parents of students, visitors of prisons, shoemakers, academicians to civil servants, wrestlers, referees, etc. Finally, people are classified into six categories: students, workers, elites, terrorists, general public and groups with opposing views. Among these, “terrorists” and “groups with opposing views” are coded as given in the newspaper articles, since it was highly difficult to gather detailed information about them from the articles. However, we can still make some inferences that, for

example, the terrorists as labeled by the journalists or newspaper refer to left-wing and/or Kurdish guerilla. On the other hand, such an inference is harder to make with respect to "groups with opposing views": while this category generally refers to two groups with rival ideologies, i.e. socialists and fascists (idealists in Turkish case), it might also be used for rival groups within the left, i.e. Sovietists or Maoists. "General public", on the other hand, includes people/groups who came together to protest an issue, such as teachers, parents of students, but cannot be grouped under other categories.

Strikes have been one of the most frequent forms of actions employed by workers. For the current study they also played a role as a means of describing the selection bias of newspapers. A comparison between the data collected from newspaper and official statistics on strikes demonstrates the difference between these two sources: as shown by Table 3.1 only 171 strikes were reported in *Milliyet* for the covered period, while official statistics count 982 strikes between 1971 and 1986.

Table 3.1: Number of strikes in Turkey according to different sources, 1971-1986.

Year	Official Data	Newspaper Data
1971	78	6
1972	48	11
1973	55	4
1974	110	11
1975	116	39
1976	58	25
1977	59	20
1978	87	19
1979	126	15
1980	220	19
1981	0	0
1982	0	0
1983	0	0
1984	4	1
1985	21	1
TOTAL	982	171

Given the fact that workers, in addition to students, were one of the groups most frequently involved in protest events, and considering the high number of protest events (n=5361), the significant difference between the official data and data gathered from the newspaper, *Milliyet* clearly underreported strikes. Especially from mid-1960s, strikes have been relatively routine acts in Turkey. Therefore it is clear that the newspaper tended to report only bigger strikes with more participants. Information on numbers of strikes and participants according to different sources is presented in Table 3.2. The selection bias of the newspaper used for gathering data towards "crowded" strikes is evident according to the data presented in Table 3.2. While the average number of participants of strikes in Turkey between 1971 and 1986 is 2.334 according to the official data, the average number of participants according to newspaper data is 29.720. The difference between these two sources reveals the selection bias of *Milliyet* very clearly; it is for this reason official data about strikes is used in the rest of the current study.

Table 3.2: Number of strikes, participants and average number of participants in Turkey according to official and newspaper data, 1971-1985.

	Official Data			**Newspaper Data**		
Year	No. of strikes	No. of participants	Average no. of participants	No. of strikes[11]	No. of participants	Average no. of participants
1971	78	10.916	**140**	5	2123	**425**
1972	48	14.879	**310**	7	59826	**8547**
1973	55	12.286	**223**	4	853	**213**
1974	110	25.546	**232**	8	12264	**1533**
1975	116	13.708	**118**	28	44300	**1582**
1976	58	7.240	**125**	11	104480	**9498**
1977	59	15.682	**266**	11	14666	**1333**
1978	87	9748	**112**	13	35307	**2716**
1979	126	21011	**167**	9	16935	**1882**
1980	220	84.832	**386**	8	14151	**1769**
1981	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**
1982	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**
1983	0	0	**0**	0	0	**0**
1984	4	561	**140**	1	223	**223**
1985	21	2.410	**115**	1	.	**.**
TOTAL	**982**	**218.819**	**2.334**	**106**	**305.128**	**29.721**

3.3. Summary

This chapter of the dissertation has presented the method and data used to analyze mobilization in Turkey in the 1979s, i.e. PEA. This method is seen as a major advance in social movement research (Oliver et al. 2003), while it also has received criticisms and triggered lively methodological debates. After providing brief information on the development of this methodological tool, I explained the sampling method used for this study and the choice of resources. The study is based on the archive of a Turkish daily newspaper, *Milliyet.* While there are

[11] Number of strikes here are different from ones provided in Table 3.1. In this table I provided information on the numbers of strikes of which the number of participants was reported. The average number of participants is significantly higher than the official data even if it is calculated according to the total number of strikes reported by *Milliyet*.

different ways of sampling for PEA, as a result of a pre-test I made, I decided not to choose particular days of a week to code, but used a keyword chain to detect the articles providing information on protest events and code every other article. This process allowed me to have a dataset of 5361 protest events.

In the second part of this chapter, I elaborated on the coding procedures that used in the data generation process. The most striking thing was the bias of *Milliyet* towards "crowded" strikes, thus official data is consulted for analyzing strikes.

Part II

Political Opportunity Structure: Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s

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Chapter 4

Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s: Political and Socio-Economic Developments

It is generally accepted that political opportunity structures have an impact on social movement mobilization (see Chapter 2). It can be claimed that the political, economic and social changes that Turkey has been undergone since its foundation as an independent republic in 1923, and especially the socio-political and economic developments of 1970s, shaped the ebb and flow of the examined cycle. Starting from the early 1970s, Turkey faced severe political and economic crises. In the following, I provide information on several political developments of the decade, the role of military in Turkey's political life, economic crises witnessed in those years which are also accepted as the reasons of polarization of society and finally, I provide a brief background information on the state of street politics.

4.1. Political Developments: Elections, Governments and Coalitions

Transition to multi-party politics in Turkey happened in 1946[12], after a 23 year-old single-party regime, with the foundation of the Democratic Party (*Demokrat*

[12] Although there have been earlier attempts for this transition, they all failed. The first attempt was the foundation of Progressive Republican Party in 1924. However, this party was closed down in 1925 after the Sheikh Said rebellion the same year. The second attempt was in 1930 with foundation of Free Republican Party. However, this party survived only for a couple of months from August to November 1930 (Emrence 2000; 2002). Founded in 1946 Democratic Party was not the first party that was established, but it was the most stable one among others (see Karpat

Parti – DP). The DP was founded by dissidents within the ruling Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP)[13] that was headed by İsmet İnönü, successor of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, at the time. Unlike the ruling CHP, the DP adopted a liberal economic point of view and "became the spokesman for private enterprise and individual initiative and that won them the support of the businessman as well as the liberal intelligentsia" (Ahmad, 1993: 105). While the DP was able to compete in the elections held in 1946, which are not accepted as free and fair (see for example Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:74), the party could not succeed at this. Turkey's first genuinely competitive and free election held in 1950 resulted in the overthrow of the one-party rule of the CHP, as the DP gained 53 percent of the votes and 86 percent of the seats (415 seats out of 487) in the Parliament. The DP rule under the leadership of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had three main goals: weakening the CHP by undermining the influence of its supporters coming from different state apparatus, replacing the statist economy with a liberal one depending on private enterprises and increasing the size of the entrepreneurial middle classes (Karpat, 2004: 16). The following elections, held in 1954, also resulted with the victory of the DP, this time with 57 percent of the total votes and 93 percent of the seats in the Parliament.[14] However, in the aftermath of the elections, the DP abandoned its liberal policies and under the Menderes leadership developed into a more authoritarian force (Karpat, 2004: 17).

1959 for s detailed account and dynamics of transition to multi-party politics in Turkey). Turkish party system basically remained as a two-party system until 1960.

[13] The party was founded under the leadership of Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan who were all deputies of the CHP.

[14] The majoritarian electoral system used in 1950s caused disproportional distribution of seats in the Parliament. For example in the 1954 elections, the DP received 57.6 percent of the votes and gained 92.8 percent of the seats in the Parliament, while the CHP only had 5.7 percent of the seats by a vote share of 35.4 percent.

The first military coup of the Republican era, held on May 27, 1960[15], ended the ten-years DP rule. The coup was carried out against the anti-democratic policies of the DP leadership and its excessive use of power as well as against the rise of a new middle class, as Karpat (2004: 17) puts it. In this regard, it was backed by the CHP, a secular, bureaucratic state party, and the state-centered intellectuals (Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1997: 154). The military junta ruled the country through the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi* - MBK) until October 15, 1961, when the first national elections after the coup were held.

During the military regime, a new constitution was introduced and accepted as a result of the referendum held on July 9, 1961 with a 61.5 percent of the votes. Based on the discontent caused by the disproportional outcome of the 1954 national elections, this new constitution introduced a change in the electoral system: a proportional representation system was accepted. Gunter (1989: 64) argues that this change in the electoral system led to a rampant multiparty system; a fact that is argued to be one of the reasons behind political instability in Turkey in the 1970s. Besides introducing a new electoral system, this new constitution adopted a more liberal approach and guaranteed basic rights and freedoms including associational rights, and thus provided the ground for the establishment of ideology based organizations. In addition, in order to prevent the monopoly of a single party, the legislative branch was divided into two separate bodies: the House of Representatives and the Senate. All legislation would have to pass both chambers (Zürcher, 2004: 245). More significantly, a full bill of civil liberties has been attached to the constitution that opened the ground for mass mobilizations

[15] The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were executed after the coup, in 1961. On the other hand, "587 people were tried on charges ranging from corruption to murder and violating the constitution" (Jenkins, 2007: 351).

following the abolishment of the ban on political activity on January 13, 1961. The rights provided and protected by the 1961 Constitution also opened the ground for political activities of all ideologies. With this ground provided, in the 1960s Turkish politics moved towards ideological debates, along the left versus right division. Meanwhile, industrialization was taking root in the country, which triggered the emergence of class politics (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 25). Benefiting from this more liberal period of Turkish politics, several political parties were formed. One among these, the Turkish Workers' Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*- TİP), is the first socialist party that ran in an election (general elections held in 1965) in Turkey and it "(…) contributed to the ideological aspect of politics (…) by forcing other parties to define themselves more clearly in ideological terms" (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 36). By the mid-1960s, the CHP took a left-of-center (*ortanın solu*) position that resembled the social democratic movement in Europe at the time (Çarkoğlu, 2007: 257) by emphasizing concepts such as social justice, social inequality and increased social welfare for labor (Ayata and Güneş-Ayata, 2007: 213).

By the end of 1960s, Turkey was in a polarized situation in ideological terms with rising social movements. As I will explain more in detail in Chapter 5, the students were the "initiator" movement according to McAdam's (1995) classification. However, movements of the leftist university youth, affected by the global movements of 1968, were accompanied by right-wing movements and organizations such as the Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*)[16] and Associations for Struggle with Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri* - KMD). As

[16] Grey Wolves was a youth group that had unofficial ties with the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey active in the streets especially against the leftists since 1968. They are also known as "commandos" because of their training, including arms instructions, in special summer camps (Landau, 1982: 594), known as "commando camps".

Altunışık and Tür (2005: 36) point out, the struggles between these right and left-wing movements subsequently almost led to a civil war.

Ideologically based intra-party debates led to splits of the major political parties and the formation of new ones, which was another significant feature that marked the second half of 1960s in Turkey. The Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* – AP) was established in 1961 as the successor of the DP, which had been closed after the military coup in 1960. In 1964 Süleyman Demirel, seen as the symbol of modern capitalism at the time in Turkey, became the leader of the party. His economic policies designed to transform Turkey into a modern capitalist society caused some problems within the party which was mainly supported by small-holder peasants (Sherwood, 1967: 55). Being sensitive with regards to Islam, representatives of the lower middle class within the party, such as small merchants and farmers, began to criticize Demirel for caring about the interests of capitalists to the detriment of the people and for pursuing pro-industrialist and state-centric policies. Those critics got organized around Professor Necmettin Erbakan to found a new political party to raise their voice (Yavuz, 1997: 66). Encouraged by the results of the national elections held in 1969 (a total decline of 6.4 percent in the votes of the AP), Erbakan formed the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* –MNP) in January 1970 with an Islamist and anti-western stance. In December 1970, another faction in the AP split and formed the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*). Still headed by İsmet İnönü, the CHP also witnessed a split after adopting a left-of-center position. The right wing within the party got disturbed with this mild social democratic trend rejecting socialism and communism. The following disputes resulted in the split of this right-wing group from the party which then founded the Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi*

Güven Partisi - CGP) in May 1967. All these internal developments within the political parties contributed to the instability of Turkish politics in the coming years.

The Turkish Workers' Party gained 14 seats in the Parliament in the 1965 elections, thanks to the "national remainder system".[17] While the political parties were splitting into new ones, the then government led by Demirel was making plans to change the electoral law and abolish the existing electoral system. In March 1968, the Parliament changed the electoral law in accordance with the proposal of the government; this change "provided for altering allocation of remainders so as to offer seats to the larger parties at the expense of the smaller" ones (Landau, 1982: 591). This amendment introduced the d'Hondt system[18] with a threshold. However, the parliamentary group of the TİP appealed to the Constitutional Court for annulment of the new law claiming that it contradicted the democratic principles of the 1961 Constitution (Hale, 1980: 407). As a result, the Court abolished the regulations of the amendment concerning the application of an electoral threshold, but the d'Hondt formula was kept. In this regard, the 1969 elections were "conducted on the basis of the majority-proportional system and not proportional representation, so that votes cast for small parties in all electoral districts, which previously had been calculated, were discounted in 1969"

[17] This is a small-party friendly electoral system applied in Turkey only in the 1965 elections. The system works as follows: The seats are allocated according to the district threshold, where the votes cast in a district are divided by the quota of the seats for that district, first. Then, each party's vote is divided by the quotient, and the parties are given the number of seats equal to the next lower whole number. As a result, there is a 'remainder' of votes, which is then divided by the number of the seats that were unfilled in the first place. Then, the result is divided by each party's remainder votes in order to distribute the unfilled seats (Hale, 1980: 406; Cop, 2011: 10).

[18] "The d'Hondt formula, or "highest average," is a proportional representation (PR) formula used for allocating parliamentary seats according to the votes received by parties in the elections. The number of votes for each party is divided successively by a series of divisors (such as 1, 2, 3, and so forth) and seats are allocated to parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total number of seats available. The d'Hondt formula systematically favors the largest parties" (Sayarı, 2007: 209).

(Lipovsky, 1992: 67). The amendment resulted in the defeat of the TİP in the 1969 national elections: while the number of the cities where the party was able to compete increased to 67 from 54 in 1965 elections, its vote share decreased to 2.7 percent compared to 3 percent in 1965 elections. While the loss in the vote share seems insignificant, the party's seats in the Parliament decreased sharply from 14 in 1965 to two in 1969, due to the changes made in the electoral law. However, the amendment was not the sole cause of the defeat of the TİP in 1969 elections; factionalism and rifts in the party also led to this defeat (Lipovsky 1992; Ulus 2011). [19] The main divide in the Turkish left in the 1960s was the one between the supporters of a socialist revolution and a national democratic revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*- MDD). According to the MDD line, in an underdeveloped country like Turkey, the main contradiction was not class based, rather it was between the oppressed nation and the imperialist powers and their domestic collaborators (Ulus, 2011: 92), and thus the main struggle would be against imperialism and feudalism (Doğan, 2010: 315). Since the proletariat, as a class, was too weak and politically immature, the strategy of the MDD was focused on establishing a national front composed of all the exploited social classes and groups, including intellectuals, military officers and the national bourgeoisie, thus the military-civil intelligentsia (Doğan, 2010: 315; Samim, 1987: 159). This general divide in the Turkish left also constituted the first serious dispute within the TİP: while the party defended a parliamentary transition, the MDD movement, which "was a reaction (…) to the TLP [TİP] leaders' attachment to parliamentarism" (Lipovsky, 1992: 110), supported a military coup in order to

[19] Belge claims that the party's votes increased almost to 6 percent, but then decreased again during the election due to the disagreements and factions within the party (Belge in Ulus, 2011: 227).

gain power in the country.[20] The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968 helped further deepening of the factions within the TİP: while the leadership cadres of the party, even the Soviet sympathizers, condemned the invasion, the "humanitarian socialism" rhetoric of Mehmet Ali Aybar, leader of the party, got reactions from the cadres. These reacting cadres claimed that such kind of rhetoric would mean that the TİP had defended "non- humanitarian socialism" before (Ulus, 2011: 81). They also blamed Aybar for adopting non-scientific theories on socialism (Doğan, 2010: 316). With the resentment of the trade unionists within the party towards Aybar, on the eve of the 1969 elections there were four groups within the party, who held their own election campaigns (Ulus, 2011: 86). As mentioned above, the TİP was defeated in 1969 elections due to this deepening factionalism within the party as well as the changes made in the electoral law in 1968.

Besides changing the electoral law in favor of larger parties, the AP government also passed an amendment law on unionism in 1970 in order to take the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Federasyonu*-DİSK) out of the game and empower the pro-government Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* - Türk-İş). However, workers responded to the call made by DİSK to protest the law with a vast and largely spontaneous demonstration held on June 15 and 16, 1970, in the İstanbul-Kocaeli region. During these two days, protestors succeeded to paralyze the city with the participation of around 100.000 workers (Koç 1999). Four people died as a result of the clashes between the workers and the security

[20] Departing from this point, Ulus (2011: 192) claims that the main difference between the socialist revolution and national democratic revolution lines was on the issues of "(…) revolutionary agency and the role of military in politics. In other words, the difference was in the methods of achieving power, or the *strategy*, and in the actual conduct of socialist policy rather than in the *substance* of the socialist movement".

forces. The government cut off all physical communications to the city in order to give an end to the events; an attempt that ended with declaration of a martial law, and the government declaring the demonstrations as "the rehearsal for revolution" (Ahmad, 1993: 146).

The military intervened in politics for the second time on March 12, 1971, this time in the form of a memorandum sent to the AP government. The memorandum, claimed to be the result of above mentioned political developments, polarization and protests, was asking for a strong and credible government that is capable of ending anarchy and implementing reforms envisaged by the constitution in "Kemalist spirit" (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 37; Ahmad, 1993: 147). It is claimed that " (…) the military commanders now apparently wished to keep the regime intact with only moderate changes designed to shore up its authority against challenges, particularly from the political left" (Tachau and Heper, 1983 :23). In other words, they were reluctant to exercise power directly. However, Demirel's government resigned after the memorandum and a cabinet of technocrats was appointed as the new government of the country. Strictly dealing with political violence (with the help of martial law), developing constitutional amendments to strengthen the executive, and carrying out the social reforms (particularly land reform) provided by the 1961 constitution were among the prior expectations from the new government (Özbudun, 1999: 34). The main reason provided for the intervention was "restoration of law and order". One consequence of this was the closure of the TİP by the public prosecutor. The party's leaders were blamed of violating the constitution by carrying out communist propaganda and supporting Kurdish separatism. On the other hand, the Islamist oriented MNP was also dissolved. While the army refrained from using

the power directly in the form of a coup or by dissolving the Parliament, it "permitted a succession of non-partisan cabinets to impose martial law, suppress the press, outlaw strikes, arrest hundreds of leftist activists" (Narlı, 2000: 113). Actually, martial law was declared in eleven provinces in April.

One of the first steps taken by the technocratic "above-party" government was to make amendments in the 1960 constitution which was seen as the main "cause" of the conflictious environment in relation to the political rights and freedoms provided by it. With two amendments made in 1971 and 1973, 35 articles of the 1961 constitution were changed and nine new provisional ones were added. The amendments were related to almost all institutions of the state: the unions, the universities, the press, the Constitutional Court, radio and television, etc. Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 18) categorizes the amendments into three types: "(1) curtailing certain civil liberties in conjunction with restrictions of the review power of the courts; (2) strengthening the executive, particularly by allowing the legislature to grant it law-making powers; and (3) increasing the institutional autonomy of the military by excluding it from review by civilian administrative courts and the Court of Account".

In the meantime, in 1972 İsmet İnönü, the leader of the CHP, was replaced by Bülent Ecevit, who acted as the secretary general of the party. This change was a result of ongoing ideological debates within the party. Under the leadership of Ecevit the party adopted a social democratic stance dedicated to economic and social welfare (Güneş-Ayata, 2002: 104; Ahmad, 2008: 205), as explained above.

The military rule was replaced with the civilian rule following the first national elections held after the memorandum in 1973. According to Adamson (2001: 284), in the elections "the country had overwhelmingly voted to the Right,

if the vote for the various right-leaning parties were added together. However, the political Right was internally divided and was not able to form a coalition government". Thanks to Ecevit's left-leaning position, the CHP received votes mainly from organized or marginal workers in urban regions (Keyder, 1987: 71), and won the elections with 33.3 percent of total votes. However, lacking 226 seats for parliamentary majority, the party was not powerful enough to establish a majoritarian government. As a result, the center left CHP had to form a coalition government with the Islamist National Salvation Party[21] (*Milli Selamet Partisi* – MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan. Zürcher (2004: 261) defines this coalition as "a marriage of convenience that nevertheless had some common basis in a distrust of European and American influence and of big business". The coalition of these parties with different ideological backgrounds was based on political opportunism (Ahmad, 1993: 162): "(…) both Ecevit and Erbakan wanted to establish the legitimacy of their respective parties and there was no better way of doing so than by becoming the government". Their moderate program was "designed to appease industry by leaving the profitable light consumer industries in private hands while the state assumed responsibility for the infrastructure" (Ahmad, 1993: 163). One of the significant steps taken by the coalition government was to announce a general amnesty in May 1974, only four months after coming to power. This amnesty led to the release of people who were accused of terrorist activities and imprisoned after the 1971 intervention; a significant event for analyzing the wave of protests in Turkey in 1970s, as the wave started to rise this year. However, this "marriage of convenience" between different ideologies did not last long. Ecevit

[21] The National Salvation Party, founded in October 1972, is the successor of the National Order Party that is closed as a result of the military intervention held in May 1971. Erbakan, who went to Germany and Switzerland due to his health problems after the dissolution of the National Order Party, became the leader of the party when he officially joined in 1973.

gained a significant popularity as a result of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and became a hero so to speak. It was this popularity that made Ecevit think that the CHP would win a landslide victory if early elections were held; as a result he resigned. His resignation brought the country on the edge of a political crisis since no one was able to form a government in the 241 days following Ecevit's resignation.

Instead of having an early election, the right-leaning political parties chose to form a coalition government, the first of the so-called "Nationalist Front" governments. The coalition formed on March 31, 1975, was composed of the center-right AP, the Islamist MSP, the far-right MHP of Alpaslan Türkeş and the CGP of Turhan Feyzioğlu. Demirel was leading the government, while Erbakan and Türkeş acted as deputy premiers. On the other hand, the formation of this government including the MHP as one of the major partners in the coalition helped legitimizing its far-right ideology, as the party was able to have two members in the cabinet out of its three members in the Parliament (Ahmad, 2008: 252). The first Nationalist Front government stayed in power from March 1975 until the next national elections held in 1977. According to Keyder (1987: 71), this period of the Nationalist Front government can be labeled as a period when satisfying rewards were provided to the conflicting factions within the bourgeoisie. The formation of the first Nationalist Front government helped preventing a possible early election; however the coalition partners were not eager to cooperate. Having both Erbakan and Türkeş as deputy premiers also contributed to the difficulties in decision making process (Gunter, 1989: 64). By the end of 1976, while the smaller parties of the coalition were suffering from a fear of national elections in which they could be swept away, Demirel was willing to hold an

election at a point where his party seemed as the most powerful. In June 1977, the two major parties voted together to hold early elections in June instead of October, when they should be normally held (Ahmad, 1993: 169).

1977 national elections resulted in the victory of the CHP. However, 213 seats gained out of 450 were not enough to establish a single party government, as in the 1973 elections. The first minority government in Turkish history formed by Ecevit after the 1977 elections failed to win a vote of confidence in the Parliament. The result was the formation of the second Nationalist Front government, again under the leadership of Demirel. This second term of Nationalist Front government didn't last long, however. Ecevit was successful in enticing 11 members of parliament (MP) of the AP by promising ministerial positions to them. Demirel's government fell when these MPs became members of the CHP. With the support of the independents in the Parliament, Ecevit was able to establish a single party government in early 1978. However, some political and economic developments such as rising inflation, shortages in some major consumer items and an escalating tide of conflicts and violence, especially the events in Kahramanmaraş[22], resulted in a loss of trust among people for the Ecevit government. The Kahramanmaraş events also led Ecevit, who had been trying to avoid martial law while the opposition had been demanding it, to announce martial law. However, even the martial law was not enough to decrease the tension. Ecevit's attempts to apply "martial law with a human face" (Ahmad, 1993: 173) caused blames by the opposition. The by-elections held in October

[22] Around 150 people, according to official records, were killed as a result of sectarian violent events that last for seven days, targeting mainly the leftists and Alevi people living in the southeastern city of Kahramanmaraş in late December 1978. The events are considered one of the milestones of the way to the military coup.

1979[23] resulted in the victory of Demirel with a rise to 54 percent of votes and the resignation of Ecevit whose party's vote share declined to 29 percent. As a result of the by-elections, Demirel formed a minority government that lasted until the military coup held in September 1980. Vote shares and parliamentary seats gained by political parties both in 1973, 1977 and 1983 national elections are shown in Table 4.1.

[23] This by-election was held to replace the five seats in Parliament which were emptied due to various reasons.

Table 4.1: General election results: 1973, 1977 and 1983.

	1973		1977		1983	
Political Party	**Vote Share (in %)**	**Number of Seats**	**Vote Share (in %)**	**Number of Seats**	**Vote Share (in %)**	**Number of Seats**
Republican Peoples' Party (CHP)	33.3	185	41.4	213	-	-
Justice Party (AP)	29.8	149	36.9	189	-	-
Democratic Party (DP)	11.9	45	1.8	1		
National Salvation Party (MSP)	11.8	48	8.6	24	-	-
Republican Reliance Party (CGP)	5.3	13	1.9	3	-	-
Nationalist Action Party (MHP)	3.4	3	6.4	16	-	-
Unity Party (TBP)	1.1	1	.4	0		
Nation Party (MP)	.6	0	-	-	-	-
Turkish Labor Party (TİP)	-	-	.1	0	-	-
Motherland Party (ANAP)	-	-	-	-	45.1	211
Populist Party (HP)	-	-	-	-	30.5	117
Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP)	-	-	-	-	23.3	71
Independents	2.8	6	2.5	4	1.1	0
TOTAL	100	450	100	450	100	399

Source: Altunışık and Tür (2005: 39, 46) and http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul (accessed March 21, 2012).

Post-1980 Period

As a result of the coup, Turkey was ruled, again, by the military from September 1980 to November 1983. The ban on establishing political parties was abolished in 1983, but only three parties among all that were established in this year were allowed by the military to run in the elections. The "admitted" parties were the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*- MDP) which was led by a former general, the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti* – HP) and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* – ANAP). While the military favored the MDP, the ANAP of Turgut Özal won the elections with 45.1 percent of the votes and gained 211 seats in the Parliament. The ANAP, tried to incorporate four different tendencies (the liberal right, traditionalist right, nationalist right and the democratic left) under its umbrella (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 46), and as a result of "the need for a synthesis liberal economic rationality and social unity based on religious-moral values" (Heper, 2002: 143), ruled the country until 1991. Thus, Turkey was ruled by the ANAP during the last two years of the period covered by this study. In line with the party's economic views, in the post-1983 period Turkey witnessed decentralization of the government, privatization of state economic enterprises and adoption of free-market economic policies.

In sum, it can be claimed that Turkish politics in the 1970s was marked by an extreme political instability and the formation of coalition governments.[24] The role of military was an important part of politics, as the military made its presence felt via the interventions made. How and when did the Turkish military start to involve in politics? What kind of effects did it have in the 1970s? In the following I elaborate the answers to these questions.

[24] See Appendix 1 for details on the Turkish governments from 1970 to 1986.

4.2. Military in Politics: Role of Military and Interventions

The military has always been an important actor in Turkish politics, a heritage based on the Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties (Narlı 2000). As Karpat (1970: 1656) mentions, “the army is the oldest social institution in Turkey, and, in fact, it is the only organization surviving from the traditionalist era”. It always had a privileged and preeminent role in the political life. In the Ottoman era, this was caused by the warrior aspect of the state and the empire’s political organization which was largely based on conquests (Vaner, 1987: 237). However, this privileged role of the army in the Ottoman era, based on the economic and political structure of the empire, strengthened especially in the nineteenth century with the modernization process, in which the military was both an object and an agent (Demirel, 2003: 255). This important role of the military is consolidated in the Republican era, as it became the first institution of the emerging Republic “(c)rowned by its success in the War of Independence (1919-23), and unified by the new ideology of Turkish nationalism” (Vaner, 1987: 237). It should also be noted that the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was himself a former soldier and heavily relied on the army to achieve his goals and to realize the reforms. Under this new Republic, the military came to see itself as the ultimate guardian of the republican regime based on secularism. As Narlı (2000: 108) states, “the army has played a prominent role in Turkey's political modernization leading the country "along a Western path," by endorsing the dynamic transformation of the Turkish state and society, in line with Atatürk's ideological commitment to the West”. In line with this understanding of the military as the “guardian” of the regime and transformation, “(…) the Turkish military felt authorized to intervene in civilian politics (issuing threats or

memorandums, blackmailing or replacing the government through pressure, or coup d'état) when acts or decisions of the civilian authorities seemed to threaten what they interpreted as the national interest" (Demirel, 2003: 255).

As we have seen, within the period covered in this study, the Turkish military intervened in politics two times: once in 1971 with a military memorandum[25] and once in September 12, 1980 in the form of a coup. The intervention on March 12, 1971, the second intervention after the first military coup held in May 1960, forced the government to resign since it was seen as incapable of dealing with increasing violence. The 1971 intervention "was the culmination of deteriorating political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, fragmentation of political parties, and weak and ineffective government" (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 23). As mentioned above, the then government led by Demirel resigned and a "non-partisan" government was formed since "(…) the military chose to govern from behind the scenes instead of taking over directly" (Özbudun, 1999: 35). On the same day with the memorandum, as mentioned above, the public prosecutor opened a case against the Turkish Workers' Party, whose leaders were accused of promoting communism and autonomy for the Kurds. The result was the prohibition of the party. As mentioned before, along with the TİP, the Islamist MNP was also closed down by the constitutional court "claiming that

[25] The memorandum read as follows: "1. The Parliament and the Government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest. They have caused the public to lose all hope of rising to the level of contemporary civilization which was set for us by Atatürk as a goal, and have failed to realize the reforms stipulated by the Constitution. The future of the Turkish Republic is therefore seriously threatened. 2. The assessment by the Parliament, in a spirit above partisan considerations, of the solutions needed to eliminate the concern and disillusionment of the Turkish Armed Forces, which have sprung from the bosom of the Turkish nation, over this grave situation; and the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk's views, will implement the reformist laws envisaged by the Constitution, are considered essential. 3. Unless this is done quickly, the Turkish Armed Forces are determined to take over the administration of the State in accordance with the powers vested in them by the laws to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic. Please be informed" (Özbudun, 1999: 34).

the party wanted to alter the secular principles of the state and institute an Islamic order" (Yavuz, 1997: 66).

To consider the actions of leftist organizations, mainly the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu* – THKO), martial law was declared in 11 of Turkey's 67 provinces.[26] In the days following the declaration of martial law, youth and student organizations were banned, meetings were prohibited, freedom of press was curtailed, people with leftist political engagement and some well-known authors such as Yaşar Kemal and Fakir Baykurt were taken under custody or arrested. One of the severest measures taken by the regime established by the military memorandum was the execution by hanging of three leaders of the THKO, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan.[27] While the left-wing movements were repressed harshly, the right-wing movements, especially those that were associated with the MHP were left alone to act against their rivals (Zürcher, 2004: 260; Ahmad, 2008: 250).

One of the main aims of the 1971 intervention was the prevention of violence, a goal that was achieved to some extent in the following years. However, political violence gained a momentum, again, in the mid-1970s; a fact that is claimed to be the reason lying behind the military coup held in September 12, 1980. Thus, it is possible to say that, in a sense, the reasons that had led to the 1971 intervention were almost the same in 1980, although they were more severe this time. The country was in a chaotic environment, struggling both with violence and insufficient governments and polarized society. Under these circumstances, as

[26] These 11 provinces are Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Siirt and Zonguldak.

[27] 18 of the THKO militants out of 25 who were judged in a military court in 1971 received death penalty; however the court approved execution of only the mentioned names, whose death penalty was also approved by the Parliament as required in the constitution. According to Sayarı (2010: 201) hanging of these three leaders of the THKO didn't make the effect that it was desired by the military and further contributed to the reemergence of political violence in the following years by creating 'heroes' and 'martyrs' for the left-wing militants.

Demirel (2003: 259) notes "(…) in their well-entrenched role as the ultimate guardian of the state, Turkish officers regarded the idea of staging a coup, not as unlawful and unethical, but as a special duty which they were trained to carry out when certain conditions occurred". Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff while staging the coup, included the reasons lying behind the intervention according to the military in his very first communiqué issued on the morning of 12 September:

> "The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order" (Tachau and Heper, 1983: 26).

However, it has always been argued that if the reasons lying behind the coup were solely increasing violence and terrorism, the intervention should have come earlier. For example, Ahmad (1993: 174; 2008: 254) argues that one of the reasons behind the military coup was the strategic importance of Turkey during the developments in the region such as the revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and also the onset of globalization. Whatever the reasons behind the coup, unlike the intervention in 1971, this time the military regime was decisive to stay in power for the time needed to establish the desired rule. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to say that the coup in 1980, legally justified according to the article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law (Law No. 211) [28], was welcomed by the majority of the Turkish people since they saw it as a way out of political violence and deaths that became

[28] Article 35 of the Law No. 211 is as follows: 'The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as it is defined by the constitution.' http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.4.211&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=

a part of the daily routine. This time the military was more warranted to hold power, not only with the strong-arm military methods, but also with political measures taken to restructure the politics in Turkey: the martial law was extended to all 67 cities, Demirel, Ecevit and Erbakan were placed under house arrest and Alparslan Türkeş, leader of the Nationalist Action Party, was put under custody, 1700 elected mayors and the members of the city councils were also dismissed (Dodd, 1990: 51), two major trade union federations namely the DİSK and the Nationalist Workers' Union Federation (*Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* - MİSK) were closed down, and May Day celebrations were banned. Mass arrests and trials opened against trade unions, political parties and some organizations such as the MHP, the DİSK, the Peace Association (*Barış Derneği* - BD) and the Association of All Teachers Unity and Solidarity (*Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği* - TÖB-DER) (Ahmad, 1993: 185). As Zürcher (2004: 280) points out, this wave of arrests was achieved at human and social cost, as it targeted notable people such as university professors, teacher, journalists, trade unionists and lawyers. However, all these measures taken were not seen as adequate by the military to achieve the above mentioned goals: a new framework to shape the society was initiated, mainly aiming to depoliticize the society, secure the continuation of the Kemalist legacy as understood by the military and curb the leftist movements that had been gaining power since the 1960s. This new synthesis[29], called "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" (*Türk-İslam Sentezi* – TİS) by some to mention the ideological position of the military for the 1980-1983 period, was an attempt to "bring supposedly shared values to the surface, peel away the 'false Western veneer' which was seen as responsible for

[29] Despite its newness with regards to the usage by state officials, the roots of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis can be traced backed to the late 1860s and early 1870s according to Çetinsaya (1999).

the ills of the modern society and recognize a national synthesis of fundamental values under the labels of 'Turk' and 'Islam'" (Poulton cited in Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 42). As a result of all these measures and repression, many political activists had to leave the country to live abroad as political refugees. More severely, many people died under torture in prisons and 50 people both from left and right wing ideologies were executed.

All the attempts to reshape the politics in Turkey were sought to be institutionalized in a new constitution prepared to replace the 1961 constitution, which was seen as one of the major problems since it had opened the ground for ideological debates. The 1982 Constitution, aiming to give the state its power back, was ratified by 92.5 percent of the votes in a referendum. [30] As mentioned above, the 1982 Constitution aimed at serving to re-shape the society, this is why "(…) state forces were given more power at the expense of decreasing rights for freedom of organization, strike and protest" (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 44). Kenan Evren was elected as the President of the state as a result of the above mentioned referendum.

At the end of the 1980-1983 period, which is defined as a "'military rule/civilian influence' phase" by Narlı (2000:114), the military delegated the power back to the civilians with the elections held in 1983, after three years of interregnum (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 265).

Besides the political developments and the interventions by the military, the 1970s in Turkey were also marked by severe economic problems and crises. What were the main economic policies adopted by the then governments? How

[30]Thinking about the vote share that the constitution prepared by the military, it should be kept in mind that alternative propaganda for the referendum was not allowed and people had a fear if that the military regime would continue, if they voted against the constitution (Demirel, 2005: 252) and, as mentioned in the text, people were so tired of political murders and attacks being a part of ordinary life.

was the labor movement affected by them? What were main causes of the economic crises? The following part is dedicated to these questions.

4.3. Economic Developments: Import Substitution, Urbanization and Crises

With regards to economic developments, it should first be mentioned that the 1960s in Turkey were characterized by the five-year development plans which were taken as a measure against the economic crisis of the late 1950s. The first five-year development plan, issued in 1963, labeled the Turkish economy as a mixed economy, i.e. a system where both the private sector and the state direct the economy with a certain degree of private economic freedom and state regulation. On the other hand, this first plan introduced Import Substitution Industrialization (*ithal ikameci sanayileşme*) policy. This policy pursues as the main strategy of industrialization the production of previously imported goods by the domestic industry under the supervision of the state. Industrialization was understood as equal to development. In the short term, these policies had positive results: from 1950 to 1973 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased by more than 3 percent annually, while the overall average income increased by more than 100 percent (Pamuk cited in Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 74). However, the increased income was not equally distributed and income inequality was increasing day by day. As a result of the measures taken by the regime established after the 1971 memorandum, i.e the banning of strikes and limiting of the freedom of organization, real wages declined by 5 percent between 1970 and 1973 (Keyder, 1987: 69; Keyder, 1979: 33). Consumption was restricted to an affluent minority (Ahmad, 1993: 144) and poverty had been a major concern with a rate of 38 percent households living in extreme poverty in 1973 (Özbudun and Ulusan cited

in Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 74). On the other hand, "the labor force grew but never in proportion to the demand for jobs so that unemployment was always rising, though mitigated by emigration to Europe" (Ahmad, 1993: 144). Figure 4.1 gives information about the unemployment tendencies in Turkey from 1970 to 1985.

Figure 4.1: Unemployment in Turkey, 1970-1986 (in %).



Source: Bulutay, 1995: 261-262.

Internal migration from rural regions to urban regions has been one of the most significant features of the 1970s in Turkey. Turkey's rapid population growth, lack of opportunities in the agricultural sector and attraction of new industries can be listed among the main reasons for this migration (Zürcher, 2004: 269). Table 4.2 shows the changes in total and urban population from 1970 to 1985. The result of increasing internal migration was an economy incapable of absorbing the growing pool of labor and unemployment. It is argued that this incapacity was one of the main reasons for the political violence of the 1970s, as unemployment increased and shantytowns (*gecekondu*) were formed as a result of internal

migration from where most of the militants were recruited (Sayarı and Hoffman, 1994).

Table 4.2: Increase in urban population, 1970-1985.

Year	Total population	Urban Population*	Proportion of Urban Population (in %)
1970	35.605.176	10.221.530	28.7
1975	40.347.719	13.271.801	32.9
1980	44.736.957	16064.681	35.9
1985	50.664.458	23.238030	45.9

Source: Turkish Republic Ministry of Development, http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ekonomi/ (accessed on March 19, 2012).
*Urban refers to areas with population of 2000 or more.

Coming to the mid-1970s, the Turkish economy was struggling with the oil crisis of 1973-1974, problems emerged as a result of the Cyprus intervention, such as the US army embargo of February 1975 and subsidies to the Turkish-Cypriot government, and a series of weak and indecisive governments. Steadily rising inflation rates and a rising import bill were the results of these developments (Zürcher, 2004: 267), which led to "a further foreign exchange crisis and a production crisis" (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 75). The government would intended to overcome the foreign exchange crisis with the workers' remittances, which were a very important source of revenue for the state at the beginning of 1970s; however, these also began to fall after 1973 and the international reputation of Turkey was strongly damaged by the intervention in Cyprus, thus the state could not borrow from other governments. As a result, the Nationalist Front governments took short-term loans from private banks with very high interest rates, and thus opened bigger holes in the economy (Ahmad, 1993: 177). The

result was the listing of Turkey among the countries that were in moratorium regarding their payments by the World Bank in 1975 (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 75). The inflation rate increased to more than 50 percent in 1976, which also eroded the value of salaries. People started to get poorer and poorer day by day as their income did not increase in line with the increases in prices. The current account deficit, which corresponded to 660 million dollars in 1973, reached 3.1 billion dollars in 1977 (Temel et al., 2002: 54). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called in as a result of all these economic developments in 1978. However, the first two attempts to sign a stand-by agreement failed and a stabilization program was only applied in June 1979. Turkey was struggling with the most severe economic crises that it had ever experienced. Under these circumstances, "(...) capitalists started calling openly for a change in the system, control of the workers' unions and syndicates and calling on the government to create 'secure' conditions for capital and investment" (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 76). In the meantime, Ecevit's government was replaced by Demirel's on November 1979. A series of new policies to remedy the economic problems of the country were announced by this new government on January 24, 1980, which then were called the "24 January Decisions". These policies marked the rendition to a liberal market economy by decreasing the role of state initiative and enterprise in heavy industry and primary goods and replacing Import Substitution Industrialization policy with an export-oriented growth policy. Besides, some structural and institutional arrangements including diversification of financial intermediaries through the establishment of a capital market, liberalization of foreign exchange market, opening of the banking sector to competition and implementing positive real interest rate were made (Köse, 2002: 119). After the

coup of 1980, the Turkish economy was reshaped according to this program. While the military regime aimed at restructuring the politics in Turkey, the economic stabilization program of January 24, 1980 remained untouched by the military junta. Basic economic indicators of the relevant years are provided in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Economic and financial indicators, 1970-1985.

Year	Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	GDP per capita (current US$)	GDP growth (annual %)	Urban population (% of total)	Current account balance (% of GDP)
1970	6.9	38.2	3.2	38.2	-
1971	15.7	38.9	5.6	38.9	-
1972	11.7	39.6	7.4	39.6	-
1973	15.4	40.2	3.3	40.2	-
1974	15.8	40.9	5.6	40.9	-1.6
1975	19.2	41.6	7.2	41.6	-3.7
1976	17.4	420	10.5	420	-3.9
1977	27.1	42.5	3.4	42.5	-5.3
1978	45.3	42.9	1.5	42.9	-1.9
1979	58.7	43.4	-0.6	43.4	-1.5
1980	110.2	43.8	-2.4	43.8	-4.9
1981	36.6	45.5	4.9	45.5	-2.7
1982	30.8	47.2	3.6	47.2	-1.4
1983	31.4	49.0	50	490	-3.1
1984	48.4	50.7	6.7	50.7	-2.3
1985	450	52.4	4.2	52.4	-1.5

Source: Compiled by author from Worldbank Databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed April 24, 2012).

As explained, during the 1970s, Turkey was dealing with incapable governments, military interventions and severe economic problems. However, institutional politics and the economy were not the only areas of dispute in Turkey. People with different ideological orientations started to take to the streets and street protests became a way of raising their voices, and of confronting their rivals

especially after the mid-1970s. The following lines aim at giving a short introduction and background to the street politics in Turkey, as the dynamics of the protests will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.

4.4. Ideology Involved: Street Politics in Turkey in the 1970s

It would not be wrong to claim that ideology was brought into Turkish political life with the 1961 Constitution. Just before the 1965 elections, the leadership of the CHP declared its position on the political spectrum as "left of the center" while the debates within the party started earlier. As Güneş-Ayata (1995: 82) mentions, this was a step taken to determine the party's position on the political spectrum rather than to introduce a new program and, new policies. On the other hand, this move might be interpreted as a strategic step taken in reaction to the socialist TİP competing in the elections. CHP's "left of the center" position found a quick response within the AP as the party's supporters adopted the slogan "left of center, road to Moscow" (*ortanın solu, Moskova'nın yolu)* against the CHP and started to emphasize that the "left" was the main threat to the unity of country and the "mother of all evil" so to speak.

The left was developing itself not only with political parties, but also with the student organizations such as the Idea Clubs (*Fikir Klüpleri*)[31] founded first in 1956. According to Ahmad (1993: 142) these "were the first serious attempts to create a civil society in a country where bureaucratic control had smothered all initiative". The leftist student activism in Turkey started in the late 1960s, and was

[31] Idea Clubs are youth organization which were founded in 1956 in Ankara University and then spread to other universities among the country. In 1965, all these separate organizations formed the Federation of Idea Clubs *(Fikir Klüpleri Federasyonu* - FKF). At the time they were acting as the youth branch of the Workers' Party, however in time, a faction within the Turkish left called MDD started to dominate the federation and its name was changed to The Federation of Revolutionary Youth Organizations (*Devrimci Gençlik Dernekleri Federasyonu* – Dev-Genç).

influenced by its international counterparts triggered by the 1968 movement. The university youth was organized around Dev-Genç, which had close relations with the TİP. However, the party's political failure in the 1969 elections caused disappointment among the youth and some cadres lost their belief in a peaceful Marxist-Leninist revolution in Turkey (Yayla, 1989: 250). The consequence was the adoption of an urban-guerilla understanding of political conflict and the foundation of three organizations which marked the period before the 1980 coup: the People's Liberation Front-Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Parti-Cephesi* – THKP/C) led by Mahir Çayan, the Turkish People's Liberation Army led by Deniz Gezmiş and the Workers Peasants Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu* – TİKKO) led by İbrahim Kaypakkaya. These organizations, among others, had a broad repertoire of action including bank robberies, kidnappings, etc.

In contrast to this factionalism within the left- wing, the right was united against the left and the perceived threat of communism. Actually, Islamic oriented right-wing organizations such as the Associations for Struggle with Communism were formed as early as 1962. However, the most effective organization on the right was the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları*), which acted unofficially as the youth organization of the MHP. Landau (1974: 216) claims that far-right militants were demonstrating peacefully until their first violent act on December 31, 1968 when they attacked the leftist students of the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University, an event that was followed by many others. The period before the coup in September 1980 was marked by the clashes between several different factions within the left and the right, mainly represented by the Idealist Hearths.

While students were the main actors on the streets in those years, the 1970s in Turkey also witnessed rising militantism among the workers due to the economic problems that the country was facing. The right to strike and collective bargaining was provided to the labor movement by the 1961 Constitution. Some leftist workers' unions broke away from the pro-government Türk-İş in 1967 over the refusal of the federation to support a strike in İstanbul (Zürcher, 2004: 273) and formed DİSK. Workers, as can be guessed, were mainly involved in strikes but also in other forms of protest events.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter provided background information on the state of politics, economics and social life in Turkey in the 1970s. Turkish politics were marked by deep political and economic crises in the 1970s, as traced in this chapter. Political instability and incapable politicians caused very often changes of governments. Turkey was ruled by ten different governments from 1971 until the coup in September 1980, even though there were only two national elections took place in those years.

The political crisis was accompanied with economic ones, thanks to the oil crisis of 1973-1974, Cyprus intervention and a series of indecisive governments. In addition, internal migration and urbanization caused challenges for the youth. Thus, it is claimed that social and economic changes in the society fostered political mobilization.

Talking about the political life in the 1970s in Turkey, as well as in general, it is not possible to avoid the role of military, who came to consider itself as the guarantee of the Republic and the founding principles of Turkey. The military

made two significant interventions to the political life in Turkey during covered period of this study. While the first one, in the form of a memorandum in 1971, emptied the streets for a relatively short time, the coup held in 1980 reshaped political life in Turkey.

The 1970s in Turkey is also characterized by political violence, which became an aspect of everyday life especially from the mid-1970s; a fact that helped the welcoming of the September 1980 military coup by the general public. While it is generally accepted that there has been an increase in the violent acts in the late 1970s, scholars of Turkish politics do not have a consensus on the exact point of radicalization: for example, while Yayla (1989) argues that the second wave of terrorist movements started in 1973, Sayarı (2010) gives the turning point as 1976 and Ahmad (1993) gives it as 1977. It is this instability and crises environment that will provide the background to the reconstructing and analysis of the cycle of protest of 1970s in Turkey.

Further accounts on the actors, repertoires of action and issues raised by the protestors are provided in the following part of the study, Part III, where the development of the cycle of contention is analyzed in details.

Part III

1970s As a Wave of Protest: Actors, Repertoires of Action and Issues

Chapter 5

Actors and Organizations

As already mentioned in Chapter 2, a cycle of protest is defined as a "phase of heightened conflict across the social system" (Tarrow, 1994: 153). Before moving towards the components of the cycle of protest in Turkey in 1970s, namely the actors, repertoire of action and issues, I would like to present an overview of the cycle itself.

Figure 5.1: Overall development of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



By showing the absolute numbers of protest events, based on the newspaper data, during the covered period in Turkey, Figure 5.1 demonstrates the protest wave very clearly. The hypothesis on the level of mobilization, that it would be lower under military regimes (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 1) is supported by the data presented in this figure. In the periods between 1971 and 1973 and after 1980, the number of protests is insignificant. It increases only after transition to civilian rule. The increase in the number of events in 1974 and the sharp decline in late 1980 is evident. On the other hand the protest wave reached a peak in 1978. The reasons lying behind these dynamics of the wave, such as the general amnesty announced in 1974 and the military coup held in September 1980, were mentioned before in Chapter 4.

This chapter is aimed at revealing the dynamics of the protest wave, and to answer the question how this overall evolution presented in Figure 5.1 has been coming about, based on the analysis of actors who contributed to the emergence and development of the wave. Some of the questions to be answered in this chapter are: Who were the initiators of the wave of protest among these various people/groups using the streets for expressing their demands? How did the mobilization of these various movements evolved in time? As mentioned before, this chapter is focusing on the actors of the cycle, trying to provide background information on their development in relation to the political opportunity structures and information on the organizational dimension. In this regard, it should be mentioned that making separate and comprehensive analysis of each of these movements is beyond the limits of this chapter; rather this chapter is an attempt to provide a background to what will be discussed in the following chapters.

Table 5.1 presents some basic data about the actors of the cycle. At this point, it has to be mentioned that the distinctions presented in Table 5.1 and below during explaining the development of different movements are aiming at an analytical understanding of the movements; thus, it is not claimed that all these movements are separate and unrelated to each other. On the contrary, for example, it is impossible to disregard the students or the Kurdish movement while talking about the left-wing movement in Turkey, as the Kurds engaged in the left-wing movement and were represented in this movement although disproportionally, due to the illegality of explicit Kurdish societies (Gunter, 1988: 393). In addition, the far-right *ülkücü* movement was also composed of students and workers among others. Thus, except for the ideological divide (left vs. right), the distinctions proposed do not claim that all these movements are mutually exclusive of eachother; instead they constitute a complex structure.

Table 5.1: Involvement of various actors in protests events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Year															
Actors	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Total
Students	31.8	5.9	25.0	62.2	58.9	67.0	72.1	60.8	40.3	27.2	9.1	20	0	0	0	57.9
Workers	18.2	76.5	5.0	16.2	22.3	11.6	6.7	6.8	13.3	16.9	0	0	0	11.1	7.7	12.2
Elites	9.1	17.7	18.8	6.8	2.7	4.1	5.6	20	3.1	3.7	0	80	0	22.2	15.4	4.5
Terrorists	4.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	.3	0	11.0	81.8	0	100	66.7	73.1	2.5
General Public	31.8	0	6.3	14.9	9.2	60	8.9	8.5	8.2	14.0	9.1	0	0	0	3.9	8.8
Groups with opposed views	4.6	0	0	0	6.9	11.4	6.7	21.6	35.2	27.2	0	0	0	0	0	140
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of total events	41	28	22	86	357	496	1079	1.147	1053	980	21	8	2	14	27	5361

As mentioned earlier, with the impact and as a result of the developments mentioned in Chapter 4, several groups of actors mobilized in Turkey in the 1970s. While their demands and repertoire of action diversified, it can be claimed that the wave of mobilization of each group presents similar patterns, as it is explained below. Who were the "early risers" (Tarrow 1994) of the wave? The answer to this question is the students, as it can be observed from Table 5.1. However, due to the state repression witnessed during the early years of the 1970s, as a result of the military memorandum, the leading student cadres "left" the streets, at least for a while. As Şafak (2013: 123) writes the labor movement was also repressed after the memorandum but not as harshly as the socialist left. This is why the workers are dominant in 1972 and 1973. Nevertheless, as the wave starts to increase in 1974, as a result of the general amnesty issued in this year, students return to the streets and remained as the main actor of the cycle until the coup held in September 1980. On the other hand, from 1974 to 1977, workers accompany students. The right-wing movement also made its presence felt throughout the cycle, especially in the mid-1970s. However, after the coup "terrorists" emerge as the dominant groups taking on the streets.

5.1. The "Early Risers": Student Movement

Students, as in the cases of Italy and Germany (della Porta, 1995: 47), were the "early risers" of the wave of the 1970s in Turkey. However, student interest in politics in Turkey did not start only in the 1970s; rather it can be traced backed to the Ottoman era (Szyliowicz 1970; Kabacalı 2007). In this era, students were acquainted with political thought in *Darülfunun,* especially of Turkism. Under the Ottoman rule, until the end of the World War I, students organized protest events mainly around the issues of constitutionalism, education and the territorial

integrity of the empire in the form of demonstrations and class boycotts (Kabacalı 2007). They also played an important role during the demonstrations against the occupation of some regions of Anatolia during World War I.

During the Republican era, the first big demonstrations in which the students were involved was carried out in 1924 when the Belgian company running the one-stop subway in İstanbul refused to give a discount to the students as the previous company had done (Szyliowicz 1970; Kabacalı 2007). Four years after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Republic, gave an important role to the youth at the end of his famous "The Speech" (*Nutuk*) (1927), by proclaiming "Turkish youth! Your primary duty is to preserve and to defend the Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic forever. This is the very foundation of your existence and your future". Despite this role devoted to the youth, Szyliowicz (1970: 152) claims that student activities were limited during the first years of the Republican era, while Mustafa Kemal was trying to implement his reforms. Some issues that students protested about in those years included the activities of some other foreign companies, claimed attacks to Turkish people's craves in Bulgaria and the Hatay issue emerged with Syria (Kabacalı 2007). The 1940s in Turkey were the years of the "National Chief" (*Milli Şef*) İsmet İnönü, and rising Fascism-Turanism movements. Thus, the student demonstrations organized in those years were closely related to this current. On the other hand, the left was also organizing among the university youth and getting involved in protests such as hanging a banner between the minarets of famous Süleymaniye Mosque in İstanbul which read as "Saraçoğlu [Prime Minister of the time] is a fascist" (Kabacalı 2007). One of the well-known events of the 1940s is known as *Tan* event (*Tan olayı*). This

was a politically led event staged on December 4, 1945 when some university students in İstanbul attacked offices of various leftist publications and the *Tan* newspaper, which was an opposition circle, during a government-sponsored demonstration (Szyliowicz, 1970: 152). Kabacalı (2007) observes that, between 1946 and 1950, from the establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey to the first multi-party elections, there were several demonstrations organized in order to "combat" communism.

The 1950 national elections play an important role in Turkish politics since the single-party rule of the CHP was overthrown with the victory of the DP, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Although the DP emerged as a political party in favor of economic liberalism and political freedom, in time, it "reverted to authoritarian policies and repression of opposition" (Türsan, 2004: 62); a process that introduced new press laws and new control mechanisms over universities. Subsequently, intellectuals and other modernist segments of the society, including the university youth, alienated from the administration of the time (Szyliowicz, 1970: 152), a fact that helped politicization of students starting from mid-1950s.

Student involvement in politics in the late 1950s gained momentum in the first months of 1960 and opened the way to the military coup held on May 27, 1960. Starting on April 28, 1960, students engaged in mass protest events targeting the DP government as a reaction to its repressive policies, mainly police repression targeting the students and the establishment and activities of Investigation Committees (*Tahkikat Komisyonları*). These committees functioned as a control apparatus of the CHP's political activities, which was in opposition at the time. The demonstrations started in İstanbul, but soon spread to Ankara: On May 5, 1960 students opposing the DP government organized a demonstration in

Kızılay square in Ankara[32]; a protest event that is described as the students' "most dramatic involvement (and) was an important stimulus to the 1960 revolution" (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 257). The last straw on the way to the military coup was the demonstration organized by Military Academy (*Harbiye*) students on May 21, 1960 in Ankara (Alper, 2009: 194).

While the students are said to have opened the path to the military coup of May 27, 1960, the coup itself had important effects on students. With the the coup, students were presented as heroes in the press and among the intelligentsia (Szyliowicz, 1970: 152) and as saviors of the country by the military itself (Alper, 2009: 173). This helped students to gain a high-degree of self-confidence which provided them with legitimacy for their acts when needed (Szyliowicz, 1970: 152; Alper, 2009: 173). Changing the patterns of students mobilization, this situation caused student statements to be more "dynamic, requesting quick action [and] containing warnings, …sometimes even threats" compared to previous statements of students which were more informative (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 258)

However, this was not the only effect of the military coup: the 1961 Constitution, accepted under the military regime, provided the ground for the emergence of an organized student movement, as explained in Chapter 4. The students' major concerns also changed after the military coup: in the period between the transition to multiparty politics in 1946 and the military coup in 1960, "students had been preoccupied with three major issues, anti-communism, which declined rapidly in importance, the protection of the Atatürk reforms and the fight against reaction, and the Cyprus question" (Szyliowicz, 1970: 160). However, from 1960 onwards, they started to get engaged in protests for improvements in

[32] This event is also known as "555 K", a code giving organizational details about the event: "fifth of fifth month at five o'clock at Kızılay square".

the conditions of universities (Neyzi, 2001: 418), and against unpopular teachers, shortages of books, and poor food in university canteens (Roos,Jr.,et al., 1969: 258). They also held politically-led protests by wrecking two newspaper offices in İstanbul and the Justice Party headquarters (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 258). International developments such as the Vietnam issue in 1965, the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966, and Che Guevara's example in Bolivia in 1967, the Arab-Israeli war, and the existence of U.S. military bases in Turkey also started to attract the attention of students (Samim, 1987: 156-7; Alper, 2009: 325). These developments also had an impact on their rhetoric: from the mid-1960s on "(…) words like Congo, Vietnam, neutralism, colonialism, and imperialism (were) frequently encountered in their statements, reflecting the ideological orientation of the majority who can be classified as leftist and anti-American" (Szyliowicz, 1970: 160).

Influenced by the 1968 movement in Europe as well as national developments, the student movement took a different path in June 1968, when university occupations were held all over the country. While press statements, meetings and demonstrations were the main forms of actions adopted by students until 1968 (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 258), they started to adopt an unconventional repertoire from 1968 on; boycotts and occupations became the main forms of action. Relational and non-relational means of diffusion (Tarrow 2005) [33] contributed to the diffusion of the European 1968 movement to Turkey: the establishment of several publishing houses that published translations of several publications concerning the philosophical foundations of socialism, under-development, imperialism, etc. helped cultural improvements of the left-wing

[33] While relational channels refer to interpersonal well-connected trust-based networks, non-relational channels mainly refer to media-like sources including the internet.

students (Uysal 2009) and helped them to get familiar with various revolutionary guerilla movements. In support of this argument Alper (2009: 433) mentions that "(…) such books became bestsellers among the socialist circles" and Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao were among the favored authors (Alper, 2009: 433). Besides non-relational means of diffusion, witnesses of Turkish students studying abroad also facilitated the diffusion of the movement to Turkey (Uysal 2009). Student actions in these years helped to further politicization of students and recruitment of new militants to the socialist students' movement (Alper, 2009: 352). The left-wing student movement was getting more powerful, a fact that alarmed the political right and right-wing students. The right-wing students were gathering around student organizations, such as the National Turkish Students' Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, MTTB), which were the meeting point of the nationalist, conservative youth. Especially from 1965 on, MTTB took a more nationalist stance and started to organize demonstrations against communism. On the other hand, the commando camps, mentioned in Chapter 4, helped increasing militancy among the right-wing students. Clashes between the students coming from these conflicting ideological backgrounds led to a fast radicalization of the student movement in late 1960s.

This new phase of clashes between right and left-wing groups turned to violence. The then government led by Demirel, in early 1971, "was powerless to act to curb the violence on campuses and in the streets" (Zürcher, 2004: 262). It was under these circumstances that the military intervened in politics through the memorandum issued in March 1971. Following the announcement of martial law in 11 provinces in April 1971, mass arrests targeting the leading cadres started: "About 5000 people were arrested, among them many leading intellectuals

(writers, journalists and professors), all the leading members of WPT [TİP] and many prominent trade unionists" (Zürcher, 2004: 259).

The first urban guerilla organizations also emerged out of the left-wing student movement. Thus, in the following I focus more on the Turkish left rather than students in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the actors who took part in the wave of protest of 1970s.

The majority of the leftists who were imprisoned after the 1971 memorandum were released with the general amnesty announced in 1974, after the transition to a normal regime in 1973. Some new organizations, movements, groups and circles were established following the general amnesty. However, the roots of all these organizations of post-1974 period should/can be traced back to the 1960s (Aydınoğlu, 2007: 277), as their strategies are shaped by familiar issues such as the working class mobilization, the increasing assaults of the ultra-nationalists, state repression, and the general revolutionary divisions (Bozkurt, 2008: 51). They were also based on the same, shared cadres. Compared to the 1960s, factionalism within the left became more diverse and complex in the 1970s, due to several factors including the debates regarding the use of violence (Samim, 1981: 73), and the strategies of revolution. In line with revolutionary divisions and differences in political strategies, Samim (1981; 1987: 160) categorizes the left in Turkey in the 1970s into three factions: Sovietists, Maoists and those who preferred to stay out of these two international centers (independents). Socialists were coming from the TİP background and consisted of political parties such as the Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi* – TSİP), the Socialist Revolution Party (*Sosyalist Devrim Partisi* – SDP) and the Turkish Labor Party (*Türkiye Emek Partisi* - TEP). The main Maoist organization was the

Aydınlık group led by Doğu Perinçek. Groups such as the People's Liberation (*Halkın Kurtuluşu*) and the People's Path (*Halkın Yolu*) were also from this branch of Turkish left. The independents, on the other hand, remained the biggest group in numbers. These were people coming from the THKP/C tradition. The Revolutionary Path (*Devrimci Yol* – Dev-Yol) and the Revolutionary left (*Devrimci Sol* – Dev-Sol) and the Liberation (*Kurtuluş*) were the main groups that can be labeled as independents. This picture of the left in Turkey renders a very significant feature of it: division.[34] This division is explained by the features of Turkish politics in general: "(…) the variegated divisions of the Turkish left found a parallel in the traditional instability of parliamentary alliances and succession of governments in Ankara: division is a general feature of Turkish society" (Samim, 1981: 61). In addition to this analysis, we can add the lack of a strong socialist organization after the weakening of TİP as a reason for the division of the left in Turkey. Within groups disputes also existed: "(…), there were more intense and though disputes within the groups who are *on the same par*, rather than the disputes between Soviet and Chinese lines" (Belge, 2007:40).

Continuity in the left-wing movement in Turkey in the 1960s and the 1970s is inevitable, as mentioned above. However, the left of the 1970s has its peculiarities as Aydınoğlu (2007:330) points out: "dominance of the international communist movement, emergence of the 'Kurdish left', shortage of intellectuals, anti-fascist struggle as a new form of political struggle and shortage of organizations". On the other hand, according to some scholars it is possible to make comparisons between two generations based on the "terrorist" organizations (Sayarı 1987; Yayla 1989): according to this comparison, the first generation

[34] Belge (2009: 17) claims that "(…) there has never been a united, coherent left [in Turkey], even in the heyday of its history".

refers to the people involved in political violence in the late 1960s, especially with the fuelling effect of the 1968 movement. But this period was interrupted by the military memorandum held in 1971, when most of the militants/activists were imprisoned. The second generation, refers to the people who got engaged in political violence that started after the general amnesty announced in 1974 and lasted until the coup d'état held in September 1980.[35] In terms of education and social bases, it is claimed that while the first generation was mainly composed of university students who became politicized in the late 1960s (Sayarı 1987), the second generation leaders were no longer students: "[E]ither they had finished or left the university after wasting their time in the necessary "capitalist" education process" (Yayla, 1989: 260), thus they were less educated than the former. Sayarı (1987) points out two other differences among the two waves with regards to the leadership cadres; while the first generation was more interested in ideology and theory, the second generation was more into action than into ideology and theory. Secondly, unlike the first generation, the second generation lacked cult figures such as Deniz Gezmiş although some activists gained publicity. Despite these differences between the leadership cadres of the organizations involved in political violence during both waves of violence, Sayarı (1987: 27) argues that the most significant difference between the two periods was related to the "followers", rather than the "leaders". While most of the followers in the first period were coming from the same subculture, and had a student background, in the second wave the followers were coming from different backgrounds including workers, teachers, free professionals as well as unemployed and they were less educated. Moreover, while the number of female activists was very limited in the first

[35] Sayarı (1987) gives the two periods as 1970-1972 and 1975-190.

period, there was a significant increase in the number of women involved during the second wave. These changes in two generations claimed by scholars give us also a clue on the development of the wave of protests, as one feature of it is accepted as the participation of actors new to conflictual behavior, thus the expansion of conflict to different parts of society (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 610; Tarrow, 1995: 92) .

Over a wave of protest, participation of different groups might differentiate as the wave itself increases and decreases. How did the student mobilization evolved in time? As Figure 5.2 clearly demonstrates, student mobilization within the handled period started to increase by late-1973, increased gradually from 1974 until 1977, and then started to decline.

Figure 5.2: Development of protests organized by students in Turkey, 1971-1986.



Lack of protests in the period from (March) 1971 to 1973 can be explained by the results of military intervention in March 1971, where most of the protestors were imprisoned and martial law was declared; a fact that brought along a lack in

human resources and increased the costs of mobilization. With the transition to civilian rule with the elections held in 1973 and the general amnesty issued in 1974, it is possible to observe an increasing trend in the number of protests organized by students. Student mobilization reached a peak in 1977 when the whole wave of protests also peaked, and started to decline from that point on. This is not surprising considering the ebb and flow of the total numbers of protests in Turkey in the period covered (see Figure 2.1), since the wave started to decline in 1977 although not as sharply as the student mobilization. In addition, it has to be kept in mind that the radicalization of the student movement in late 1970s brought along the labeling of students as terrorists and reporting of the student actions as terrorist activities. The effects of the military regimes, on the other hand, can be clearly observed from the graph: student mobilization could not exist after the military coup held in September 1980.

5.2. The Followers: Labor Movement

Workers, next to the students, were one of the main groups protesting on the streets in the 1970s.[36] The Turkish labor movement developed late compared to the "Western" world, since the founders of the new Republic of Turkey aimed at establishing a new state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, an attempt that was seen to require a certain amount of authoritarianism. The Kemalist vision of state was envisaging a classless, solidaristic society[37], thus the establishment of

[36] While there is no direct link between the labor movement and the student movement, it is generally accepted that they both supported each other's actions and the repertoire of action used by students, such as occupations, diffused through the workers (Koç 1999).

[37] In a speech made before the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk provided an overview of the Kemalist conception of populism: "In my opinion, our nation does not possess various social classes that will pursue interests that are very different from one another and that will, accordingly, come into a state of struggle with each other. The existing classes are necessary and indispensable to one another" (quoted in Bianchi, 1984: 101).

trade unions and workers organizations was banned by law[38] (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992:712). Parallel to this vision, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Turkish state intended at maintaining a domicile labor force (Kahveci cited in Mello, 2007: 212).

Several developments including increasing urbanization, industrialization and the transition to multi-party politics helped the development of labor in Turkey, and the first nation-wide labor unions' federation, Türk-İş, was founded in 1952. However, despite the regime change in 1946 and the change of government in 1950, the Turkish state's attitude against the labor movement did not change until the military coup held in 1960. Despite their differences, CHP and DP, the two parties that marked the pre-1960 period, "adopted a broadly similar approach to economic development, state intervention and policies towards labour and capital" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 726), and thus "tacitly agreed not to make any concessions to the workers" (Ahmad, 1994:142). As a result, workers failed to win any significant rights (essentially the right to strike and to bargain collectively) in the 1950s. On the other hand, the working class was not strong enough to put pressure on the governments' policies.

The new constitution issued in 1961, after the military coup of 1960, can be considered as a milestone for the Turkish labor movement with regards to the rights it provided. Besides accepting the principle of the "social state", the 1961 Constitution granted several social and economic rights for labor, including the right to work, fair wages, the right to establish unions, the right to bargain collectively and to strike, social security.[39]

[38] The Labor Code of 1936 and the Law of Associations of 1938.

[39] There are two articles in the 1961 Constitution, guaranteeing these rights, Article 10 and Article 11. Article 10 read as follows: "Every individual is entitled, in virtue of his existence as a human being to fundamental rights and freedoms, which cannot be usurped, transferred or relinquished.

Besides the 1961 Constitution, the Trade Union Act (Law Number 274) provided freedom of organization to workers and employers. Accepted and coming into force in 1963, this law gave those organizations opportunity to freely operate according to the international norms of freedom of unionism and it provided the necessary legal foundation to strengthen unions in a short time (İleri, 2009: 280). The boundaries of the term "worker" was also changed with this act: not only those working according to a contract of service, but also those making a living with their labor, such as freelance writers, were accepted as workers; a fact that also shaped the union membership. A broad area of activities became available for unions such as deciding strikes or lock-outs, signing collective contracts, establishing cooperatives and training, while the list of banned activities was kept short. Another important feature of the Act is that it allowed unions to support political parties in elections. On the other hand, the check-off application, which helped unions to gain strength in economic terms, was introduced in this act for the first time. According to Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992: 717) both the 1961 Constitution and the law issued in 1963 "aimed at adding new groups to the social bases of politics, that is, setting up pluralist power centers in the form of interest associations over a broad range of ideological, economic and social orientations juxtaposed to the state".

The State shall remove all political, economic and social obstacles that restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in such a way as to be irreconcilable with the principles embodied in the rule of law, individual well-being and social justice. The State prepares the conditions required for the development of the individual's material and spiritual existence". Article 11 read as follows: "The fundamental rights and freedoms shall be restricted by law only in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. The law shall not infringe upon the essence of any right or liberty not even when it is applied for the purpose of upholding public interest, morals and order, social justice as well as national security".

In the meantime, through its bylaws Türk-İş adopted an "non-partisan" position in 1964[40], probably as a reaction to increasing politicization of workers.[41] The second blow to the organizational and ideological hegemony of Türk-İş, after the foundation of TİP, came in 1967 with the foundation of DİSK. This new confederation was founded as a result of initiatives of some unions[42] which were previously affiliated to Türk-İş.[43] The foundation of a socialist confederation "was the expression of a reaction against the old-line corporatist inducements offered to Türk-İş, in return for accepting a subordinate role under the government" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 721). On the other hand, according to Mello (2007: 222) it "(…) illustrated the extent to which a more radical political identity had taken hold within the Turkish working class". DİSK was not the only confederation that split from Türk-İş: following the far-right nationalist party MHP, MİSK was founded in 1970, while a religiously oriented confederation related to the Nationalist Salvation Party, Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (*Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* - Hak-İş), was founded in 1976. Şafak (2013: 122) also claims that from 1976 on the labor movement in Turkey entered a quickened phase of dissolution and disruption. Considering this fact, it can be claimed that the fragmentation and polarization among political parties in Turkey led to a split in trade unions, too. This fact can be read from the names of main confederations':

[40] Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992: 715) claims that "above-party politics" policy of Türk-İş actually dates back to 1950s, the period of DP rule.
[41] TİP was founded in 1961 by 12 union leaders who were once members of Türk-İş.
[42] These five unions are Mineworkers' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası* - Türkiye Maden-iş), the Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Industry Workers' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Petrol, Kimya ve Lastik Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası* - Lastik-İş), Press, Media, Graphic Design and Packaging Industry Workers' Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Basın, Yayın, Grafiker ve Ambalaj Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası* - Basın-İş), Union of Food Industry Workers of Turkey (*Türkiye Gıda Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası* -Türkiye Gıda-İş) and Union of Mineworkers of Turkey (*Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası* - Türk Maden-İş).
[43] Some of these founding unions were expelled temporarily from Türk-İş as a result of a strike in Paşabahçe Crystal Factory in 1966 which was not approved by the confederation itself (Kaleağası Blind, 2007: 294).

instead of naming their organization in accordance with their economic views, they preferred names based on their ideologically led positions, as revolutionary or nationalist, etc. In this regard, it is impossible to read the history of labor movement in Turkey within the handled time period with focusing solely on economic developments. While the general issues leading to workers' mobilization were economic, such as demanding wage increases, rights for collective bargaining, standing against firings and increasing costs of living, workers also mobilized around political issues such as standing up against fascism and fascist repression and against State Security Courts (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi*- DGM). As Ahmad (1994:156) writes, "(t)he struggle was seen as both economic and political and was waged on both fronts". Departing from this point, it can be claimed that increasing militancy, fragmentation and radicalization of the labor movement marked the mid and late 1970s in Turkey (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 718).

Especially after the 1960 military coup and the introduction of the new constitution and new laws regarding the labor, labor activities spread in the 1960s. Several developments such as rapid industrialization and social change in those years (Ahmad 1993), weak coalition governments (Karpat 1973), formation of the TİP in 1961, as well as a growing working-class awareness (Mello 2007) created favorable conditions for this spread. On the other hand, the shift in the political orientation of the center left CHP to a "left of the center" position starting from mid-1960s, the emphasis on "democratic left" from 1972 onwards, and the CHP's major coalition partnership, along with the MSP, in the coalition government

founded in 1974 can also be considered as triggering effects for Turkish labor movement. [44]

One of the most significant protest events of the early 1960s was the workers' meeting at Saraçhane square in İstanbul on the last day of 1961, organized in order to demand official recognition of the right to strike and collective bargaining. This Saraçhane meeting is accepted as a milestone with regards to the workers' demands. On May 3, 1962, "just a few days after a Justice Party minister declared that Turkey had no problem of unemployment" (Karpat, 1973: 273), around 5000 unemployed construction workers gathered in Ankara and walked to the Parliamentary building.[45] Another important event of the early 1960s was the strike of Kavel factory workers in 1963 that lasted for 36 days. The Kavel strike is claimed to have opened the way to the legally granting of labor's right to strike and to engage in collective bargaining (Koç 2003). The events that took place on the 15-16 June 1970 are referred to as "two long days that shook Turkey" (Ahmad, 1994: 154). As explained in Chapter 4, they constitute the peak of the increasing workers' activity in early 1970s: "it was the first time that the working class had acted for an essentially political reason, though declining wages since 1967 were an important factor in their anger and militancy" (Ahmad, 1994: 154).

The 1971 memorandum had a negative effect on the labor movement in Turkey, as it replaced the 1963 Unions Law by a new one. This new law, issued in 1971, outlawed the foundation of union federations, brought in the requirement for workers to be active in their field for at least three years to be qualified to establish a union, and the obligation for unions to represent at least one-third of

[44] Mello (2010) observes a correlation electoral support for the CHP and the rise of support provided by the labor movement throughout the 1970s.
[45] This event is also known as the "march of the hungry" (Koç, 2003: 178).

the workforce in a given sector to become a national federation (Kaleağası Blind, 2007: 294). Besides, the 1961 constitution was amended "so as to deny the right of unionization to public employees" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 723). However, the military regime was not capable of preventing the continuing politicization of workers: although the workers' mobilization remained limited in early 1970s, they remained as the dominant group on the streets in 1972 and 1973 (see Table 5.1 above) and their activity increased again in 1974-1975, after the end of the interim regime. One major event of the late 1970s is the 1977 May Day demonstrations that ended with the death of 37 people as a result of gunshots and mass panic, causing the event to be called as "Bloody May 1st".[46] By gathering around half a million people in Istanbul's Taksim Square, this demonstration "signified the resurgence of the Turkish left following the martial law repression of the early 1970s" (Benhabib, 1979: 17). In this regard, this event might be accepted as a milestone for the labor movement in Turkey. The labor movement increasingly politicized after May Day 1977, and especially in the period 1979-1980 (Şafak 2013). The last turning point for the workers' mobilization before the military coup in 1980 was the austerity program announced on January 24, 1980 (see Chapter 4); the result was mass strikes by the workers in early and mid-1980 that took place until the military coup held in September 1980. The major set-back to the labor movement in Turkey came with the military coup in 1980: activities of DİSK, Hak-İş and MİSK were suspended, strikes and other forms of actions interrupting the industrial activity were banned, and collective negotiations were replaced by compulsory arbitration (Koç 1999). The movement also suffered in human terms as around two thousand members of DİSK were arrested (Mello

[46] See Baykan and Hatuka (2010) for a detailed account of diverse groups' planned entrances to the Taksim Square and the organization of the square.

2010). On the other hand, new legislation, such as the new law on collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs (Law Number 2822), was also used as tools for repressing the labor movement as "strikes were forbidden, social rights abolished, the right to seniority compensation eliminated, collective agreements suspended, and job security, social security, health coverage, and periods of vacation and leave of absence were curtailed" (Kaleağası Blind, 2007: 295). As a result of the repression of the labor movement and the restructuring of industrial relations, the first mass protests after the coup in 1980 were only witnessed nine years later, in 1989, when around 600.000 workers of state enterprises participated in these protests that are also known as "Spring Protests" (*Bahar Eylemleri*) (Dogan 2010). Such mass protests were not witnessed until the protests of TEKEL workers in 2009 and 2010. Thus it is possible to say that Turkey witnessed only two waves of mass workers' mobilization after the coup d'état of 1980: a fact that illustrates the "traumatic" effect of the military coup held in September 12, 1980 on social and political movements in Turkey.

How did the activities of the workers evolve throughout the period covered? Figure 5.3 presents the evolution of the labor movement with regards to the number of strikes. The figure is based on official data, as explained in detail in Chapter 3.

Figure 5.3: Distribution of workers' strikes in Turkey, 1971-1986.



The figure clearly demonstrates the ebb and flow of labor mobilization with regards to workers' strikes organized in Turkey from 1971 to 1986. As mentioned before, as the repressive atmosphere after the military memorandum initially targeted students, the number of strikes remained relatively high in 1971 compared to the two years following it. The effects of repression however become clear in 1972 and 1973 when the number of strikes remained more limited. The level of mobilization starts to increase again in 1974. Several reasons including the economic crisis that erupted in this year, the CHP's dominance in the coalition government and the general amnesty issued the same year can explain this. Starting in 1977, the workers' mobilization increased again and reached a peak in 1980, as a result of the attempts to restructure the economy of Turkey with the 24 January Decisions, as explained earlier. The repressive impact of the military regime established in September 1980 is clear cut as shown in Figure 5.1. As of 1984, after returning back to civilian politics, workers started to strike again.

The data on official numbers of strikes, from 1968 to 2006, presented in Table 5.2, provides a basis to understand the exceptional quality of the period

covered for studying social and political mobilization in Turkey, especially with regards to the labor. 1974, 1975, 1979 and 1980 are the years with the highest numbers of strikes within the time period covered by this study. However, another wave of strikes started by the end of 1986, when the labor movement began to be active again with the strikes in Netaş, Derby and Dora factories (Dogan 2010).

Table 5.2: Official data on numbers of strikes in Turkey, 1963-2005.

Years	Numbers of Strikes	Years	Numbers of Strikes
1968	54	**1987**	307
1969	74	**1988**	156
1970	72	**1989**	171
1971	78	**1990**	458
1972	48	**1991**	368
1973	55	**1992**	98
1974	110	**1993**	49
1975	116	**1994**	36
1976	58	**1995**	120
1977	59	**1996**	38
1978	87	**1997**	37
1979	126	**1998**	44
1980	220	**1999**	34
1981	0	**2000**	52
1982	0	**2001**	35
1983	0	**2002**	27
1984	4	**2003**	23
1985	21	**2004**	30
1986	21	**2005**	34

Source: Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı in Millioğulları (2007: 65, 133).

5.3. Counter Movement: The Idealists (*Ülkücüler*)

The 1970s in Turkey witnessed a mass left-wing movement composed mainly of university youth and workers, as described above. As Koopmans (2004: 27) wrote "(…) successful mobilization by one group may affect, or threaten to affect the interests of another group in such a way that it provokes counter-mobilization or competitive mobilization among the members of that group". Belge (2009:13) claimed in a recent article that "(l)eftist politics cannot exist without a 'rightist' alternative". In this regard, the alternative to the left in Turkey in the 1970s came from the *ülkücü* (idealist) movement, also known as "Grey Wolves", as mentioned before. This movement is composed of far-right militants with strong ties with the MHP. Due to the strong relationship between the MHP and the idealist movement, in the following I shall first provide some background information on MHP and its ideology before giving detailed information about the activities of the Grey Wolves.

MHP is founded in 1969, as the first extreme right-wing party in Turkey that had been founded in 1948 by General Fevzi Çakmak, Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* - CKMP), changed its name, after four years of rule by former colonel Alparslan Türkeş. The ideological stance of the party was shaped by the "Nine Lights Doctrine" (*Dokuz Işık Doktrini*)[47],

[47] "The nine 'lights' or principles are as follows: (1) Nationalism (which not coincidentally comes first), defined as the sentiment feeding the Turkish nation with a desire to raise Turkey to the peak of civilization - safe, prosperous, happy and modernized. (2) Idealism, characterized as the wish to serve one's nation and secure its independence, liberty and well-being. (3) Morality, the basis of society, which ought to conform to local Turkish traditions and beliefs. (4) Social-mindedness, said to comprise the protection and encouragement of free enterprise; the provision of economic incentives to holders of small capital; and statewide organization of social welfare. (5) A Scientific Mentality, encouraging well-planned study and research. (6) Liberalism, guaranteeing all conceivable freedoms, political and otherwise, to every single Turk. (7) Peasant Care that is, according special significance to rural development in schooling, medicine and the modernization of agriculture. (8) Populism, intended to channel all progress and development for the benefit of the nation's overwhelming majority. (9) Industrialization, emphasizing technology and preparing for the nuclear and space era" (Landau, 1982: 601-602).

offered by Türkeş himself, who "embraced an ultranationalist ideology that relied on a combination of pan-Turkist, monoculturalist, authoritarian, anti-communist, and essentialist moralist elements" (Celep, 2010: 390). On the other hand, *ülkücülük* (idealism) is another principle identified with the movement. Having a different connotation than nationalism (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26), *ülkücülük* "signifies the idea of serving one's own state as opposed to a commitment to the prosperity and well-being of a particular ethnic community" (Öniş, 2010: 31). Another component of MHP's ideology is Turkism (*Türkçülük*). Accordingly, power, warfare and militarism, which are seen as the important aspects of a being a Turk, constitute significant motives for the movement. Turkish nationalists usually accept the idea that "warfare is an inherent cultural and even a racial tendency of Turkish nation and that having superior military capability is one of the quintessential and defining characteristic of Turkish identity" (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 23-4). According to this tradition Turkish nation is considered as an army-nation, which is a special ability/capacity of the Turks; a fact that makes the Turkish nation superior to others.

Guided by all these aspects of the Turkish nationalism, the *ülkücü* movement came into existence with the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları*), mainly student and youth organizations established in universities.[48] The foundation of first *Ocak* in 1966 at the Faculty of Law of Ankara University was followed by the *Ocaks* in the Faculty of Language, History and Geography and the Faculty of Agriculture of the same university. In 1968, they started to get organized in every

[48] However, the activities of *ülkücüs* cannot be limited with the *Ülkü Ocakları* since other parts of the society such as the policemen, teachers, and workers had their own *ülkücü* organizations respectively named as Police Union (*Polis Birliği* - Pol-Bir), Association of Idealist Academicians and Teachers (*Ülkücü Öğretim Üyeleri ve Öğretmenler Derneği* - Ülkü-Bir), and MİSK. As in the case of *Ülkü Ocakları*, these organizations also had unofficial ties with the MHP; a fact that can also be read from the title of the case opened against them after the military coup d'état held in 1980: "*MHP ve Ülkücü Kuruluşlar Davası*" (Case of MHP and the *Ülkücü* Organizations).

university. In 1969, Dündar Taşer, the deputy chairman of the MHP, called the MHP youth to unite around the Idealist Hearths, which were unofficially founded in big cities by this time. On December 13, 1970 the Idealist Hearths of Turkey founded a union named the Union of the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Birliği* - ÜOB). At this time, the number of the *Ocaks* was around two hundred.

As mentioned above, the idealists had close ties with the MHP, which is one of the main characteristics of the movement (Sayarı, 2010: 203). While being more radical than the MHP (Bora and Can, 2004: 279), *Ocaks* served as the youth branch of the party. On the other hand, they operate as "schools" where the idealist/nationalist youth is shaped and the future leadership cadres of the party are recruited. Indeed, "(…) throughout the 1970s, Idealist Hearths became the most active party group to recruit new members, especially university students, and served as a school where future MHP leaders and activists acquired organizational and leadership skills" (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26). They also provide the members with a sense of belonging and protection with the help of the nationwide organization and connection (Tepe, 2000:67-8).

Besides serving as a school, the Idealist Hearths also "set the tone of the party's ideological basis" (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26). One main aim of an *ülkücü* is to enlighten and coordinate the people according to idealists' ideas and to get into power by the help of these people (*Ülkü Ocakları* Website, n.d.). Thus, it can be claimed that Idealist Hearths support the indoctrination of youth with the party's ideology (Tepe, 2000:67-8).

On the other hand, the MHP also uses the Idealist Hearths to disseminate the party's ideas and ideology into neighborhoods throughout the country. The Idealist Hearths work in a communal setting and mobilize a wide range of people

for the movement and, as mentioned above, provide a sense of social solidarity among members (Tepe, 2000: 67-8). For example, being from an *Ocak*, or even knowing someone from the *Ocaks* means in daily life that one has a strong and powerful group behind oneself to protect or save one especially from street battles or personal fights. This provides important opportunities especially for the young people and university youth who are coming to big cities from small towns for education and who do not have adequate financial resources.

The *ülkücü* youth or the members of the Idealist Hearths are also known as the "Grey Wolves", as mentioned before. With the empowering of leftist students, the Grey Wolves started to make their presence felt in the streets starting from December 1968 (Zürcher, 2004: 257). As Landau (1982: 594) points out, they were demonstrating, clashing with the leftist youth and marching in the streets in their uniforms, which led them to be called "commandos". They were trained in special camps, organized by the MHP and claimed to provide "a patriotic education" (Celep, 2010: 132) to the participants.

As mentioned above, the Grey Wolves made their existence felt especially from the end of 1968, but their activities and clashes with the left wing students peaked in 1969 and 1970. In those years "(…) the organization was mostly busy with both oral and written propaganda (in frequent seminars and various bulletins, respectively) and, according to their opponents, with anti-left violence" (Landau, 1982: 594). The *ülkücü* movement also felt the negative effects of the military memorandum of March 12, 1971, though not as harshly as the left-wing. The ÜOB was closed down as a result. After transition to civilian rule, in search for new ways of organization, the idealists founded the Association of Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Derneği,* ÜOD) in December 1973. It can be claimed that

their militancy increased in time, especially during 1974-1977 period, a fact that can be explained by the strong alliance between the Grey Wolves and the MHP which was a member of Nationalist Front coalitions. As Ahmad (2008: 252) writes, "the pro-Front media popularised the slogan 'Demirel in Parliament, Türkeş in the Street' and the party's militants (…) began to play an even more active role in the violence". In addition to their alliances in the government, the police and the security forces, who became preservers of the MHP under the Nationalist Front governments, protected and shielded the Grey Wolves even under the CHP rule (Zürcher, 2004: 263). They got involved in violent acts; with an effort to legitimize these acts it was frequently indicated that the *ülkücü* youth was helping the state and the government in their struggle with so-called anarchism by using violence. According to the *ülkücü* movement, the country's situation in those years was so serious that without a militaristic and violence-oriented *ülkücü* reaction to communist forces between 1960s and 1980s, the Turkish state and nation could have vanished (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 25-6). This was in line with MHP's concerns about "a communist takeover by either the Soviet Union or 'collaborators' inside" (Celep, 2010: 132). As Ağaoğulları (1998: 232) indicates, violent events helped the MHP and the *ülkücü* movement to reproduce their ideology which is, as mentioned above, based on violence, as in a vicious circle.

How did their activities evolve in time? Figure 5.4 demonstrates the evolution of actions carried out by actors with a far-right ideological engagement[49] over years, during the covered period. Thus, the graph shows the activities not only of students, but also far-right workers, civil servants, etc.

[49] The graph presents data about far-right militants, as it was not possible to track *ülkücüs* in the newspaper articles.

Figure 5.4: Development of protest events organized by far-right militants in Turkey, 1971-1986.



It is worth noting that the figure is almost identical with the one demonstrating the actions carried out by actors with a rightist political orientation. In support of the analysis above, we can observe an increase in the actions starting from 1975 to 1977, when the MHP was a coalition partner of the first Nationalist Front government and in their longest time of rule. However, on the other hand, the level of mobilization decreased gradually starting from 1977, as in the student movement. The military coup in 1980 crushed the *ülkücü* movement as well; it was also repressed and sent to the courts and jails "for attempting to seize control of the state through anti-democratic means and establishing a dictatorship in the country" (Celep, 2010: 132).

After providing information on the emergence and the development of the main actors of the cycle of protest, let me conclude by providing data on the organizational structures of these movements. What kind of organizations did these actors rely on? Table 5.3 provides information about the involvement of organizations in protests events in Turkey in the period covered. While the

number of observations related to organizations is low compared to the total observations on protest events (n=779), it can still give us some clues about participating organizations.

Table 5.3: Organizations involved in protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Year														
Organizations	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Illegal Organizations	10.0	5.0	0	0	0	1.0	3.7	5.2	25.0	24.6	60.0	50.0	0	0	0
Associations	10.0	10.0	0	10.7	22.1	31.3	22.9	40.9	18.2	1.5	0	0	0	0	0
Other SMOs	20.0	5.0	0	3.6	16.8	24.0	21.9	21.4	23.9	27.5	40.0	50.0	100	0	0
Political Parties	10.0	5.0	18.2	21.4	12.6	11.5	33.9	13.6	8.0	10.1	0	0	0	66.7	50.0
Unions	50.0	60.0	63.6	46.4	44.2	29.2	10.9	14.3	18.2	29.0	0	0	0	16.7	50.0
Chambers/Benches	0	15.0	18.2	17.9	4.2	3.1	6.8	4.6	6.8	7.3	0	0	0	16.7	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	10	20	11	28	95	96	192	154	88	69	5	2	1	6	2

The dominance of labor unions in the first five years of the wave is striking. Besides the fact that workers were active during the first years of the wave, we should also consider the ease of identifying involving labor unions for the newspaper reporters. After a decrease for a couple of years, union activity increases again in 1980, as the workers were involved in protests against the 24 January decisions. Associations, on the other hand, take the role of the unions from 1977 to 1980. Student associations are the most frequent form of this category. Political parties become dominant in 1977, as a result of the elections held in this year. Since the political parties are organizations running for office, they are organizing meetings, demonstrations, and other protest events especially in the election years. Illegal organizations, on the other hand, are dominant during the last two years before the 1980 military coup and during 2-3 years following it, which reveals the extent of violence used during this period.

It is also possible to read the effects of the military coup of 1980 from the table. As is obvious, the coup closed the door for "legal" organizations and politics, and those who remained active under the military regime were the more radical ones. On the other hand, after transition to a non-military regime in 1984, we do observe the resurgence of political activities of conventional political actors such as political parties and unions, although their activity also remains very limited until the mid-1980s; a fact that can be explained by the repressive character of the military regime established after the coup.

5.4. Conclusion

The chapter elaborated on the emergence and development of various actors that were dominant on the streets during the 1970s in Turkey. It is claimed in the chapter that thanks to the 1961 Constitution various movements based on diverse

political ideologies in Turkey flourished, a fact that opened the ground for mass student mobilization including both the high-school and university youth. The students, who were presented as "heroes" after the military coup in 1960, were the "early risers" of the wave of protest as the chapter revealed. However, some organizations and groups among the students lost their belief in the parliamentary politics as a result of the defeat of TİP in 1969 elections and radicalized. Student mobilization gained momentum after the general amnesty in 1974, peaked in 1977 and harshly declined after the coup in 1980.

The student movement that started to use unconventional after 1968 also triggered the labor movement that was underdeveloped compared to its Western counterparts at the beginning as a result of the classes society envisaging of the founders of the state. Both the 1961 Constitution and the Trade Union Act introduced in 1963 enabled labor to engage in politics in various forms. The labor remained as the main actor on the streets after the memorandum in 1971 and started to increasingly politicize after bloody May Day demonstration in 1977. The military coup also crushed the labor movement.

The empowerment of these left leaning movements constitutes a reason for the emergence and development of the right-wing *ülkücü* movement, among other reasons such as the opportunities opened by the 1961 Constitution. On the other hand, the formation of the Nationalist Front governments starting in 1975 and the developments following it such as the setting up of their own cadres in the police force supplied strong alliances to the *ülkücü* movement, which facilitated the further strengthening and radicalization of the movement.

In sum, it can be claimed that certain developments in the political arena such as the rights introduced by the 1961 Constitution and relevant laws, defeat of

the socialist TİP in 1969 elections, general amnesty announced in 1974, alliance structures especially of the right-wing movement helped emergence and development of these movements in Turkey in the 1970s.

Chapter 6

Repertoires of Action

After explaining the actors of the cycle, this chapter is examining the repertoires of actions of these actors. Described as one of the two main characteristics of a cycle of protest (Tilly 1978), repertoires are of significant importance to analyze cycles of protest. Differentiation of types of protests used among time (evolution throughout the wave of protest) and actors (differentiation among the left and right-wing organizations/groups), correlation between changes in the repertoire used and political developments in Turkey in 1970s, radicalization of the wave and mass use of violent events are among the topics to be covered in this chapter. Before addressing these topics, however, the operationalization of the concept of repertoires of action for the current study and general overview of the set of forms of actions used in Turkey in 1970s will be elaborated.

Tarrow (1995: 97) writes that "in each period of history some forms of collective action are sanctioned by habit, expectations, and even legality, while others are unfamiliar, unexpected, and are rejected as illegitimate by elites and the mass public alike". During the 15-years period covered in this study, social movement organizations and participants in Turkey used a variety of forms of actions, ranging from petitions to demonstrations, strikes to bombings. These various forms of actions can be categorized in different ways. This study is based

on Kriesi et al.'s (1995) work with regards to the categorization of forms of actions. Kriesi et al. (1995: 266-267) used a pre-structured list of forms including five categories of overarching strategies: conventional, direct-democratic, demonstrative, confrontational and violence. According to their categorization conventional strategies include juridical (administrative, civil and criminal lawsuits, etc.), political (lobbying, letters to politicians, voting advice, etc.) and media-directed (leaflets, press conferences, tribunals, etc.) forms of actions. Direct-democratic strategies include people's initiatives and referendums, while demonstrative strategies cover petitions, rallies, demonstration/protest marches, and festivals. Confrontational strategies are grouped into two sub-categories: legal confrontational acts such as boycotts, hunger strikes, and burning in effigy and illegal confrontational acts such as illegal boycotts, and occupations. Finally, violent strategies are also distinguished into two groups: light and heavy violence. While light violent acts include limited property damage, theft, threats to people, heavy violence includes bombings, political murders and kidnappings. However, of course, the list of actions they used is modified for the Turkish case (i.e. by omitting the direct-democratic actions).

6.1. Violent Protests

Based on the Italian cycle of protest between 1965 and 1975, Tarrow (1989: 69) writes that "cycles of protest are made up of both disruptive mass movements and conventional repertoires of collective action, but most people's actions are closer to conventional politics than to violence". The data presented in Table 6.1 demonstrates that this is not the case in Turkey: around 71 percent of the events coded for this study employed violence, mostly in heavy forms. As it is generally

argued and accepted, the period covered is marked by mass violence.[50] This data support the hypothesis on the radicalness of the cycle with regard to the repertoire of action (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 5).

Table 6.1. Frequency of the forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986.

	Forms of Action Used	**(in %)**
Conventional	Media-directed	6.7
	Political	1.5
	Juridical	.2
Unconventional	*Demonstrative*	8.7
	Confrontational	.5
	Illegal	40
	Legal	3.9
	Strikes[51]	3.2
	Violence	
	Heavy Violence	69.2
	Light Violence	2.1
Total		100
N		5.360

Violence became a feature of daily life and politics in Turkey, especially from mid-1970s on, as already explained in Chapter 4. It is estimated that more than 5000 people lost their lives as a result of violent acts from 1976 to 1980 (Sayarı 2010). In fact, violence was said to be the cause of the military coup d'état in September 1980. Thus, in order to understand the development of the wave and the dynamics of institutionalization and radicalization, it is important to understand the use of violence in Turkey during the period covered.

Understanding the social and political developments at the origin of the massive use of violence is essential. What were the reasons of the intense use of

[50] It should be noted that this is not a fact exclusive for Turkey: violence escalated during cycles of protest in Italy, Germany, Northern Ireland and in the Basque countries in late 1960s and in early 1970s (Della Porta, 2008: 222).
[51] The data used here is the one gathered by the review of the newspaper archive.

violence during the wave of protest? I will try to answer this question before elaborating the details of the violent events coded for this study.

6.1.1. Reasons for the use of political violence in Turkey in the 1970s

There are some scholars who explain the existence of violence[52] in the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s by referring to more cultural reasons, such as Mardin (1978) who explains the events started in 1968 (first wave of political violence) based on the university youth who were subjected to cultural dislocations and who were torn between the rural traditions and modern social behavior. Orlow (1982), in a similar approach, refers to the modernization process of Turkey and the Kemalist legacy as the main sources of political violence.

Besides cultural explanations, some scholars emphasize the importance of socio-economic developments that the state was witnessing, such as urbanization caused by large-scale migration to cities (Sayarı and Hoffman 1994; Keleş and Ünsal 1982). *Gecekondu* (shantytowns) districts emerged as a result of this migration. It is argued that they facilitated the escalation of political violence by causing alienation among young people (Orlow 1982), by providing anonymity (for example, establishment of "liberated zone"s) and hiding places for militants, and by providing human resources since these districts became main sources for recruitment (Sayarı 2010).

[52] In the current study, an operational definition of violence based on the forms of action is used; those protest events are considered to be violent in which at least one violent form of action is used. As mentioned above, the scheme used in the work of Kriesi et.al. (1995: 268) is adapted for the current study: accordingly the range of violent forms of action involves light violence including limited property damage, theft, burglary, threats to persons, violent demonstrations (if initiated by the movement), etc. and heavy violence includes physical violence against persons (including political murders and kidnappings), bombings, fire attacks and other severe property damage, sabotage. In order to adapt this scheme which is mainly used to analyze mobilization in Western Europe to the Turkish case, we should also include violent confrontations between members of opposing political groups adapting different or same political orientations into the violent forms of actions.

Adaptation of radical ideologies is also referred to as a source of escalating political violence. While most of the scholars supporting this argument refer to the Marxist ideologies (such as Sayarı 2010) which are claimed to channel the students into actions against the state, we should also mention the role of far-right ideologies: as we have seen the ideology of the idealist movement in Turkey was based on violence (Ağaoğulları, 1998: 232), and shaped by Turkism, in which the Turkish national character is described through power, warfare and militarism (Altınay and Bora 2002). However, the existence of ideologies justifying violence does not necessarily bring along use of political violence. As Della Porta (1995) shows based on the German and Italian cases of the 1970s, it is only with the triggering impact of political opportunities that extremist ideologies engender violent acts.

Besides the ideological orientations, alliance structures of groups might also affect the choice of action repertoire. In this regard, it is generally expected that protest events of a group with strong allies would be less violent than groups without powerful allies, since they have more access to the system and would prefer non-violent actions to make their voice heard. However, if we think in a different way, these groups are able to use more radical and violent types of actions since their allies can provide them more space for using a radical repertoire to reach their goals. Considering the period covered, it can be stated that the right wing groups were more likely to find allies, at least all the governing parties of the period except one had nationalist-conservative tendencies. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the radical right protesting groups are more likely to employ higher levels of political violence than the left-wing groups since their strong allies might overlook their radical activities (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 3b).

Table 6.2 presents data confirming the hypotheses: the majority of the violent events (52 percent) were carried out by right-wing groups, as was also the case for the Italian wave of protest of 1966-1973 (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 622). Left-wing groups follow the right-wing ones with a share of almost 40 percent. On the other hand, according to the data, Islamists and Kurdish groups[53] were involved at lower levels of violence compared to left and right wing groups. The low share of Kurdish groups involved in violence might seem surprising at first as Kurds did not refrain from using violence; the reason for this can be the fact that the Kurdish movement distinguished itself from the left-wing movement in late 1970s and was not very active until 1984.

Table 6.2: Ideological orientations of actors involved in violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Orientations of actors involved in violence	**(in %)**
Rightists	52.0
Leftists	39.7
Kurdish groups	4.5
Islamists	3.8
Total	100
N	421

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the Turkish left was highly factionalized. This factionalism deepened after the general amnesty issued in 1974. According to Sayarı (2010: 205) factionalism among the left-wing militants was also an important source of escalation of political violence: "Each new factional conflict

[53] While the Kurdish movement started to flourish in 1970s, especially in early 1970s it was considered as a part of the socialist left-wing movement. The actors are coded as "Kurdish groups" when there was an overt reference to their Kurdish identity.

pushed the militants toward greater activism in their efforts to receive more media attention than the other groups". This fact can also be explained by collective identity building, since "violent action helps to strengthen collective identity by providing a context in which the group can – and in fact must – count" (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 628). This is also relevant given the fact that all these organizations that emerged after the 1974 general amnesty were claiming to be the successors of previous organizations. It should also be noted that some of the left-wing groups, before the military memorandum in 1971, were hoping for a revolution with the support of some of the military officials (see Chapter 4). However, after the memorandum and repression following it, they lost their confidence in these military cadres. By contrast, the right-wing movement became more powerful in the arena left empty with the imprisonment of most of the leading left-wing cadres. Thus, the political arena after the release of these cadres in 1974 was far more different than early-1970s. It is generally accepted that an opening in the political system would lead to more moderate politics. In the case of Turkey, the 1974 general amnesty constituted such an opening, as the leading cadres of the movements were released. However, due to the reasons explained above this opening prepared the ground for radical politics and armed struggle.

These points might be sufficient for explaining the use of political violence. However, they are inadequate in explaining the "timing" of political violence in Turkey in the 1970s. One major explanation for the use of political violence in Turkey in the late 1960s and in 1970s in fact is the defeat of the TİP in 1969 elections. As mentioned before on Chapter 4, this defeat was a result of both the disputes within the party and the change in the electoral law made in favor of larger parties in 1968. This defeat in 1969 further deepened the factionalism

within the party in particular and the Turkish left in general: the party's leading cadres were pursuing a parliamentary road to reach socialism, but the defeat created disappointment among the left-wing youth who were already influenced by the MDD line, that blamed the TİP leadership as being pacifists. As a result, the youth lost confidence in parliamentary politics. In this regard it can be claimed that the exclusive political system in Turkey created a favorable environment for radicalization and played a catalytic role for escalating violence among young people (Orlow 1982; Sayarı 1987; Yayla 1989). This first wave of political violence came to an end with the measures taken by the interregnum after the military intervention in March 1971. As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, the number of violent events started to increase in 1973, after the transition to civilian rule. However, a significant increase is observed in 1974, when the general amnesty that led to the release of most of the former militants was announced. Thus, again, it can be claimed that an opening in the political system helped the increase of overall mobilization and eventually to an increase of violence. On the other hand, the hypothesis about the level of violent events under the military regimes (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 6) is disconfirmed by this data, as the numbers of violent events are insignificant in these periods.

Figure 6.1: Numbers of violent protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



Della Porta (2008: 224) points out that "(e)ncounters between the movements and the state apparatuses produced radicalization in a wide variety of movement cases". It is also true for the encounters between conflicting movements, such as the left and right-wing groups in Turkey. In this regard, clashes between rival groups of both left and right wing groups contributed to the escalation of political violence in Turkey. In particular, the empowerment of the right-wing groups, which already started to employ violence against their opponents in the late 1960s, contributed to the use of violence. In line with hypothesis 3b, their empowerment was a result of their alliances with the political elite, an important feature of the POS and the political environment as explained in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the level of mobilization of a movement that has strong allies would increase. The existence of a powerful external ally, namely the MHP, helped the idealist movement in its motivation. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the MHP became a strong coalition partner in 1975 with the establishment of the first Nationalist Front government. Among some other ministries, the MHP was controlling the ministry responsible for the activities of intelligence services (Sayarı, 2010: 203),

the Ministry of Education and the system of State Teacher Training Schools (Mardin, 1978: 234). As Sayarı (2010: 203) puts it, "many right-wing militants were implicated in numerous terrorist incidents during the period from 1976 to 1980". Accordingly, MHP's major partnership in two Nationalist Front governments that ruled the country in two different terms between 1975 and 198 can also be used as an explanation of the escalating political violence in mid-1970s.

6.1.2. Violence as a Political Means-Presentation of Data

Analyzing cycles of protest is also useful for understanding the development of political violence, since it is one of the most frequent outcomes of a cycle (Della Porta, 2008: 222). The overall development of the wave of protest according to violence and other forms of actions used is shown in Figure 6.2; the data presented here give us clues about the outcome of the wave of protest. As can be traced from the figure**,** 1974 is the year when the use of all forms of actions increased. The significance of this year for Turkish politics in the period covered is explained above. On the other hand, 1977 emerges as the year when the use of non-violent forms of actions (conventional, confrontational and demonstrative) peaked. The escalation of violent events is parallel to the development of the wave of protest itself: the number of violent events starts to increase in 1974, peaks in 1978, when the clashes between various groups with diverse ideological orientations intensified and declines sharply in 1980, with the effect of the military coup in September 1980. The dominance of violent events throughout the whole wave of protest is striking, as it contradicts the expectation that a cycle would radicalize towards its end. In the Italian case of the late 1960s and early

1970, for example, violence was the outcome of the cycle; the use of violence only increased towards the end of the cycle (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 616; Tarrow, 1989: 297). In the Turkish case, although use of more violent forms of actions increase towards the end as well (see Chapter 8), violence tends to appear from the beginning. This can be explained by the repressive character of the military regime after the 1971 memorandum, the increase in the number of organizations established after the general amnesty announced in 1974 which contributed to the increasing factionalism, and the loss of confidence in the parliamentary politics, especially among the left-wing youth. Figure 6.2 also clearly shows the sharp decrease in the use of all forms of actions after 1980, which is a result of the repressive regime established by the military coup in September 1980. In sum, it can be maintained that the figure demonstrates the "radical" character of the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s.

Figure 6.2: Use of violence and other forms of actions in Turkey, 1971-1986.



What kind of violence was used more frequently in Turkey? Answering this question would help us to understand the scope of violence used. As already

shown in Table 6.1, heavy violence is dominant among the vast majority of violent events. Table 6.3 shows us the distribution of different forms of violent events. According to the table, 33.7 percent of the violent events event took the form of shootings. Shootings were followed by clashes between groups with a 28.7 percent share and by bombings which constituted 21.5 percent of the violent events.

Table 6.3: Frequency of violent forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Forms of violence	**(in %)**
Shooting	33.7
Clash	28.7
Bombing	21.5
Attack	8.1
Other violence targeting people	5.5
Other violence targeting objects	2.6
Total	100
N	3.825

Who was responsible for the violent events is another question to be answered in order to understand the wave of protest and use of mass violence. Table 6.4 demonstrates the actors of the violent acts. According to the data presented in the table, almost 63 percent of the violent events are carried out by students, as was also the case in the Italian wave of protest from 1966 to 1973 (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 621). This shows that even though the students were the early-risers of the cycle and somehow triggered the mobilization of the labor movement, the labor movement did not mobilize using violent forms of actions. The first explanation for this might be the alienation of the students, "impatient for

revolution, eager to retaliate against right-wing terror" (Benhabib, 1979: 17) as they are, from the workers. In addition, compared to students, workers were provided with more structural access to the decision making processes, at least within the industrial relations, through collective bargaining that became centralized in 1963 (Şafak, 2013: 136). The second highest share among the violent events can be attributed to the groups with opposed views, which makes sense since the newspaper articles refer to them when there is a violent encounter between diverse groups. The low share of "terrorists" among those using violent forms of actions is not surprising since militants engaging in social movements were referred as "terrorists" only after the military coup in September 1980. Thus, "terrorists" only existed from 1981 to 1986, a relatively short period of time when the whole cycle of protest is considered.

Table 6.4: Actors involved in violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Actors	**(in %)**
Students	62.9
Groups with opposed views	260
Terrorists	4.3
General public	3.8
Workers	2.8
Elites	.2
Total	100
N	1094

The ideological background of the people who started violence and/or were involved in violent events has long been a point of dispute in the literature on Turkey. While some claim that it was the left-wing students who started violent acts which were followed by the right-wing students, some other scholars claim

the opposite that it was the left-wing students who were defending themselves against the fascist attacks. In this regard, the ideological orientations of the people who were involved in violence is an important point to probe. On the other hand, considering the effects of alliance structures both on mobilization and the choice of repertoire of both left and right wing groups, the ideological orientations of the perpetrators of the violent events is also relevant for social movements. Thus, in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the violence used in Turkey in 1970s and the actors of the cycle of protest, we should provide more detailed information on the relationship between the ideological background of protestors and the forms of violence used.

The distribution of violent acts according to different ideological orientations of actors over time is shown in Figure 6.3. According to the figure, in the period following the military memorandum issued in March 1971, left-wing groups held a number of violent events, possibly in reaction to the repression caused by the intervention. However, from the end of 1973 to the end of 1978, violent events are mostly attributed to the right-wing groups. This provides further evidence for the hypothesis that the strong alliances in the government led the way to the radicalization of the right-wing groups, since it was the Nationalist Front governments, who ruled Turkey for almost 3.5 years of this period. On the other hand, the period from the late 1978 until the coup of 1980 is dominated by left-wing violence, which can also be explained by alliance structures since it was the CHP government who ruled the country from January 1978 to December 1979. However, increasing factionalism within the left and attacks by right-wing groups might also explain this situation. A militant of Dev-Yol, for example, narrates that especially after 1975/6 all left-wing groups started to arm themselves (Houston,

2013: 56). In this regard, it can be claimed that out of the two competing hypotheses on the use of violence by right-wing groups the latter (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 3b) is supported by this data, as right-wing groups are more likely to employ violence.

Figure 6.3: Numbers of violent protest events according to ideological orientations of actors in Turkey, 1971-1986.



As already mentioned, the scope and targets of violence and violent events vary. What kind of violence were these groups with different ideological backgrounds involved in? Table 6.5 shows the involvement of groups with different ideological stances in different kinds of violence. Accordingly, left-wing groups are more likely to get involved in clashes, bombings and violent acts targeting objects, while right-wing groups are more likely to use attacks and other kinds of violence targeting people.

Table 6.5: Forms of violence used according to the political orientations of actors in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Ideological Orientations of Actors			
Forms of violence	Leftists	Rightists	Islamists	Kurdish groups
Other violence object	10.6	4.2	6.3	0
Other violence people	6.0	26.1	12.0	0
Attack[54]	6.1	34.2	6.3	0
Bombing	9.1	2.8	19.0	0
Shooting	19.7	15.0	25.3	25.8
Clash	48.4	17.8	31.0	73.7
TOTAL	99.8	100	100	99.5
N	168	219	16	19

This fact that leftist actors are more involved in clashes is not surprising considering the factionalism within the left. This factionalism, explained in Chapter 5, caused left-wing groups to get involved in violent encounters with right-wing adversaries as well as with their counterparts within the left-wing. Bombings are another form of violent events mostly used by left-wing groups or actors. Mainly represented by the idealist movement, right-wing groups on the other hand employ more violence targeting people. The fact that the idealist organizations' "explicit purpose" is "confronting and containing growing left-wing militancy" (Benhabib, 1979: 16) might help explaining this situation. Since their ultimate goal was to protect the state against the threat of communism, they positioned themselves against the left-wing youth instead of raising claims. In this regard, Ağaoğulları (1987: 204) claims that the violence exercised by idealists followed several stages: "until 1974, it had been staged in universities and other institutions of higher education, and had targeted revolutionary youths. After the

[54] Attacks are coded as they were presented and used in the newspaper articles (i.e. when the wording used in the article was "attack"), when no further information was provided about the essence of the violent act.

RPP [CHP] rose to power (…) the attacks extended to its members, as well as such leftist professional organizations (…). Later still, the guns were turned toward prominent journalists (…), unionists (…), university faculty (…), party leaders (…), and others. (…) Finally, terrorism acquired mass proportions as religious-reactionary circles were instigated to violence against *Alevi*s and "leftists" (including the RPP [CHP]) in Malatya, Sivas, and Kahraman Maraş in 1978 and in Çorum and some other locations in 1980".

What were the targets and goals of violent events? It is important to answer this question to elaborate the scope of violence used in Turkey in 1970s.

Violent events most frequently target buildings and vehicles with around a 42 percent share as Table 6.6 demonstrates. Among people, representatives of the state, including civil servants, security forces and some of the elites are the most prevalent targets of violent acts. The data presented here, however, contradicts the observation of Sayarı (2010:205) that "the violence against the representatives of the state was primarily directed at the security forces". On the other hand, his distinction between the sources of violence against different branches of security forces in Turkey is important: accordingly, Kurdish separatist groups were targeting army and the gendarmerie, while left-wing groups were targeting policemen and their stations in cities (Sayarı, 2010: 205). This is not surprising when the organizational structure of Turkish security forces and the area of activity of different organizations are considered: Army and gendarmerie in Turkey are usually in charge of rural areas where Kurdish guerilla groups operate, whereas the police force is responsible for urban areas.

Table 6.6: Targets of violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Targets	**(in %)**
Buildings and vehicles	41.9
Elites	12.3
Students	11.8
Civil servants	9.4
Workers	7.0
Security forces	5.3
Professionals	4.9
General public	3.7
Self employed	3.6
Employer	0
Total	100
N	2.415

Besides the targets, the issues raised during violent events tell us about the motives lying behind these acts. As mentioned above, most frequent forms of violence in Turkey during the period covered are shootings and clashes, which accounts for the fact that we know very little about the issues involved in these acts, as they are generally exercised in reaction to a previous attack without making some explicit claims. As a result, the number of violent events, in which it was possible to determine the goal or issue raised, is very low (n=108). Table 6.7 shows that while students were involved in 63 percent of the total violent events, a relatively small amount of violent events (around 7 percent) were motivated by issues related to education. Violence is more likely to occur when there is a commemoration or death anniversary (20.4 percent). Goals that are related to daily politics, politics of governments are also expressed in a violent way (18.5 percent).

Table 6.7: Goals of actions involved violence in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Goal of action	**(in %)**
Commemoration/anniversaries	20.4
Political	18.5
Murders/attacks	14.8
Repression	14.8
Social	13.0
Educational	6.5
Economy/labor policies	4.6
International	4.6
Ungrouped	2.8
Total	100
N	108

The relationship between the use of different forms of violence and various issues raised during protests is presented in Table 6.8. The data presented demonstrates that bombings are most frequently used during commemoration events or anniversaries. The clashes between security forces and countermovements and first generation left-wing actors and the repressive military regime established after the memorandum issued in 1971 contributed to the creation of "martyrs" among the left-wing movement, such as prominent student leaders such as Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Arslan and Mahir Çayan. Thus, the left-wing movement organized commemoration events on the death anniversaries of these "martyrs". While the right-wing movement had its own "martyrs", organizing commemorations was a more frequent event for the left-wing. This fact would help us explain the frequent use of bombings by left-wing actors, as they were organizing commemorations more frequently.

Table 6.8: Forms of violence used according to goals of action in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Forms of Violence					
Goal of Action	Other violent act targeting object	Other violent act targeting people	Attack	Bombing	Shooting	Clash
Political	16.0	41.7	0	11.1	33.3	18.2
Educational	8.0	8.3	9.1	0	0	9.1
Economy/ Labor Policies	4.0	0	0	0	0	12.1
International	12.0	0	0	5.6	11.1	0
Murders/ Attacks	2.0	8.3	27.3	0	11.1	18.2
Repression	8.0	25.0	9.1	5.6	33.3	18.2
Commemoration/ Anniversaries	2.0	0	0	66.7	11.1	12.1
Social	12.0	0	45.5	11.1	0	12.1
Ungrouped	0	16.7	9.1	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	25	12	11	18	9	33

6.2. Other Unconventional Forms of Actions

The cycle was not solely composed of violent events of course. While not as frequent as violent acts, conventional and other unconventional forms of actions (including demonstrative, confrontational actions and strikes) compose 28.7 percent of the total events. In the following part, I focus more on these forms of actions starting from unconventional ones.

Unconventional forms of actions consist of demonstrative, confrontational and violent acts as well as strikes. Table 6.1 showed that the violence has the highest share among the unconventional forms of action. Demonstrative and confrontational actions, on the other hand, follow violence with shares of respectively 9.5 percent and 9.1 percent. Strikes, according to the newspaper data,

turn out to be the least frequent actions among the unconventional ones; they only consist 3.5 percent of unconventional events and 3.2 percent of total events. However, it should be kept in mind that the newspaper data is biased towards strikes (see Chapter 3).

Demonstrative forms of actions include marches, demonstrations, public assemblies/rallies, etc. according to the classification of Kriesi et al. (2005). Table 6.9 presents the frequency of demonstrative acts: 30.8 percent of the demonstrative events are composed of marches, while demonstrations constitute 17.5 percent and meetings 13.3 percent of the demonstrative events. Forums, which were organized mainly by students as a mechanism of collective decision making, are also significant with a share of 7.9 percent.

Table 6.9: Frequency of demonstrative actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Demonstrative Forms of Actions	**(in %)**
March	30.8
Demonstration	17.5
Meeting	13.3
Others	12.8
Forum	7.9
Pirate march	7.9
Funerals	5.3
Pirate demonstration	4.5
Total	100
N	468

Confrontational forms of actions, on the other hand, compose 8.4 percent of total events. As mentioned above, Kriesi et al. (1995) group confrontational strategies into two sub-categories: legal and illegal confrontational forms of actions. In the Turkish case, boycotts, especially class boycotts organized by students, constitute the largest share of confrontational acts with almost 40 percent, as shown in Table

6.10. Raids, which might target a meeting, a workplace, or a dormitory of a group with opposing views constitute the second highest share after boycotts with around 20 percent.

Table 6.10: Frequency of confrontational actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Confrontational Forms of Actions	**(in %)**
Boycotting classes	36.4
Others	21.4
Raid	20.3
Occupation	14.7
Hunger strike	4.0
Boycott	3.1
Total	100
N	448

The overall development of demonstrative and confrontational events is shown in Figure 6.4. As can be traced from the figure, the demonstrative acts increased in the first phase of the protest wave. However, they presented a decreasing tendency after 1977, a year where the whole wave peaked. There are two similarities that this curve shares with the curve of demonstrative actions: one is the relatively low levels of numbers of events in the periods under the military rules (from 1971 to 1974 and from 1981 to 1986), and the peak point at 1977. While the general tendency for conventional (see Figure 6.6 below) and demonstrative events were an increase from 1974 up until 1977 and a decline following the peak point until the military coup, the number of events in which confrontational forms of ations were used as the main forms presents an up and down trend.

Figure 6.4: Number of demonstrative and confrontational protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



Strikes are another category of unconventional forms of actions, the most common and effective "tools" of workers. However, as shown in Table 6.1 the share of strikes, according to the newspaper data, in the wave of protest is not very important compared to other forms of actions. This is surprising given that the workers were accompanying students in the streets. Two reasons for this can be provided: the first one is the selection bias of *Milliyet* towards strikes – which is explained in detail in Chapter 3, the second reason refers to the expansion of the cycle of protests that led to the use of various forms of actions by various social groups. Thus workers were not exclusively involved in strikes but also in other forms of actions ranging from conventional to unconventional including violence although not as significant as strikes. Figure 6.5 presents the evolution of strikes over the years according to both the official data and the newspaper data.

Figure 6.5: Number of strikes in Turkey, 1971-1985.



Considering the official data, as explained in Chapter 3, the evolution of strike events organized by labor do not resemble any of the curves presented above on demonstrative and confrontational forms of actions. Unlike other forms of actions, for example, the number of strikes did not peak in 1977, but in 1980 as a result of the reactions against "24 January Decisions", the austerity package that is explained in detail in Chapter 4. This difference supports the claim of Koç (1999) that there is no direct link between the student and labor movements. While the labor movement accompanied students on the streets and the repertoire of each movement diffused to the other, it is clear that the labor movement had its own agenda, which was shaped by the economic crises that ended in mass firings, and suppression of labor rights such as collective bargaining.

Who were the actors involved in unconventional forms of actions? Table 6.11 shows the actors' use of different forms of unconventional action. According to these data, students are the actors responsible for most of the demonstrative and confrontational events, as was also the case for violent events. This is not

surprising given the large number of protests organized by students. The general public and workers follow students in using demonstrative forms of actions with shares of respectively 19.7 percent and 11.6 percent. These forms are, however, never used by radical actors such as "terrorists" and only 1.4 percent is carried out by groups with opposed views, which is in line with demonstrative actions being part of the moderate repertoire. On the other hand, not surprisingly, around 90 percent of the strikes are carried out by workers.

Table 6.11: Actors involved in unconventional protests (excluding violence) in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Unconventional Repertoire		
Actors	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike
Students	64.9	73.2	.6
Workers	11.6	8.3	90.5
Elites	2.5	5.3	3.0
Terrorists	0	1.5	0
General public	19.7	11.8	6.0
Groups with opposed views	1.4	0	0
Total	100	100	100
N	285	339	168

The data on the involvement of various organizations in protest events, on the other hand, provides us with more information for analyzing the patterns of the cycle. Among the organizations of actors who were involved in the protests, associations were the ones who used demonstrative forms of action most often, as shown in Table 6.12. Thus, it is possible to claim that moderate protests more often involved professional social movement organizations and external allies. Confrontational and violent forms of actions, on the other hand, are employed mostly by external allies and "other SMOs". The high share of external allies

which are mainly composed of "conventional" organizations such as political parties, labor unions and professional chambers, etc., which normally involve in institutional politics, can be referred to as a sign of radicalization in Turkey during the taken period. Unsurprisingly, most of the strikes are carried out by union members.

Table 6.12: Organizations involved in unconventional protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Form of Action			
Organizations	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike	Violence
Illegal organizations	4.8	8.5	0	22.9
Associations	34.7	17.0	0	8.8
Other SMOs	21.8	35.6	0	41.5
Political parties	23.4	17.0	.9	22.9
Unions	15.3	17.0	98.3	3.4
Chambers/Benches	0	5.1	.9	.5
Total	100	100	100	100
N	124	59	118	205

Another important feature of the actors in relation to their choice of repertoire is their ideological orientations. Table 6.13 presents the data on the relationship between the use of unconventional forms of actions (except violence) and the ideological backgrounds of actors. Accordingly, 57 percent of confrontational are carried out by right-wing oriented actors. Left-wing actors are the followers of right-wing actors in these kinds of events. Majority of the demonstrative actions, on the other hand, are carried out by left-wing actors.

Table 6.13: Ideological orientations of actors involved in unconventional protests (excluding violence) in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Unconventional Repertoire		
Orientations of Actors	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike
Leftists	68.2	40.2	98.2
Rightists	25.0	57.3	1.9
Islamists	6.8	.9	0
Kurdish groups	0	1.7	0
Total	100	100	100
N	220	117	54

The aim of the protest is an essential feature of it, as can be inferred from various definitions provided in the Chapter 2. What kinds of issues were raised in protests where unconventional forms of actions were used? In order to answer this question and have a further understanding on the repertoires of action used by the social movements in Turkey in 1970s, we should also have a look at the relationship between the issues that people organized around and the forms of actions used to represent their concerns.

Table 6.14 presents the data related to this relationship**.** It is surprising to see high shares of protests in reaction to murders and attacks demonstrative acts since these can be classified as unconventional issues; we see the use of moderate actions for protesting on unconventional issues. On the other hand, as we understand from the table, confrontational forms are used mostly in protests framed by educational issues; a fact that can be considered as a feature of radicalization. Not surprisingly, a very high share of the strikes is used for protesting on economic issues and about labor policies. However, almost 10 percent of the strikes are resorted about political issues. Violence, on the other

hand, is mostly used about political matters. Protests organized on commemorating the former accidents or militants and on death anniversaries of former militants follow political issues with regards to the use of violence.

Table 6.14: Goals of unconventional protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Unconventional Repertoire			
Goal of Action	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike	Violence
Political	16.8	7.1	9.6	18.5
Educational	17.8	42.2	1.3	6.5
Economy/Labor Policies	10.5	10.3	83.3	4.6
International	4.6	2.5	0	4.6
Murders/Attacks	24.2	17.0	1.9	14.8
Repression	5.1	7.8	2.6	14.8
Commemoration/ Anniversary	12.9	5.0	0	20.4
Social	7.6	7.8	1.3	13.0
Ungrouped	.5	.4	0	2.8
Total	100	100	100	100
N	410	282	156	108

6.3. Conventional Forms of Actions

Besides unconventional forms of actions, use of conventional forms of actions should also be examined in order to analyze a cycle of protest. Use of conventional forms of actions in Turkey in the covered period is not very significant, as they constitute only 8.4percent of total events. Figure 6.6 demonstrates the evolution of use of conventional forms of actions. Accordingly, the use of these forms of actions, including lobbying, sending letters to politicians, leafleting and mobilizing law, increased until 1977 with an exception in the period between 1972 and 1973. 1977 is the peak point for these kinds of events and the

number decreases continuously until 1981. The number of conventional actions from 1981 until the end of 1985, on the other hand, is insignificant.

Figure 6.6: Numbers of conventional protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



What kinds of conventional forms of actions were the protestors using? Table 6.15 presents data on the use of different forms of conventional actions. As can be observed, media-directed forms of actions, with a 80 percent share, are dominant among the conventional forms of actions. The majority of the rest is composed of political forms of actions (almost 18 percent). Juridical forms[55] on the other hand are not significant. The most frequent conventional forms are publishing notice (40.2 percent), press releases (22.3 percent) and placarding (13 percent).

[55] The only juridical form of action that was found present in the newspaper articles was "applying to Council of State".

Table 6.15: Different forms of conventional protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Conventional Forms	**(in %)**
Media-directed	80.1
Political	17.9
Juridical	2.0
Total	100
N	448

Conventional forms of actions are mostly used by students, as it was the case for other forms of actions including violence, as Table 6.16 shows. While we don't see active participation of elites, they were the main actors of 35.3 percent of the events in which conventional forms of actions were used. General public follows the elites in participation to these kinds of events with a share of 20 percent.

Table 6.16: Actors of Conventional Protests in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Actors	**(in %)**
Students	40.5
Elites	35.3
General public	19.7
Workers	4.6
Terrorists	0
Groups with opposed views	0
Total	100
N	173

It is possible to observe a similar pattern with the involvement of organizations; most of the protest events where conventional forms of actions were used were organized by established and traditional organizations: as Table 6.17 shows 40.3 percent of these events were organized by associations and associations are

followed by political parties with a share of 18.7 percent and chambers and benches with around a share of 16 percent.

Table 6.17: Organizations involved in conventional protests in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Organizations	**(in %)**
Associations	40.3
Political parties	18.7
Chambers/Benches	16.1
Unions	13.2
Other SMOs	10.6
Illegal organizations	1.1
Total	100
N	273

Who were the actors of the conventional protest events with regards to the ideological backgrounds? Table 6.18 presents the relevant data. Accordingly, unlike violent and confrontational events, a vast majority of the conventional events (82.3 percent) are carried out by left-wing actors. In organizing these kinds of events right-wing actors follow left-wing actors with a share of 15.1 percent, while Islamists and Kurdish groups have no significance.

Table 6.18: Ideological orientations of actors involved in conventional protests in turkey, 1971-1986.

Orientations of Actors	**(in %)**
Leftists	82.3
Rightists	15.1
Islamists	2.6
Kurdish groups	0
Total	100
N	265

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter dealt with one of most significant features of social movements, repertoires of action. It showed that people who took the streets in the 1970s in Turkey adopted a variety of forms of action. These included both conventional and unconventional forms ranging from press releases, demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, to shootings, clashes, attacks and bombings. However, a vast majority of the events involved political violence. While several other European democracies such as Italy and West Germany also encountered violent periods of mobilization in the 1970s, the Turkish case, in comparison to these European countries, claimed far more fatalities: the number of fatalities witnessed in Turkey in a week during early 1980 was higher than the number of fatalities in Italy during the entire year of 1980 and in Germany during the entire decade (Sayarı, 987: 21; 2010: 198). The peculiarity of the Turkish case is also based on the fact that the cycle of protest was violent from the start. In addition, as Table 6.7 showed half of the violence is essentially a reaction to violence. Thus, it can be claimed that there is a vicious circle going on, where violence triggers violence.

Apart from the mass use of violence, the data on the overall development of the wave of protest in Turkey during the 1970s contains other signs of radicalization, as, for example, the decrease in the number of demonstrative events after 1977 as shown in Figure 6.4. With regards to the conventional forms of actions, it is clear that collective actors mainly resorted to media-related forms of actions. The low share of political and judicial forms, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a sign of distrust in formal politics.

After examining the actors and the repertoires of actions mobilized by these actors, in the following chapter, the last one of Part III, I will elaborate the last component of the cycle of protest analyzed in this study: issues.

Chapter 7

Issues

The issues raised in protests events constitute another variable that should be considered in detecting and analyzing a wave of protest: as Tarrow (1994: 153) writes, new or transformed collective actions frames are an important feature of a wave. Studying the issues raised in protests will give us a general idea about the state of politics in the country at hand, as the issues raised will be related to the main conflict in the polity. The scope of the protests on the other hand, i.e. whether or not they are internationally oriented, can also be understood from the development of the issues during the wave of protest.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the students and workers were the main groups taking to the streets to voice their demands, although they were not alone. Why were they in the streets? What were they shouting about? Did their demands and issues raised evolve over the curse of the wave of protest? If so, how? What kind of developments effected the change? This chapter is going to answer these questions based on the empirical data gathered for this study. However, unfortunately, the data on issues is very limited. Out of 5361 protest events coded for this study, it was only possible to infer the issues for 1326 protest events (around 25 percent of the total number of events), a fact that can be attributed to the radical character of the wave.

It is possible to claim that the major domains in the social movement sector in Turkey in the 1970s were ideological and industrial. Although the labor movement emerged in the 1960s, the class perspective crystallized only in the 1970s (Turan 2013). Thus, the conflict was framed as class struggle, as it was in Italy (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 80), at least for the left-wing movements. On the other hand, adapting a "nationalistic discourse based on cultural-historical essentialism" (Bora, 2003: 445), the right-wing was concerned with "anti-communism" in reaction to increasing left-wing activity. It is hard to talk about identity-based movements in Turkey which were developing in its Western counterparts in the 1970s. The Kurdish movement started to organize in the 1960s and early 1970s, especially with the "Eastern Meetings" (*Doğu Mitingleri*)[56] in 1967, and with the foundation of Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East in 1969 (Şimşek, 2004: 131). However, despite its autonomy mainly starting in 1973 (Bozarslan 2012), the Kurdish movement is regarded as a part of the class-based left-wing labor and student movement until 1980s. This is also the case for the women's movement. While the feminist movement in its Western counterparts emerged in the 1970s, in Turkey it is not possible to talk about such a movement until the 1980s. This does not mean that women were out of the scene in the 1970s: they were active in left-wing movement and founded an association called Progressive Women's Association (*İlerici Kadınlar Derneği* - İKD) in 1975.

[56] Eastern Meetings are a series of 12 meetings that were held in the cities of East and Southeast Anatolia, as well as in Ankara, with the support of the local branches of TİP against "backwardness" of the region, with the participation of tens of thousands of people. (Elçik 2007; Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009; Gündoğan 2011), who "called for resources, development, democratization, and Kurdish-language rights" (Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009: 466). Gündoğan (2011: 392) puts the significance of these meetings as such: "(…) it was a moment for the Kurds to voice the problems and demands exclusive to the Kurdish region and population instead of the class-based politics of the Turkish left which remained indifferent to the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish problem". On the other hand, Bozarslan (2012) mentions that the meetings were "(…) a kind of autonomization vis-à-vis the Turkish Left that comes from the basis and wherein the Kurdish members of the TİP also play a very important role".

However, the motivation underlying the mobilization of women was, again, the class struggle (Tekeli 2004). In addition, although there were some protests concerned with international events (such as the occupation of Czechoslovakia, shah regime in Iran, etc.), Turkey did not witness the emergence of a peace movement in those years. [57]

The lack of studies on this time period in Turkey, and more generally on social movements makes it harder to trace general themes that were raised during the protest wave. As it was pointed out before, the 1970s in Turkey constitute one of the "darkest" periods with regards to academic works covering the period (Turan, 2013: 3). And the existing literature is mainly interested in violence.

In this context, it is hard to categorize the issues raised during the protests according to some specific movements. A general categorization according to the demands that were voiced during protests is used for this study: political, educational and social issues, issues concerning economy or labor policies, protests against murders and attacks, protests against repression, and protests organized for commemoration.

Tarrow (1994: 202) writes that "cycles of contention are usually remembered for big, bold, and system threatening claims, but the early demands that trigger a cycle are often narrow and group-specific". While it is not possible to talk about such big claims in Turkey due to the nature of the cycle, it is worth analyzing the development of various claims and demands within the cycle. How did the distribution of these issues evolved throughout the wave of protest? According to the data presented in Figure 7.1, economic issues dominated the wave in the first years. This period also coincides with the dominance of workers.

[57] The only event with regards to peace was carried out in 1976, on the international peace day.

Educational issues, on the other hand, are raised by students who were the early risers of the cycle. These issues follow the economic ones, and take the lead within the period from 1976 to 1978, as the students' visibility on the scene increases. As mentioned before, the cycle of protest had been radical with regards to the repertoire of action employed, and this radical nature became dominant through the end of the 1970s. Accordingly, the number of protests against murders and attacks became more significant towards the end of the wave, as a result of increasing violence. This might also be a side effect of the decrease in protests related to political and educational issues.

Figure 7.1: Overall distribution of issue domains used in protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (over 10 percent).



More detailed information about the categories mentioned above is provided in the following.

7.1. General Issues Raised in Protest Events

How often were these categories raised in protest events? According to the data presented at Table 7.1, educational, political and economically oriented issues are most frequently raised ones, along with the protests organized against murders and attacks. On the other hand, social issues and issues related to repression and commemorations follow political, educational and economic issues with shares around 8 percent. The relative insignificance of social issues and the non-existence of identity-based issues are in line with the explanation given above. In the following lines, I will try to provide a better understanding of the issues that are more commonly raised (those with a share more than 10 percent), namely educational, economic and political issues and protests against murders and attacks.

Table 7.1: Issues raised in protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Issue	**(in %)**
Educational	20.1
Murders/attacks	19.1
Economy/labor policies	18.4
Political	14.6
Repression	9.0
Commemoration/anniversaries	7.9
Social	7.2
International	3.2
Other	.6
Total	100
N	1326

7.1.1. Educational Issues

As we have seen in Chapter 5, students were the early-risers of the wave of protest and one of the main actors who were on the streets. Even though the students were

involved in politics, educational issues were, of course, one of their main agenda. As Table 7.1 shows, educational issues were raised in 20 percent of all protest events. In addition to the structural problems that the universities were facing[58], the changes in the higher education system constituted one of the reasons behind this. After the military memorandum in 1971, with the changes made in the 1961 Constitution, the autonomy of the universities was limited. In this regard, an "autonomous" and democratic university became one of the demands of the students. They demanded rights to participate in the decision-making processes in the university and/or faculty administration, university reform, and more democratic by-laws and a democratic university. Increasing clashes between students coming from different political backgrounds helped the administrations to leave the security of the campuses to police forces with a regulation introduced in 1971 after the military intervention. Police control in universities was also one of the reasons that the university students protested. State control on the universities was not only implemented by locating police forces in the campuses: it was also made possible by appointing the presidents of Board of Trustees of universities, as it was in the case of Middle East Technical University, one of the leading universities based in Ankara. In 1976, the then Nationalist Front government appointed Ahmet Sonel, the president of the Ankara branch of Hearths of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*)[59], as president of the Board of Trustees. In February 1977, Hasan Tan, a right-wing professor, was appointed by the Board of Trustees as the rector of the university. In the following months, demands for

[58] Roos et. al. (1969: 277) mentions that high student-faculty ratios, inadequate budgets and an archaic examination system also existed in the university system in late 1960s, and they helped the sparking of university occupations in 1968.

[59] Founded in 1970, *Aydınlar Ocağı* served as an ideas club where conservative intellectuals unite. It "(…) has functioned as a sort of fountainhead for a new legitimizing ideology [Turkish-Islam Synthesis] for the Turkish Republic" (Akin and Karasapan, 1988).

his resignation became one of the major topics among the university youth in Ankara. Students also organized protests for re-arrangement of class hours according to prayer times, against the closure of a mosque in their campus and against the pictures of Atatürk in classrooms and against not-working heaters in the buildings.

7.1.2. Murders/Attacks

Political violence became a part of daily life in Turkey in 1970s, as discussed in Chapter 6. People reacted to these violent organizations: protests organized against murders and attacks on people constitute the second largest group of issues after educational issues with a share of 19 percent of all the protest events, as shown in Table 7.1. On January 24, 1975, for example, students of Istanbul University protested against the murder of their friends one day ago. According to a report on *Milliyet* on January 25, 1975, the "revolutionary" students in several universities organized occupations, boycotts and stood in silence in respect for their losses. Protests against murders ended in the politicization of the funerals. This issue plays a significant role in the protest activities of students, elites and general public. On the other hand, the large share of this issue among the ones raised during protest events, I would argue, reveals the radical dynamics of the wave of protest.

7.1.3. Economic Issues

Economic issues are also among the most frequent issues raised during protest events in Turkey in the 1970s: they constitute the third largest group of issues with a share of 18.4 of all protest events. The international debt crisis of mid-1970s and 1980s and the austerity measures taken afterwards caused protests in

developing countries (Walton and Ragin 1990) all over the world.[60] Economic instability and crises were also significant features of 1970s in Turkey. The country witnessed economic crises consecutively in 1974, 1978 and in 1979-1980 due to several factors including the oil price, the foreign trade deficit and the scarcity in financial resources. The data presented in Figure 7.1, showing the shares of protest events organized with an economic aspect from 1971 to 1986, provides supporting evidence for this; the number of protests is larger in the period from 1975 to 1981. Thus, it can be claimed that economic situation had a triggering effect for mobilization.

While general economic policies, crises, high costs of living and IMF practices constitute the first aspect of protests regarding the economy, the second is about industrial relations. The conflicting interests of labor and the employers caused several problems, especially with regards to the rights demanded by workers. All these ended up in unsolved collective bargaining processes, among others. These kinds of protests, that opened the way for workers' dominance throughout the wave of protest along with the students, mainly addressed collective bargaining, the policies of the protesting workers' unions, mass firings, having syndical rights, etc.

7.1.4. Political Issues

Political crisis, instability, polarization and deadlock were important features of 1970s in Turkey (Gunter 1989; Zürcher 2004): from 1971 to the coup in September 1980, Turkey was ruled by ten different governments, even though there were only two national elections took place in those years. In this context, it is not surprising to see political issues among the most frequent issues raised

[60] According to Walton and Ragin (1990: 877) "(…) a wave of austerity protest has occurred in 26 of the approximately 80 debtor countries".

during protest events (see Table 7.1). It is possible to categorize political issues into two: the first groups consists of protests against politicians and governments, such as against Ecevit, leader of the CHP, and Demirel, leader of DP, and protests against the Nationalist Front governments, etc. The second group, on the other hand, consists of ideologically led protests. As it was mentioned in Chapter 4, ideological politics was introduced in Turkey with the 1961 Constitution. In 1970s ideological debates between right and left-wing groups and within such groups intensified, a fact that explains the protests carried out for an independent Turkey, and against fascism and communism, etc.

As in economic issues, the significance of political issues starts to rise in 1975, as shown in Figure 7.1. This can be explained by the political developments in the state following the first national elections held in 1973 after the military memorandum in 1971. The year 1975 also marks the year when the first Nationalist Front government under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel was formed. Significance of political issues decreases in the last two years before the military coup, when the conflicts within groups with different ideologies increase.

7.2. Actors and Issues

While various issues were raised throughout the wave of protest, it is clear that certain groups were prone to highlight some particular issues. Thus, not all issues were equally salient to each group. Who were the ones rising these issues? Table 7.2 presents the shares of actors raising specific kinds of issues. It can be observed from the table that students were the ones who raised educational issues mostly (86.1 percent), and workers were the ones rising economy related issues (84.5 percent). Parallel to the fact that students were one of the most active groups in

Turkey in the 1970s, most of the international issues (50 percent) and issues related to murders and attacks, repression and commemorations were also voiced by students. On the other hand, while political issues were mainly raised by elites, it is possible to say that almost all actors, except groups with opposed views, raised political issues. Another striking point is that groups with opposed views are not significant for any of type of issues; a fact that can be explained by the very nature of this group of actors since they are more into clashing than a rising issues and organizing protest events about it. Social issues, on the other hand, are mainly covered by general public who is more directly subjected to the social problems in its daily life.

The ideological stance of the actors is another important point in analyzing the wave of protest with regard to the issues. As Table 7.3 demonstrates the majority of the issues whatever they are related to are raised by leftists. Only in educational issues and issues related to the murders or attacks targeting people, the share of the right-wing protesters is relatively close to the left-wing protesters. The higher share of right-wing groups in organizing protest events with an international scope is related to the fact that they are concerned more about their compatriots living abroad, as the Turkish minority was claimed to be under attack or repression in some European countries.

Table 7.2: Issues according to actors of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Issue Domain								
Actors	Political	Education	Economy	International	Murders/Attacks	Repression	Commemoration	Social	Ungrouped
Students	25.3	86.1	1.6	5.0	63.4	61.9	91.9	16.4	33.3
Workers	22.0	.8	84.5	0	1.5	6.4	0	11.5	0
Elites	27.5	5.5	3.6	16.7	19.4	12.7	2.7	14.8	0
General Public	23.1	7.2	10.4	33.3	13.4	17.5	2.7	57.4	66.7
Group with opposed views	2.2	.4	0	0	2.2	1.6	2.7	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	91	237	193	18	134	63	37	61	3

Table 7.3: Issues according to ideological stance of actors of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Issue Domain								
Ideology	Political	Education	Economy	International	Murders/Attacks	Repression	Commemoration	Social	Ungrouped
Leftists	71.8	64.8	94.0	8.0	61.7	86.3	98.5	48.0	25.0
Rightists	23.4	33.3	6.0	12.0	35.3	13.7	0	24.0	75.0
Islamists	4.8	1.9	0	8.0	3.0	0	1.5	28.0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	124	54	83	25	133	51	67	25	4

7.3. Repertoires of Actions and Issues

We had a look at the use of repertoires of action in the previous chapter; here, we can have a look at the relationship between the issues and the forms of actions used in raising them. As Table 7.4 demonstrates, conventional (35.7 percent) and demonstrative (35.7 percent) forms of actions are used for political issues. On the other hand, for raising educational demands protestors (mainly students) mostly used confrontational issues (44.9 percent). Not surprisingly, strikes (53.2 percent) are the main instrument to raise economic issues and issues related to labor policy. For international issues, demonstrative (44.1 percent) forms of actions are preferred. In the protests organized against murders and attacks targeting people, for commemorations and for social demands demonstrative actions are the most frequently used ones with respectively 39.1 percent, 50.4 percent, and 32.6 percent. On the other hand, protests organized against repression employed conventional forms of actions most frequently, with a share of 47 percent.

With regards to the relationship between issues and repertoire of action used, we should also have a look at to the issue of violence. Table 7.5 shows us that the majority of the events where it was possible to code the demand are nonviolent. The share of the violent events is highest in commemorations and social issues.

Table 7.4: Issues according to forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Issue Domain								
Forms of Action	Political	Education	Economy	International	Murders/Attacks	Repression	Commemoration	Social	Ungrouped
Conventional	35.8	24.2	15.2	27.9	34.4	47.1	15.2	27.4	25.0
Demonstrative	35.8	27.6	17.6	44.2	39.1	17.7	50.5	32.6	25.0
Confrontational	10.4	44.9	11.9	16.3	19.0	18.5	13.3	23.2	12.5
Strike	7.8	.8	53.3	0	1.2	3.4	0	2.1	0
Violence	10.4	2.6	2.1	11.6	6.3	13.5	21.0	14.7	37.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	193	265	244	43	253	119	105	95	8

Table 7.5: Violence, non- violence and issues rose during protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Issue Domain								
Violence	Political	Education	Economy	International	Murders/Attacks	Repression	Commemoration	Social	Ungrouped
Non-violent	89.6	98.5	98.0	90.7	93.7	87.4	79.1	85.3	62.5
Violent	10.4	1.5	2.1	9.3	6.3	12.6	21.0	14.7	37.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	193	265	244	43	253	119	105	95	8

7.4. Conclusion

The chapter elaborated on the issues raised during the protest events took place in Turkey in the 1970s. It was explained earlier that the major actor of the wave of protest of the 1970s in Turkey is the students. In relation to this fact, a large number of the protest events organized during the decade in Turkey mainly addressed issues related to education. By claiming their rights to take part in the decision making processes in the educational system, students demanded a more democratic education and an autonomous university. Economic policies and industrial relations, including the crises that became apparent in the mid-1970s, high costs of living and IMF practices and the rights demanded by workers that were handled in collective bargaining processes that usually stuck, also concerned people. In addition, ideology based politics, such as demanding the resignation of the prime minister or the government, were also among the most frequent issues raised by protestors. On the other hand, thanks to the increasing violence throughout the cycle, people also protested against these mass attacks and killings. One prominent example of this kind of protests is the one organized by women who lost their children as a result of violent encounters between opposing groups with the participation of around two thousand people in January 1976.

The data presented in this chapter also revealed the dynamics and timing of the issues raised. Accordingly, in line with the overall development of the wave of protest, the frequency of all the above mentioned issues started to increase after 1974. This is, of course, related to the economic crises erupted in that years, increased political conflict even among established political actors such as political parties thanks to the election atmosphere and the certain openings in the political system such as the general amnesty announced in 1974.

With regard to the scope of the protests, the chapter showed that their main concern is national rather than international. Thus, it can be stated that the social movements of the time failed to link their activities to their counterparts abroad. In addition, as Uysal (2009) claims based on the 1968 movement in Europe, the "field of production" (*champ de production*) was not "imported" to Turkey and thus the movements in Turkey fell short compared to their European counterparts in generating collective frames.

Part IV

Dynamics of the Cycle

Chapter 8

Institutionalization and Radicalization

Cycles of protests evolve in time and have some inherent dynamics. The current chapter is related to the dynamics of the wave of protest in Turkey in the 1970s with regards to the repertoire of action, involvement of different organizations and goals of action. According to the existing scholarly studies dealing with several waves of protest (Koopmans 1993; della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Tarrow 1989; McAdam 1982; Jung 2010) there are two dynamics that can be observed during, more specifically at the end of, a cycle of protest: institutionalization and radicalization. To be more precise, a combination of institutionalization and radicalization is claimed to accompany the decline of a cycle or wave of protest (Tarrow 1989; Koopmans 1993). These processes "(…) in tandem contribute to the decline of the cycle, as people are either satisfied by reforms, or scared the streets by violence" (Koopmans, 2004: 29).

8.1. Institutionalization

What does institutionalization and radicalization refer to? Institutionalization, according to Hipsher (1998: 157), "is a process that involves a shift toward more standardized, nonthreatening forms of collective action that entails less mobilization and less disruption". In a similar manner, Jung (2010: 29) points out that institutionalization refers to "to pursuing social movements' goals more

through established political channels than through extraparliamentary means". Rucht et al. (in Seippel, 2001: 125), on the other hand, refer to institutionalization as a process of "successive development and reinforcement of movement structure" by putting the emphasis on organizational structures. In sum, it can be claimed that institutionalization is related both to the repertoire of action and to organizational aspects.

This study operationalizes institutionalization with regards to the actors and organizational aspects and goals of actions. To trace institutionalization with regards to these elements, it is possible to examine four variables: 1) increase in involvement of established allies, 2) emergence of new parties, 3) increased support for established reformist parties, 4) increase in membership of social movement organizations (Koopmans 1993, 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995).

As "complex social entities with vague and shifting boundaries" (Rucht, 2004: 197), social movements have various kinds of relations with other groups, organizations. One variety of these relationships might be alliance-building: "social movements as whole, or parts of them, may also form alliances with external groups, such as other movements, interest groups, political parties, elites, intellectuals, and media" (Rucht, 2004: 203). Involvement of allies is accepted as a significant factor that facilitates mobilization of social movements. On the other hand, growing involvement of external allies from the parliamentary arena and among trade unions can be accepted as a sign of institutionalization. As mentioned above, movements might find allies within the party system, as well as from the professional sector. Allies within the party system might be among "small parties as well as large established parties that adapt their positions under the impact of the competition by the smaller challengers" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 29).

It can be argued that the left-wing in Turkey found allies among trade unions and professional organizations as well as political parties. In this regard, it is possible to consider DİSK whose foundation referred "(…) to the growth of a more politically radical Turkish labor activism driven by an alternative set of values" (Mello 2010). In addition, the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (*Türk Mühendi ve Mimar Odaları Birliği* – TMMOB), which is considered as the pioneer of the left-wing professional organizations (Bora, 2002: 267), for example, reported in 1977 that it held joint meetings with "forces organized in squatter neighborhoods, in order to strengthen democratic solidarity" (Annual Report in Batuman, 2008: 1939). It was not only the left-wing movement that found external allies: the foundation of Hak-İş in 1976 reveals the desire in the Islamist movement to establish allies within the labor movement, as "MSP wanted to disseminate its ideology among workers and actively encouraged the formation of Hak-Iş to act as a labour wing of the party" (Duran and Yıldırım, 2005: 231). This was also the case for the idealist movement: they were supported by MISK (Landau, 1982: 252) as well as other idealist civil society organizations such as Ülkü-Bir, etc. (see Chapter 5). Thus, in order to assess institutionalization of the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s, I will focus on the involvement of these organizations. Figure 8.1 provides the relevant data about the participation of political parties, unions and chambers/benches in Turkey in the period covered. As the figure shows, the involvement of external allies decreased in time. The involvement of political parties peaked in 1977, a fact that, as already pointed out, can be explained by the elections held in that year and by increasing conflicts. On the other hand, the trade unions' participation peaked earlier compared to that of political parties, in 1975, and started to decline from that time on. Involvement of

chambers/benches on the other hand remained very limited compared to other external allies. Their involvement also peaked in 1977, when the whole cycle intensified before it started to decline. In sum, it is not possible to talk about institutionalization in Turkey in 1970s with regards to the participation of external allies. Accordingly, the hypothesis on the higher participation of external allies during heightened phases of conflict (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 4) is partially supported and partially disconfirmed by data. Their involvement is higher in the period between 1974 and 1980; however, their presence is not steady and declines through the end of 1970s.

Figure 8.1: Involvement of external allies in protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



As Koopmans (1993: 646) puts it "(i)nstitutionalization may also find expression within the party system, either in the emergence of new parties, or in increased support for established parties". Over the course of a cycle of protest, social movements as a whole, or some participants might decide to establish a political party,[61] or there might be some political entrepreneurs who are willing to collect

[61] See Kitschelt (2006) for a detailed analysis of "movement parties".

votes from different movements by establishing political parties concerned with similar issues. Thus, we should first have a look at the foundation of new political parties as conventional actors of the political arena to assess the institutionalization of the cycle of protest in Turkey in the 1970s. According to data gathered from the website of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM, n.d.), 42 political parties were established from 1971 to 1986 in Turkey. While this might be considered as a large number, it should be mentioned that 22 among these 42 were established after the transition to a normal regime from the military rule in 1983. Detailed information about 20 political parties established from 1971 until the coup held in September 1980 are provided in Table 8.1.[62]

Eight out of the 20 political parties established in nine years from 1971 to 1980 can be labeled as right-wing, while 11 of them can be referred to as left-wing parties. The existence of eight political parties with overt socialist political orientation among the 11 left-wing political parties established in those nine years can be read as a sign of institutionalization with regards to the left-wing; however none of these parties succeeded to become a mass political party. Indeed, these parties did not even run in the elections[63]; thus, they did not participate in the elections held in 1973 and 1977. In this regard, while the formation of new political parties constitutes as an attempt for institutionalization [64] , the establishment of these political parties should rather be considered as an example of the fractionized landscape of the left-wing presence in Turkey.

[62] Full list of political parties established from 1971 to 1986, with their establishment years, political orientations, reason of dissolution, can be found as Appendix 2.

[63] Only two of these 20 political parties run in general elections in 1973 and/or in 1977, namely *Milli Selamet Partisi* and *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi.* The later was founded by the unification of two political parties that were also founded in the covered period, *Milli Güven Partisi* and *Cumhuriyetçi Parti.*

[64] An attempt that became clearer especially in 1975 when four political parties with socialist tendencies were founded.

Table 8.1: Establishment years and political orientations of the political parties established in Turkey, 1971-1980.

Year of Establishment	Name of Party	Political Orientation
1971	*Milli Güven Partisi* (National Reliance Party)	Center-Right
1972	*Cumhuriyetçi Parti* (Republican Party)	Center-Right, Nationalist
	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)	Political Islam
	Türkiye Ulusal Kadınlar Partisi (National Womens' Party of Turkey)	Feminist
1973	*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi* (Republican Reliance Party)	Center-Right
	Büyük Kuvvet Partisi (Grand Strength Party)	-
	Türkiye Kardeşlik Partisi (Fraternity Party of Turkey)	Center-Left
1974	*Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi* (Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey)	Socialist
1975	*Vatan Partisi* (Motherland Party)	Socialist
	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)	Center-Right
	Türkiye Emekçi Partisi (Laborer Party of Turkey)	Socialist
	Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Labor Party)	Socialist
	Sosyalist Devrim Partisi (Socialist Revolution Party)	Socialist
1977	*Nizam Partisi* (Party of Order)	Conservative
	Sosyalist Hareket Partisi (Socialist Movement Party)	Socialist
	Türkiye Sosyal Adalet Partisi (Social Justice Party of Turkey)	Center-Left
1978	*Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi* (Worker Peasant Party of Turkey)	Nationalist, Socialist
1979	*Sosyalist Vatan Partisi* (Socialist Homeland Party)	Socialist
	Hürriyetçi Millet Partisi (Libertarian Nation Party)	Center-Right
1980	*Hür Demokratlar Partisi* (Free Democrats Party)	Center-Right

13 of the remaining parties on the other hand, were closed down by the Constitutional Court in the trials that took place after the military coup, a fact that is not surprising when the long history of political party closures in Turkey is considered.[65]

Besides the foundation of new political parties, increasing support for established parties is considered as another feature of institutionalization with regards to organizations, as mentioned above. Thus, we can have a look at the vote shares of political parties in two general elections that were held in the covered period, respectively in 1973 and 1977. The relevant data was presented already in Chapter 4; accordingly, it is possible to observe an increase in the vote shares of major political parties such as the AP (from 29.8 percent in 1973 to 36.9 percent in 1977), CHP (from 33.3 percent in 1973 to 41.4 percent in 1977), and MHP (from 3.4 percent in 1973 to 6.4 percent in 1977). While it is hard to talk about reformist parties that run in the elections in the taken period, we can also have a look at the vote shares of the TİP as a socialist party: the party did not even run in 1973 elections and had a major setback in 1977 by receiving only 0.1 percent of the total votes. With regards to the elections, we might also have a look at the changes in people's participation to elections. The participation rate increased from 66.8 percent in 1973 to 72.4 percent in 1977, which demonstrates that people did not lose their faith in elections. Given these facts, it is possible to claim that some aspects of the electoral system and participation in elections revealed dynamics of institutionalization.

Over the course of a cycle of protest, there might be changes in the membership structures of social movement organizations. People might decide

[65] For a detailed analysis/observation on party closures in Turkey see Kogacioglu (2003, 2004), Kaynar (2007), Güney and Başkan (2008).

either to participate in social movement organizations or to drop membership due to several reasons. Increase in membership of social movement organizations, as well as trade unions and political parties is considered as a variable to assess institutionalization of a protest wave. Unfortunately, institutionalization with this regard was not traceable for the Turkish case, since it is not possible to get membership data of social movement organizations of the time, as most of them do not exist anymore. As for the political parties, it was only possible to get the relevant data for the period after 1980.[66] It is also hard to present accurate data on union membership due to several reasons, including the facts that workers were able to become members of different unions at the time, notarization was not required. In addition, given the need to appear strong because of inter-union competition, the unions and their confederations tended to over-report their membership (Mello 2010; Mahiroğulları, 2001: 186). Table 8.2 demonstrates the increase in the number of unionized workers. The two major confederations, DİSK and Türk-İş also reported an upsurge in their membership: DİSK's members increased from 67.000 in 1967 to around 500.000 in 1980 while Türk-İş's members increased from 497.587 in 1967 to 700.000 in 1976 (Mello, 2010). Based on these data, it is possible to argue for an institutionalization for the labor movement.

[66] See Tosun and Tosun (2010) for a record of party membership in Turkey after 1985.

Table 8.2: Number of workers in the scope of Labor Act and number of unionized workers in Turkey, 1960-1980.

Year	Number of Workers in the Scope of Labor Act	Numbers of Unionized Workers
1960	824.881	282.967
1961	868.954	298.000
1962	903.817	307.000
1963	975.570	259.710
1964	999.569	338.769
1965	1.082.507	360.285
1966	1.142.912	374.058
1967	1.336.945	834.680
1968	1.327.215	1.057.928
1969	1.365.936	1.193.908
1970	1.406.100	2.088.219
1971	1.448.108	2.362.787
1972	1.562.580	2.672.857
1973	1.612.579	2.658.393
1974	1.718.551	2.878.624
1975	1.819.456	3.328.633
1976	1.580.000	3.269.356
1977	1.970.000	3.807.577
1978	2.205.056	3.897.290
1979	2.152.411	5.465.109
1980	2.204.807	5.721.074

8.2. Radicalization

Radicalization is mostly considered in relation to the repertoire of action. According to McAdam et al. (2001: 69) radicalization refers to "(…) the expansion of collective action frames to more extreme agendas and the adoption of more transgressive forms of contention". Similarly Jung (2010: 29) claims that "radicalization involves shifting protest actions and claims in a violent and extreme direction". Radicalization might also be related to the organizational dimension, as it is important to see what kinds of organizations are involved in more radical forms of protests. In addition, the changes in the goals of actions, if any, in the curse of a wave of protests should be analyzed to assess radicalization.

In order to trace radicalization, this study focuses on three variables: repertoire of action, the organizational dimension, and goals of actions/issues rose during protests. However, it is clear that the core of the radicalization discussion will be the use of violence by participants or social movement organizations involved in the cycle of protest.

Examining radicalization, we should have a look at the evolution of the use of different forms of actions, more precisely conventional and demonstrative ones. While an increase in these kinds of actions might reveal a trend towards institutionalization, a decrease might be accepted as a sign of radicalization. The number of protest events in which conventional forms of actions were used increased until 1977, with an exception in the period between 1972 and 1973, as Figure 8.2 demonstrates. The same tendency is observable also for demonstrative actions. 1977 is the peak point for these kinds of events and their use decrease continuously until 1981. The number of conventional and demonstrative protests from 1981 until the end of 1985, on the other hand, is insignificant. In this regard, it is possible to talk about radicalization, especially after 1977.

Figure 8.2: Number of conventional and demonstrative protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



Besides the evolution of use of conventional and demonstrative actions, we might also analyze use of different forms of violence over time, as violence is the most frequent form of action used in Turkey in 1970s as already explained in Chapter 6. This will help us to understand the nature of the violence used and see the patterns of radicalization. We shall have a look at the most frequent violent forms which were mentioned in Chapter 6, namely attacks, shootings, bombings and clashes and other forms of violence targeting both objects and people. As shown in Figure 8.3, these different types of violent forms follow different patterns of evolution overtime. As mentioned in earlier chapters, when talking about the 1970s in Turkey, one should focus more on the period from 1974 to 1981. The first striking information that we can drive from the Figure 8.3, is that while other forms of violence remain low until 1976, clashes or encounters between various groups dominate the cycle until it peaks in 1977. Thus we can claim that their incidence was greatest at the peak of the cycle and decreased in the last years of the period. Bombings, on the other hand, are dominant among the rest of other forms of violence which peak in 1978. However, we can say that shootings replace clashes from 1978 onwards and dominate the cycle until its end. When the results of the violent forms are considered, it is possible to claim that the more bloody and directed forms of violence such as shootings grew continuously up to the end of the cycle, while the number of less dramatic forms of violence tended to decline.[67] According to Sayarı (2010: 204), "(t)he dialectical process of mutual escalation was the most distinguishing characteristic of 'anarchy' in Turkey". As he explains, "(t)he attacks and counter-attacks between the revolutionary left and the ultranationalist right followed a predictable pattern of escalation: The murder

[67] Bombings, here constitute and exemption; while they are part of the more severe violent forms, their use decline after 1978.

of a leftist terrorist – who was immediately declared a 'martyr' by his comrades and given a political funeral- triggered the revenge killing of a right-wing terrorist. This, in turn, prompted the rightists to respond in a similar fashion: A political funeral for their 'martyr' was followed by the assassination of a leftist militant". In addition to this vicious circle fed by the counter-attacks by different groups, the glorification of violence by some groups (see Ağaoğulları 1987) also contributed to this escalation. As a result, as in the Italian protest cycle of 1960s (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986), violent encounters coincided in magnitude with the peak of the cycle, while severe violence directed at people increased as the total magnitude of conflict declined.

Figure 8.3: Use of different forms of violence in Turkey, 1971-1986.



With regards to the organizational dimension, we saw above that the involvement of external allies and/or conventional organizations declined through the end of the cycle. In order to trace radicalization, we might have a look at the use of violence by different organizations. The relevant data is presented in Table 8.3.

Accordingly social movement organizations without an overt tendency to use violence are responsible for 41.5 percent of total violent events, a share that is even higher than illegal organizations. Political party organizations and/or people with overt party affiliation, on the other hand, are accountable for almost 23 percent of total violent events. This fact contradicts the idea that the more organizations involved the less contentious the protest tactics (Piven and Cloward 1979; Staggenborg 1988). The high share of professional SMOs and political parties among the actors who employed violence in Turkey can be referred to as a sign of radicalization during the covered period.

Table 8.3: Share of different organizations in violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

Type of Organization	**Violence**
Illegal organizations	22.9
Associations	8.8
Other SMOs	41.5
Political parties	22.9
Unions	3.4
Chambers/Benches	.5
Total	100
N	205

On the other hand, it is not surprising to see the illegal organizations category among the groups using violent acts intensively. How did the involvement of these kinds of organizations evolved through the end of the wave of protest? In order to analyze the dynamics of institutionalization and radicalization, we should also answer this question, as an increase in the involvement of these organizations might be a sign of radicalization, while a decrease indicates institutionalization, at

least to some extent. As can be seen in Figure 8.4, illegal organizations' participation increased towards the end of the wave, and they were still active after the military coup in 1980, at least for 2-3 years following it. This may also serve as an indicator of radicalization over the course of the wave of protest.

Figure 8.4: Number of events organized by illegal organizations in Turkey, 1971-1986.



The goals of social movements or protest events might also change during the cycle of protest. In this sense, while an increase of more moderate goals can serve as a sign of institutionalization, an increase in more radical and ambiguous goals can serve as a sign of radicalization. As shown in Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7, parallel to the social and class bases of the "early risers" of the wave of protest, at the beginning of the wave protests were more concerned with economic and social issues, followed by educational demands. However, in time, while the intensity of demands on economic and educational issues decrease, it is possible to observe an increase in protests targeting the repression coming from adversaries and protests aiming at commemorating the death of their militant counterparts or

"revolutionary martyrs". Since these demands/motivations are related to heightened conflict among different groups and repression, it is possible to claim a link with radicalization more than institutionalization.

Besides the issues raised during all protests events, we might also have a look at the issues raised during violent events in order to have a clue about the motives lying behind these acts and the dynamics of radicalization. As mentioned before, most frequent forms of violence in Turkey during the covered period are shootings and clashes. The share of less conflictual issues such as political and social ones, as well as issues regarding education, economy policies and international issues is 47.2 percent (see Chapter 7). Employing violence even during protests against increasing prices, against lack of teachers, against students who are wearing grey wolf pins, and against the second Nationalist Front government who obtained a vote of confidence might be taken as proof of radicalization of politics in Turkey during 1970s.

8.3. Conclusion

Based on the data presented in this chapter, I conclude that in contrast to the examples from Italy, Germany, the wave of protest in Turkey in the 1970s revealed mainly the dynamics of radicalization; institutionalization remained very limited. The wave radicalized with regards to the goals of actions, organizations involved and more specifically with regards to the repertoire of action: heavy violence followed lighter violence during the wave of protest of 1970s in Turkey. On the other hand, the degree of institutionalization for the labor movement, increase of membership in labor unions and increasing vote shares of the CHP in 1977 elections thanks to the support from the labor (Kaleağasi Blind 2007; Mello 2010) serve as relevant signs of such a process.

Koopmans (2004: 29) claims that "(i)n contexts where the political system offers multiple channels of institutionalized access to challengers and where authorities react by accommodation and concessions, institutionalization will predominate, and radicalization may remain very limited. If, however, the regime offers few channels of access, responds by repression and is unwilling to reform, radicalization will be the dominant outcome". This was actually the case for Turkey. Young people whose only access to the politics was elections, and who were repressed harshly by the military memorandum on March 1971 followed a path towards radicalization. On the other hand, it can also be argued that, especially with regards to left-wing movement, factionalism and discussions about the revolutionary methods facilitated radicalization. With regards to the right-wing movement, far-right anti-communist and Turkist ideology and the "shield" that is provided by the strong alliance structure with the Nationalist Action Party helped the radicalization of the idealist movement, and thus contributed to the radicalization of the wave of protest itself.

Chapter 9

Repression

Repression is accepted as a dimension of political opportunity structure (della Porta 1995; Brockett 1995; McAdam 1996). Scholars of social movements consider repression "as a factor that should have a strong impact on the levels and forms of protest mobilization" no matter what their theoretical approach is (Koopmans, 1997: 149-50).

During the 1970s, but not limited to this era, repression has been a part of the political life in Turkey. Proclaiming martial law, detainments, postponing strikes are only some examples of repressive practices that have become a part of daily routine in those years. After the military memorandum on March 1971, with the anti-terrorist campaign, "the security forces managed to either kill or capture almost the whole leadership cadres" (Sayarı, 1987: 25). Besides targeting main cadres of various political groups, especially of left-wing ones, the military repression also addressed ordinary people. Samim (1981: 74), for example, writes that "(i)n an attempt to control meat prices, for example, the soldiers arrested butchers; to restore a semblance of order they shaved hippies and closed popular coffee shops". Military sourced repression showed itself, again, after the coup on September 12, 1980 in various ways. As Demirel (2005: 251) writes about 65.000 people are estimated to have been detained and many have lost their lives in

prisons because of mistreatment and torture. In addition, it is also claimed that state repression, especially mistreatments and torture in prisons in Eastern provinces such as Diyarbakır, after the military coup are the reasons for the radicalization of the Kurdish movement and the dominance of PKK within the movement starting from the mid-1980s (Bozarslan 2014; Ergut 2014). Thus, the dynamics of repression are another significant variable to understand the emergence and development of the wave of protest of the 1970s in Turkey.

Being probably the most frequent form of reaction to protests, repression is broadly defined as "(…) any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action" (Tilly, 1978: 100). Based on this broad definition, repression may take several forms varying from direct police action during protest events, surveillance, military suppression of protest events, restrictions of free speech and assembly, arrests and/or imprisonments of participants to "disappearance" or murders of activists. Besides the forms, the purpose of repression may also vary. Explaining external efforts to facilitate or damage social movements, Marx (1979) mentions the following purposes: creating an unfavorable public image, gathering information on the movement targeted, inhibiting supply of resources such as money, encouraging internal conflicts that may end in displacing leaders, causing participants to leave the cadres and inhibiting or sabotaging some particular actions. Based on these diverse forms and purposes, repression should be "considered along a continuum" (McPhail and McCarthy, 2005: 3).

In this regard, it is also possible to make more precise distinctions between different types and sources of repression. Earl (2003; 2007), for example, makes three common distinctions: between overt and covert repression, between

coercion and channeling and between state authorities and private actors. The first distinction that is between overt and covert repression, is grounded on the visibility of repressive acts (Earl 2007). While the surveillance or counterintelligence activities of state authorities might refer to covert repression, direct police action to a protest event and arrests may serve as examples of overt repression. The second distinction refers to the model of repression. Accordingly, coercion "involves shows and/or uses of force and other forms of standard police and military action (e.g., intimidation and direct violence)", while channeling refers to "more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of resources to movements" (Earl, 2003: 48). The last distinction concerns the actors of repression: repression might come from state actors such as national police, military, gendarmerie, as well as non-state actors such as a counter-movement or individuals.

It is possible to argue that all these types of repression existed in Turkey in the 1970s. Police intervention in protest events co-existed with surveillance activities and the activities of "contra-guerilla".[68] On the other hand, imprisonments accompanied postponements of strikes as a form of channeling. Finally, repression by state actors was accompanied by repression perpetrated by countermovements, especially in the form of repression by right-wing idealists on the left-wing groups. Analyzing the effects of all these dimensions of repression on protests is beyond the limits of this study. In addition, it is also not always possible to trace covert repressive activities/attitudes, such as the activities of the secret police, and repression coming from countermovements. Thus, the current study deals systematically only with overt repression, coming from state actors

[68] According to Zürcher (2004: 259), "contra-guerilla, an underground organization of rightist civilians who were paid and armed by the army" played an important role in the suppression of the left in Turkey.

and/or countermovements. On the other hand, both models of repression, namely coercion and channeling, are covered. Thus, considering repression along a continuum, as mentioned above, this study covers a range of repressive actions. Repressive actions targeting objects, protest actions and people are along the continuum, including banning newspapers, closing schools for a certain time period, imposing curfew, police search in political party or association buildings, taking city entrances under control, detaining, opening investigation against people, using tear and smoke gases, lock-outs, armed attacks targeting protestors, torture, etc.

As mentioned above, several forms of repression coming from different sources existed in Turkey during the period covered in this study. How did this repression evolve? One should answer this question before proceeding with a more complex analysis of different forms of repression. According to the data gathered from newspaper review, repression is detected in around 28.5 percent of total protest events (n=1524). Figure 9.1 shows the evolution of repression in Turkey in 1970 through the numbers of repressed protest events. According to the figure, the number of the repressed events starts to increase by 1974, peaks in 1978 (the value is very close to the one in 1977) and then starts to decrease. It is important to mention that the curve of the repressed events is quite similar to the overall development of the wave of protest itself and the other curves that were represented in previous chapters.

Figure 9.1: Numbers of repressed protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.



How does repression affect dissent and mobilization? The relationship between repression and protest has been one of the puzzles of the literature, given the fact that scholars working on the issue are far from having a consensus on the answer. In other words, the effects of repression on the level of mobilization are not clear-cut. Scholars adopting different approaches to study social movements and collective action also have different conclusions on the effects of repression on protest. According to rational choice scholars, for example, repression increases the costs of participation and thus has a negative impact on the levels of mobilization (Muller and Weede 1990; Opp and Roehl 1990). Scholars focusing on the social psychological effects of repression on the other hand, such the classical approach of Gurr (1969), claim that since repression will increase the frustration of the protestors it would contribute to the escalation of violence. Parallel to this approach, but with a more modern understating, scholars working on emotions and collective identities also claim that "repression embodies the very message that they seek to convey to their adherents and to the larger public, namely, that of a repressive political system that is in need of revolutionary change" (Koopmans, 1997: 151). Aiming at integrating these two opposite views

on the impact of repression on mobilization, the inverted U-curve model has been developed (Gurr 1969; DeNardo 1985; Muller 1985; Weede 1987). The inverted U-curve model suggests that "when repression is low, mobilization is also low because the availability of institutional channels for claims making alleviates the need for extrainstitutional protest" (Johnston and Mueller, 2001: 353). As repression reaches moderate levels, protest should be stimulated as people would consider state actions as unjust. "Only beyond a certain - theoretically undetermined - level of repression does the deterrent effect of repression begin to get the upper hand" (Koopmans, 1997: 151). In other words, "(t)he hypothesis of an inverted-U relationship implies that any state progressing from low or high coercion to midrange coercion would confront a substantial rise in protest" (Francisco, 1995: 265).

Combining these models, Neidhart (in Koopmans 1997) produces a "lying S-curve" model. According to this model, repression, on the first hand, decreases mobilization. However, if repression crosses the "line of proportionality", mobilization increases. This line refers to the "normative boundary demarcating the difference between legitimate and illegitimate repression" (Johnston and Mueller, 2001: 354). However, when repression reaches a threshold, the costs caused by repression are too high; a point after which mobilization declines. This model proposed by Neidhart (in Koopmans 1997) is contradicted by Francisco (1995). Based on the cases where harsh repression increases mobilization, he claims that "the inverted-U curve might yield another rise in protest at the high end of coercion", and arrives at the conclusion that "the relationship between protest and coercion may be nonlinear" (Francisco, 1995: 265).

Given this lack of consensus on the impacts of repression on mobilization, I will try not to make general assumptions, but to describe the relationship between repression and mobilization in Turkey during the covered time period. In this regard, the data on Turkey shows us that the relationship between repression and the numbers of protest events is positive and strong, as the correlation coefficient is 0.89. This means that as repression increases so does the number of protest events, and vice-versa.

9.1. Repressive Acts

As mentioned above, repression might take several forms. What kinds of repression were present in Turkey in the 1970s? In the following I will try to answer this question by also focusing on the sources of repression.

The data on the forms of repression is presented in Table 9.1. Accordingly, the major form of overt repression in Turkey in the 1970s has been taking people under custody either during or after protest events. Thus, the main model of repression is coercion. Repressive actions might also target a protest event directly, i.e. in the form of delaying it or not allowing it at all. This form of repression is coded as "against events". Repression targeting protest events, mainly in the forms of channeling, follow the act of custody with a share of 16.5 percent. Postponing strikes, for example, can be considered in this category. The Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-outs (Act No. 275), accepted in 1963, allow the governments to postpone any strike or lockout for sixty days if it is deemed to endanger national security and public health (Çelik, 2008: 101). In this regard, from December 1963 to September 1980, 252 strikes were postponed due

to reasons of national security and public health (Topalhan, 1999: 30; Çelik, 2008: 105).[69]

Table 9.1: Types of repression used in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Types of Repression	Freq.	Percent
Custody	918	61.2
Against events	248	16.5
Ungrouped	185	12.3
Arrest	83	5.5
Investigation	66	4.4
Total	1.500	100

Investigations, arrests and judicial cases opened against movement organizations have also been a means for political repression, especially after the military memorandum on March 1971, as Table 9.1 shows. Harris (2011: 206) mentioned that the series of non-partisan governments that ruled the country in the early 1970s started a wave of arrests that even targeted people who had no direct involvement in violent events. The establishment of State Security Courts also coincides with this period. As a result of a change in the 1961 Constitution made in 1973, these courts were designed for cases deemed threatening to the security of state[70] and played important political roles as they dealt with crimes covered in 99 articles of the Penal Code and infringements of laws related to demonstrations,

[69] To be more precise, 143 strikes were postponed due to national security, 43 were postponed based on the reasons related to public health and 55 were postponed for both national security and public health (Topalhan, 1999: 30). However, since the concepts of "national security" and "public health" were not described in the constitution in detail, they were interpreted very broadly and caused controversial decisions on postponement of strikes (Çelik 2008); a fact that can be accepted as a feature of repressive state.

[70] Here, it is important to make a reference to "meta-ideology of national security" in Turkey, which refers to the overall importance of national security justifies interventions by the security services and the judiciary in the areas of political parties, social activities, the distribution of information, the media, education, and so on" (Dorronsoro in Casier 2010).

strikes, lock-outs and organizations (Hale, 1977: 187).[71] This explains the fact that the workers mobilized against the DGMs, as explained in Chapter 5. It is possible to group the political juridical cases opened after the memorandum into two types: the first group consists of cases against workers, youth, and teachers. organizations and associations which are founded according to the law and operate in line with their bylaws such as DİSK, Dev-Genç, Teachers Union of Turkey (*Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası* – TÖS), while the second group involves cases against party and guerilla organizations that mainly adopted armed struggle as a strategy such as THKPC, THKO, etc. (Özdemir, 2002: 266-67). The judicial cases, of course, were also mobilized after the military coup in 1980: as Jacoby (2003: 678) wrote "by September 1981, 167 mass trials were underway, of which the majority focused on 'left-wing' allegations".

Declaration of martial law in some cities, or in the countryside is another form of repression. After the military memorandum on March 1971, martial law was declared in 11 provinces (namely İstanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak, İzmir, Eskişehir, Ankara, Adana, Hatay, Diyarbakır and Siirt) and lasted until September 1973. This martial law in practice, as Karabelias (1999:144) argues, "permitted the local commanders to concentrate the judicial, legislative and executive powers in their own hands". It was not only the local commanders that gained power with this practice, but also the right-wing movement as the militant cadres of MHP were "instrumental in establishing martial law and undertaking operations in which large numbers of socialists were arrested, silenced or killed" (Jacoby, 2003: 675). Later, in 1978, martial law was declared again in 13 provinces on the basis of increasing violence. The execution of martial law was

[71] DGMs functioned until 1976, when the Constitutional Court annulled the law creating the courts. However, the DGM system was restored again after the military coup in 1980, in 1982.

then extended to include 22 provinces in total (namely Adana, Ankara, Bingöl, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kars, Malatya, Sivas, Urfa, Adıyaman, Hakkari, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, İzmir, Hatay and Ağrı) and prolonged ten times until the military coup in 1980. Repression through the implementation of martial law became harsher after the coup in 1980, as it was declared in every province in the whole country and was only repealed completely in 1987.

With regard to the source of repression, as shown in Table 9.2 below, security forces, including the police and the gendarmerie,[72] are the main actors with a share of 81 percent. Given the role of countermovements in Turkey in the 1970s, this might be considered as a surprising fact. However, it should be kept in mind that especially from the mid-1970s, thanks to its role in the Nationalist Front governments, security forces in Turkey were heavily under control of the far-right Nationalist Action Party, whose unofficial youth organization Grey Wolves constituted the countermovement of the left-wing student movement in Turkey. In addition, it should also be considered that detecting and reporting the repressive activities of security forces might be far easier than the activities of countermovements. On the other hand, the high share of security forces in repressive acts might be explained by the changes in the Law on Duties and the Authority of Police (Law No. 2559) made respectively in 1965, 1973 and 1980. According to Gönen et. al. (2014: 20), these changes made in the Law expanded the police department and increased its authority, for example, by providing the police with the right to enter universities which have been one of most frequent

[72] Gendarmerie in Turkey is a part of the armed forces with the responsibility for policing in rural areas. "The gendarmerie takes care of law enforcement, conducts criminal investigations, controls traffic within their areas of responsibility" (Mutlu, 2000: 384). While the branch is connected to the Chief of Staff with regards to training and education, it is directly related to the Ministry of National Defense on issues of security and order (Satana, 2007: 13).

scenes of protests with students being the major actors of the cycle of protest. Besides, the onsite intervention in the protest events and police surveillance strategies took other forms, too. According to Uysal (2007: 381), these strategies that have a long history in Turkey included the suspension of activist knowledge, illegitimating protest events by pejoratively labeling the protesters as separatists, provocateurs, etc., unpredictability of risks and penalties and polarizing the protesting groups.[73]

Table 9.2: Sources of repression in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Source of Repression	**Freq.**	**Percent**
Security forces	1.226	81.3
Other	283	18.8
Total	1.509	100

9.2. Repression, Actors and Goals

As mentioned above, around 28 percent of protest events in Turkey between 1971 and 1986 were repressed. It was discussed in Chapter 2 that use of repression might vary according to the organizing or participating actors of a protest event. In this regard, it is significant to differentiate the groups who were subjected to repression. Table 9.3 presents the relevant data on the target groups of repressive acts. Accordingly, students, who "(…) were reconstructed in public discourse as a "threat" to the national interest" (Neyzi, 2001: 419), are the ones who suffered most from repression, as 67.8 percent of the total number of repressed events were

[73] For a more detailed account of policing, with a special focus on the organization of riot policing, in Turkey see Uysal (2010).

carried out by them. Students were also the main actors of the cycle of protest as explained in Chapter 5.

Table 9.3: Targets of repression in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Actors	**(in %)**
Students	67.8
Groups with opposed views	16.7
Workers	6.8
General public	6.5
Terrorists	2.0
Elites	.3
Total	100
N	976

In order to understand the dynamics of repression with regards to the actors of the cycle, we might also have a look at the repression that targeted organizations. In this regard, according to the data presented in Table 9.4, social movement organizations that are not directly involved in violent attacks or illegal activities are the ones that are repressed more than any other type of organization. Associations and political parties are following these social movement organizations. Repression of organizations operating in the formal political arena and whose activities are limited and controlled by law, such as the associations and political parties, is a significant sign of the repressive character of state in Turkey. This fact clearly demonstrates that even the formal and conventional political organizations can be subjected to repression in various forms.

Table 9.4: Targets of repression with regards to organizations in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Organization	**(in %)**
Other SMOs	26.0
Associations	23.7
Political parties	23.7
Unions	13.3
Illegal organizations	12.7
Chambers/benches	.6
Total	100
N	173

With regard to the relationship between repression and actors, one should also analyze the role of ideological orientations of the protestors. Table 9.5 presents relevant data on the share of the leftists, rightists, Islamists and Kurdish groups' events that are repressed. According to the table, the share of right-wing protest events that is repressed is higher than the left-wing. However, the share is highes in Kurdish groups, a fact that can be explained by the fact that the state in Turkey has been repressive towards the Kurds since its foundation. On the other hand, given the fact that the Kurdish movement, at first, was part of the left-wing movement in Turkey, as explained already in Chapter 5, and that it has located itself in the left-wing ideology, it can be claimed that share of repressed events of the left-wing is higher than the right-wing.

Table 9.5: Share of events repressed according to ideological orientation in Turkey, 1971-1985 (in %).

	Ideological Orientation of Groups			
Repression	Leftists	Rightists	Islamists	Kurdish Groups
Not repressed	66.5	63.1	87.2	61.9
Repressed	33.5	36.9	12.8	38.1
Total	100	100	100	100
N	635	382	39	21

As discussed in the relevant literature, state repression, even in liberal democracies, targets some groups more harshly than others (Moss 2014). Combes and Fillieule (2011: 7), for example, write that the "(…) policing styles remain selective and dependent on several factors, starting with the perception of marginalized groups by the authorities". Left oriented social movements in Turkey are a case in point. Zürcher (2004: 259), for example, writes that the martial law declared after the military memorandum in March 1971 was used "(…) to institute a veritable witch-hunt against anyone with leftist or even progressive liberal sympathies". The situation got worse after the formation of the first Nationalist Front government in 1975, as the nationalists gained power in the bureaucracy; a fact that acquired state protection for the Grey Wolves (Samim, 1981: 75). In this regard, it can be hypothesized that the security forces' repressive activities would target left-wing groups more (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 2). Also the anti-terror campaign which started after the coup in September 1980 was "biased against the left" (Zürcher, 2004: 279). The data presented in Table 9.6 supports the hypothesis as around 58 percent of events where the security forces were the source of repression targeted left-wing militants.

Table 9.6: Sources of repression according to ideology in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

Ideology of Actors	**Source of Repression**	
	Security Forces	Other
Leftists	58.1	54.7
Rightists	37.7	43.8
Islamists	1.4	1.6
Kurdish groups	2.8	0.0
Total	100	100
N	289	64

How is repression related to the goals of actions? The data presented in Table 9.7 shows that among different goals of protests, commemoration events are the ones that have the highest share of repression, as 43.8 percent of such events were repressed. In addition, around 26 percent of protest events organized against repression are also repressed. Thus, it can be claimed that protests organized as a result of violence and repression were also met with repression like in a vicious circle. Protest events having an educational goal, meaning protests demanding amelioration, change on education issues, are also repressed with a share of about 24 percent. The same is true for the protests that have a direct and overt political goal; around 23 percent of such events are repressed. This indicates that repression, in one way or another, became a part of daily routine of student life, when even a protest event related to any aspect of educational and political life risks to be repressed. This contradicts the general expectation that "activists with radical goals and strategies are more likely to be subjected to repression, whereas moderate wings are more likely to receive facilitation" (Koopmans, 1993: 645).

Table 9.7: Goals of repressed protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Goal of Action								
Repression	Political	Education	Economy/Labor Policies	International	Murders/Attacks	Repression	Commemoration	Social	Ungrouped
Not repressed	76.7	75.9	82.8	79.1	77.9	74.0	56.2	76.8	75.0
Repressed	23.3	24.1	17.2	20.9	22.1	26.1	43.8	23.2	25.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	193	266	244	43	253	119	105	95	8

9.3. Repression and Repertoires of Action

Constituting a part of the political opportunity structure, repression also has an impact on the forms of actions used by social movements. However, this relationship is complex: on the one hand it can be inferred that high levels of repression will moderate the repertoire of action due to high costs, on the other hand it might escalate tension and thus radicalize the repertoire of action especially in the case of countercultural movements (Kriesi et. al. 1995: 39).

To start with, it can be claimed that more moderate forms of actions would meet less repression. This expectation is not met in the Turkish case, as seen in Table 9.8. Around 40 percent of demonstrative events are repressed. Also, around 24 percent of conventional forms of actions are met with repression. However, it is also observable that 30 percent of confrontational protests and 28 percent of violent events were subjected to repression. In this regard, it is possible to claim that repression in Turkey did not focus on particular forms of actions, but it targeted protest events in general regardless of the forms of actions used.

On the other hand, the data showed us that there is a positive correlation with the use of repression and number of violent protest events, as the correlation coefficient is 0.81. This strong relationship infers that when use of repression increases so does the use of violent forms of actions.

Table 9.8: Repression according to the forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Forms of Action				
Repression	Conventional	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike	Violence
Not repressed	76.3	60.3	70.1	86.0	72.0
Repressed	23.7	39.7	29.9	14.0	28.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	448	468	448	171	3.825

What is the relationship between different forms of repression and forms of actions? Table 9.9 presents data on the types of repression according to conventional, demonstrative, confrontational forms of actions, as well as strikes and violent events. In this regard, custody has been the major type of repression for those actions which were repressed. It is mentioned before that the vast majority of repression is functioned by the security forces. In this case, it is not surprising to see custody as the major form of repression for these diverse forms of actions, as custody can only be employed by security forces. On the other hand, it is clear that demonstrative and confrontational protest events and the violent ones are tried to be channeled by banning, postponing events and emptying school buildings, etc.

Table 9.9: Types of repression according to the forms of protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Forms of Actions				
Type of repression	Conventional	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike	Violence
Against events	7.6	19.0	26.5	8.0	15.9
Custody	43.8	44.0	47.0	36.0	68.4
Arrest	6.7	4.9	2.3	8.0	5.9
Investigation	0.0	0.0	3.0	4.0	5.8
Ungrouped	41.9	32.1	21.2	44.0	4.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	105	184	132	25	1.053

Who was in charge of repression of protest events in which different forms of actions were employed? According to the data presented in Table 9.10, except for the strikes, security forces, including policemen and gendarmerie, are the main source of repression for each form of action. The reason lying behind the exceptional case for strikes is coming from the nature of industrial relations: main source of repression for the workers' strikes are employers with their repressive means including lock-outs, etc.

Table 9.10: Sources of repression according to different forms of protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

	Forms of Actions				
Source of repression	Conventional	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Strike	Violence
Security forces	75.3	81.9	71.2	48.0	83.8
Other	24.7	18.1	28.8	52.0	16.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	97	182	132	25	1.072

The data presented here is on repression during the cycle. On the other hand, repression was also present before and after the cycle, i.e. between 1971 and 1973 and after 1980 as a result of the military (interim) regimes established after military interventions. This massive repression that took various forms including mass arrests, declaration of curfew, dismissals, party closures, torture, death penalties, had a clear effect on social movement mobilization in Turkey and the number of protests organized as already shown in Figures 2.1 and 5.1. Thus, it can be claimed that this mass and multi-layered repression of the military regimes that took various forms was capable of doing away with any form of protest. While repression also existed during the cycle, it was not capable of ending the protests as it was done by the military regimes. It was the opening up of the system, such as the amnesty announced in 1974, that led to the number of protests increase. However, it was observed that the cycle that flourished after 1974 was violent from the start and showed only weak signs of institutionalization. This can be partly explained by the fact that the system did not open up widely enough to lead more established and conventional mobilization. Thus, it can be claimed that it's the partial opening of the system that contributed to the emergence of mass violence, as predicted by the inverted U-curve model. The system provided human resource to the social movements as the main cadres of both the left and right-wing movements were released after the general amnesty announced by the efforts of the center left CHP and Islamist MSP. However, it did not provide access to formal politics and decision making processes. The only way to participate in politics was seen as voting in elections. Thus, the system did not provide wide opportunities to the movements, which had their human resources back, to institutionalize and the amnesty, which was actually an election campaign

promise before the 1973 general elections, was a partial opening with regards to the movements that. On the other hand, repression in prisons during the period between the military memorandum and the amnesty led to more radicalization among the youth. It is widely accepted that it was the mistreatments towards the Kurdish youth contributed to formation of the PKK in the coming years.

9.4. Conclusion

The chapter elaborated on the dynamics of repression of the cycle of protest in Turkey in the 1970s. According to the data presented in this chapter, it can be claimed that the majority of events were not repressed, at least not overtly. However, around 25-30 percent of all forms of protest events were repressed. This showed us that repression along with violence became a part of the political life in Turkey in the 1970s, regardless of forms of actions used.

Despite the fact that the increasing militancy of left-wing youth created a strong countermovement, a vast majority of repression was carried out by the state apparatus via security forces including the police and the gendarmerie. This fact is explained by the fact that during the Nationalist Front governments, the MHP and other right-wing parties managed to "to colonise the state by placing their supporters in various ministries" (Ahmad, 2008: 252).

The chapter also revealed that repression mainly targeted students with left-leaning ideological positions. While the right-wing was also subjected to repression, considering the Kurdish groups and the left-wing, it can be claimed that it was not wide as the repression of the left.

With regards to the forms of actions, while all types of events were repressed as mentioned above, the share of repressed events was higher in demonstrative actions which are accepted to the be least challenging ones among

other unconventional forms of actions. Repression of violent events came only the second after demonstrative ones. On the other hand, the empirical data showed that there is a strong positive relationship between repression and the numbers of protests events and use of violence.

Finally, considering the repression during the military regimes, not during the cycle, it is claimed in the chapter that the partial opening of the system, i.e. the amnesty announced in 1974, contributed to increasing violence after transition to a normal regime as is was predicted by the inverted U-curve model.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

Considered as a chaotic period, the 1970s in Turkey have long been disregarded politically as well as academically. Those years are usually referred to by politician when talking about social movements and collective actions. Burhan Kuzu, a founding member of the ruling Justice and Development Party and head of the Constitutional Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, pointed out in 2012 that people involved in contemporary street movements are after a chaotic environment, making a reference to pre-1980 period. He also added that under their rule the military went back to its barracks, the judiciary is normalized and now it's the turn for the "streets" to be emptied (*Radikal*, 24.12.2012). "Are you aiming at going back to the pre-1980 period?" is a question that is still asked after almost every attempt of resurgence in social opposition, as also mentioned by Yaşlı (2013).

This study aimed at showing that the 1970s were more than a chaotic period and a dark era that should be disregarded. We should keep in mind three significant developments with regard to the social movements sector in Turkey: First, those years have been the years of politization of the youth in Turkey. Thanks to the basic rights provided by the 1960 Constitution, a growing interest in

politics flourished among the university youth as well as high-school students. As empirically shown in this study, students were on the streets especially from 1974 onwards to make some claims and react to some socio-economic and political developments. While their major concerns were related to the education system and its democratization, they also engaged in directly politically oriented protests such as the ones organized against the governments of the time and economically led protests including the ones against increasing prices.

The crystallization of a class perspective is another significant feature of those years in Turkey. This is an important fact given the "classless" understanding of Turkish society by the founders of the republic. With the 1970s, the labor movement raised consciousness with regard to their class interest and, supported by several laws guarenteering labor rights, started to get organized politically. The strike that lasted for two days on June 15-16, 1970 constitutes one of the milestones of the labor movement and is often compared to the TEKEL resistance that took place in 2010 in Ankara and elsewhere.

Finally, as shown empirically in this study, widespread and extensive use of violence marked those years. Inspired by several international models i.e. Soviet and Chinese models and Latin American guerilla movements, some of the left-wing organizations adopted violent tactics as a means for a socialist revolution. Their lack of access to the formal political structures, the defeat of the Labor Party and the military interventions in 1971 and 1980 and state repression preceding and following these interventions might be listed as causes in addition to the ideological bases of violence. On the other hand, some other groups resorted to violence as a way of self-defense against the increasing militancy of the right-wing.

One of the main arguments of this study is the need to consider the 1970s as a cycle of protest. Increasing militancy of students that diffused to other groups, use of various forms of actions and the dynamics of protests, heightened phases of conflict and diverse forms of interactions between the state and social movements that are explained in detail in the individual chapters are among the features of those years that help us to label the period as a cycle. Figure 2.1 and Figure 5.1 documented the start and termination of the cycle very clearly. Considering the period as a cycle of protest, and analyzing it accordingly would contribute to the "normalization" of perception of street protests and collective action in Turkey.

If it is possible to consider the mobilization in the 1970s as a cycle of protest, then we should also consider its development and ebb and flows. Departing from the political process approach and the concepts central to it, this study argued that changes in the political opportunity structure shaped the overall development of the cycle of protest. In this regard, the defeat of the TİP in 1969, the military intervention in the form of a memorandum in March 1971, the general amnesty announced in 1974 and the formation of National Front governments as well as the military coup in September 1980 can be listed as milestones for the social movement activity within the covered period. The clear-cut impacts of these developments on the level of mobilization in Turkey in 1970s are clearly shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 5.1. As we have seen, there were some protest events in the period between 1971 and 1973, however they remained insignificant. The repressive character of the military regime established in March 1971 that operated through bans on some political parties and organizations, declaration of martial law and the following mass investigations and imprisonments is responsible for this low level of mobilization. The same is true for the period after

the military coup in September 1980: harsh repression and imprisonments of the main cadres of major movements and organizations contributed to the loss of human sources of these movements and thus emptying the streets. On the other hand, the period from 1974 until the military coup marks a phase of heightened conflict that involved different groups and use of various forms of actions. Again, it can be claimed that the changes in the political opportunity structures shaped mobilization of social movements in those years. Changes in the configuration of power, unexpected coalitions with the center left CHP and Islamist MSP which led to the general amnesty announced in 1974, the formation of National Front governments in the late 1970s, economic crises, and restructuring of economy with the 24 January Decisions, are some of the developments that marked this period and that modified the political opportunity structure significantly, with important implications for the mobilization of protestors.

Each cycle of protests has its own components that vary according to the context and timing of the cycle. In this regard, in order to be able to reconstruct the cycle in Turkey in the 1970s, this study focused on three components, namely the actors, repertoires of actions used and the issues raised during protests. The empirical analysis of the actors of the protests in Turkey that took place between 1971 and 1986 shows that students, who were also the early risers, led the protest events. Politicization of students that started in the mid-1960s, supported by the rights provided by the 1961 Constitution and several other developments explained in this study, ended up in radicalization caused by a combination of their lack of access to formal politics, increasing factionalism, and reactions and attacks by opposing groups. In this regard, the right-wing idealist youth that positioned itself next to the state apparatus with the aim of protecting it against the

"threat of communism" flourished as a countermovement, especially under the protection of its allies especially within the Nationalist Front governments. Thus, it is not surprising to see a similar pattern in the mobilization of these groups. The labor movement, on the other hand, accompanied students and mobilized for their socio-economic rights. This was possible thanks to the rights provided by several laws including the 1961 Constitution including the right to establish unions, and the right to bargain collectively and to strike. In addition, the Trade Union Law of 1963 provided freedom of organization to workers and employers. However, while seeing the struggle in both political and economic terms, the data showed us that the workers were mainly concerned about their collective rights with regards to the industrial relations.

Actors of a cycle of protest are not solely composed of social groups, but also by several organizations. In this regard, the empirical data showed that in line with the increasing labor militancy, the unions emerged as the dominant organizations within the first years of the period covered. In the late 1970s, their role was replaced by associations mainly in the forms of university student associations that played a leading role for student mobilization. Professional organizations such as TMMOB, on the other hand, emerged as the external allies of social movements in Turkey in those years. However, increasing militancy and the use of violence led to the dominance of illegal organizations in the years preceding and following the 1980 military coup. The military intervention and the repressive strategies of the regime closed the door for "legal" organizations. The legacy of the coup in 1980 is significant in this regard: it created a rupture with regard to the organizations, as a vast majority of the organizations, including political parties, active in 1970s do not currently exist in Turkish political life.

Repertoires of actions constitute the second one of the main characteristics of cycles of protests and distinguishing features of social movements. One of the differentiating features of the 1970s in Turkey has been the use of extensive violence; a fact that can be explained based on several dimensions including culture, socio-economic developments of the period, ideologies that are dominant, alliance structures, factionalism and repression coming from both the state and third parties. Besides the high share of violence, this study also showed that cycle has been violent since the start. This is a striking fact considering other cycles of protest in those years in some European states, such as Italy and Germany, where the cycle radicalizes towards its end and where violence was the outcome of the cycle, not an important component of it. The majority of the rest of the protest events were unconventional too: class boycotts, leaving black wreaths in front of party buildings or central squares in cities, demonstrations, forums should be considered in this respect. Only around 8 percent of the total numbers of protest events were conventional, thus the vast majority of the protests were unconventional; a fact that reveals the innovative dynamic of the actors. Instead of dealing with more conventional forms of actions such as press releases, participants of social movements of the 1970s in Turkey preferred employing more radical forms of actions. The data also clearly demonstrated that the actors did not employ political and judicial forms of actions, a fact that serves as an indicator of distrust in formal politics.

Finally, this study dealt with the issues raised by several actors during the protests. However, it was possible to detect the goal of action in only around 25 percent of the events. Based on the data, I showed empirically that the struggle was mainly educational and industrial. While students were concerned about

educational issues, the labor movement was concerned about the economy and labor policies. At the beginning of the 1970s, when the streets were filled with the labor movement, as the student movement was crushed by the military intervention, economic issues were relatively significant. Following economic issues and labor policies, issues regarding education system mainly raised by students took the scene in the mid-1970s when the student movement regained its momentum. Towards the end of the 1970s, the number of protests against murders and attacks became more significant as a result of increasing violence, and decrease in protests related to political and educational issues. In this regard, it can be argued that the social movements of the 1970s in Turkey failed to generate a master frame for their events, and the concerns of new social movements emerged in Europe in the same years did not resonate in Turkey.

As mentioned above, this study is not aimed at analyzing the emergence or development of several social movements in Turkey in the 1970s. Rather it aimed at demonstrating the characteristics of the period that help us to consider it as a cycle of protest. Once showing this, the next step was to analyze the dynamics of this cycle and the way it evolved. In this regard, this study focused on two dynamics. First, based on the general expectation of institutionalization and radicalization as two hand to hand processes towards the end of the cycle, I empirically analyzed the existence of these processes in Turkey in 1970s. For this purpose, I focused on the increase in the involvement of external allies, emergence of new parties, increased support for parties in favor of reform, and increase in the membership of social movement organizations. The data showed that the involvement of external allies decreased in time. In addition, while there were 20 political parties founded between 1971 and 1980, none of these became

mass parties. Thus, it would be appropriate to accept this fact as an indicator of factionalism in Turkey rather than an attempt towards institutionalization. With regards to the increase in the vote shares of reform parties, it is possible to observe and increase in the votes of center-left CHP, while the share of TİP decreased. Finally, membership data of social movement organizations is very limited. However, an increase in the membership of labor unions is observable. In this regard, it is only possible to speak about a limited attempt towards institutionalization in Turkey in 1970s.

Radicalization, on the other hand, is discussed with regard to the evolution of the use of different forms of actions, more precisely conventional and demonstrative forms, and use of different forms of violence, involvement of organizations in the use of violence and the development of issues rose during protest events. The data showed that the number of conventional and demonstrative actions increased until 1977, but decreased from that time on. On the other hand, considering the use of different forms of violence, it can be claimed that the more bloody and direct forms of violence such as shootings grew continuously up to the end of the cycle, while the number of less dramatic forms of violence tended to decline. With regard to the involvement of organizations in violent events, in the Turkish case, contradicting the idea that the more organizations involved the less contentious the protest tactics (Piven and Cloward 1979; Staggenborg 1988), political parties and social movements organizations without an overt tendency to do so also employed violence. The number of protests targeting the repression coming from adversaries and aiming at commemorating the death of militant or "revolutionary martyrs", on the other hand, increased throughout the end of the cycle. Based on these empirical results,

the wave of protest in Turkey in the 1970s, in contrast to the examples from Italy, Germany, revealed mostly the dynamics of radicalization, while institutionalization is limited to the labor movement with regard to the increase in members of labor unions. Lack of channels of institutionalized access, factionalism and discussions about the revolutionary methods within the left-wing movement and strong alliance provided to the right-wing movement especially during the Nationalist Front governments facilitated radicalization.

Secondly, repression, as a dimension of political opportunity structure, is considered. Based on Earl's (2003; 2007) distinction I focused on overt repression, coming from state actors and/or countermovements, in the forms of both coercion and channeling. The empirical data on repression of protest events showed us that state as well as countermovements employed various forms of repressive acts including banning newspapers, closing schools for a certain time period, imposing curfew, police search in political party or association buildings, taking city entrances under control, detaining, opening investigation against people, using tear and smoke gases, lock-outs, armed attacks targeting protestors, torture, etc. However, the major form of repression was taking people under custody, especially during on site interventions to protest events. Thus the main strategy of the state towards social movements and protests was coercion, rathen than channeling. Aiming at suspension of activist knowledge[74], illegitimating protest events by pejoratively labeling the protesters as separatists, provocateurs, etc., making risks and penalties of participation unpredictable and polarizing the protesting groups (Uysal, 2007: 381), the main source of repression in Turkey in

[74] Activist knowledge is defined as a "process of (trans)forming social consciousness through a certain course of socio-political contentions and communicative actions – mostly undertaken in 'public spheres', around a vital set of interrelated social issues, in order to explain and respond to them" (Hosseini, 2010: 341).

those years have been the security forces that include both the police and gendarmerie. The data also revealed that it was the left-wing students who suffered more from repression. Another significant feature of repressive dynamics in Turkey in 1970s is that the level of observable repression followed a similar path with the level of mobilization: it started to increase in 1974, made a peak in 1978 and declined from that time on. This is related to the fact that vast majority of repressive events took place during protest events. The effect of repression on the use the choice of repertoire, especially on violent events, is a highly debated in the literature. Based on the statistical analysis of the relevant data a strong positive relationship between repression and number of protests can be claimed: thus, as repression increased so did the number of protest events. The same kind of relationship also existed between repression and use of violence. As the statistical analysis demonstrated as repression increased so did the number of violent events.

With regard to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, it can be said that 5 out of 7[75] hypotheses are supported. In this regard, the number of protest events is insignificant under military regimes, given their repressive character. In addition, growing polarization that expanded the opportunities for new alliances caused increasing levels of external ally participation to protest events during heightened phases of conflict. Moreover, having a closed institutional context, low levels of access to formal politics and strong state tradition facilitated the radicalization of the cycle, at least with regards to the forms of actions used. However, the repressive character of the military regimes did not lead to more radicalization. On the other hand, repressive acts in Turkey in the 1970s, especially of security forces are biased towards the left-wing students. Finally, right-wing groups who

[75] Hypothesis 3a and 3b were competing (see Chapter 2).

were more successful in finding powerful allies, especially during the Nationalist Front governments, compared to the left-wing were subjected to repression less and able to employ higher levels of violence as they were somehow protected by their allies.

As I have already pointed out, there is a strong positive relationship between repression and levels of mobilization. However, this was not the case under military regimes. In this regard, it can be claimed that repression led mobilization to some extent; harsher and covert repression during the military regimes did not cause an increase in the number of protests, nor did it radicalize the forms of actions. This fact might be explained by the fact that the military interventions and coups in Turkey, that are accepted as reflections of the coercive (*ceberrut*) state tradition in Turkey (Heper 1985), seriously damaged the human resources of social movements of 1970s in Turkey. In addition, especially the last coup in 1980 managed to ensure suspension of activist knowledge, and to establish a pejorative understanding of street protests among the Turkish society; a legacy that still exists. It can be claimed that even in early 2010s, actors of the social movement sector try to differentiate themselves from the "old left" in Turkey in search for their own legitimacy. Repertoire choice, i.e. use of violence, of these groups of course contributed to this fact. In this regard it is possible to consider the coup in 1980 as a rupture from the period preceding it.

It can be claimed that the changes in the regime structure in Turkey had a significant effect on the mobilization of several groups including students and labor. Based on the centralized institutional structure of the state apparatus and the exclusive prevailing strategies of the elites Turkey is considered as a "strong" state. The coercive state tradition, rampant multi-party system, incapable

governments as well as the exclusive political system that lead to distrust in formal politics contributed to the radicalization of mobilization in those years.

The inheritance of those years in Turkey is still alive with regard to both the state apparatus and social movements. Conserning the social movements, there are still protests against the military coup, especially on its anniversary. For example, on September 12, 2011, some groups demonstrated and organized a march against the coup in Bursa, an event that ended in a conflict between groups with opposed views as some people threw stones at the protestors (*Radikal*, 12.09.2011). The next year, again on the anniversary of the coup, protests were organized by several groups including DİSK in several cities including Ankara, İstanbul and Diyarbakır (*Aljazeera*, 12.09.2012).

In addition, analyzing the previous cycles of protest helps us to build some analytical bridges between the social movements of the past and contemporary ones. Thus, some of the activists that took part in the anti/alter-globalization movements in Turkey, who were also somehow related to the "old-left" in Turkey, tried to differentiate themselves and their repertoire of action from the ones used in the 1970s. Recent Gezi protests of 2013 are also compared to those of the late 1960s, especially the 1968 movement.

In addition, some of the forms of action used in the 1970s became popular again very recently. For example, after the Gezi Park protests in Turkey during summer 2013, people started to organize forums in public parks. This "new" practice attracted significant attention. However, as mentioned in Chapter 6, forums have been one of the frequent forms of actions used by students to make decisions on how to proceed with their struggle within universities in the 1970s. The same is valid also for occupations: it is possible to see different forms of

occupations in contemporary Turkey, while occupations were an important tool of university youth in late 1960s. On the other hand, it can be claimed that the recent mass labor protests in the late 1990s and in TEKEL resistance in 2009 rose on the shoulders of the historical background of the labor movement in Turkey including the 1970s. In this regard, it is possible to trace some extent of continuity within the Turkish context across decades.

The legacy is still alive also with regard to the state and use of repression. As mentioned in Chapter 9, the postponement of strikes was used as a mean of repression in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though a new law on trade unions and collective bargaining was introduced in 2012, the regulation that gives the government the authority to postpone strikes was kept. In this regard, besides some other examples from early 2000s, in June 2014 the Turkish government postponed the strike of Şişecam factory workers for 60 days, as it was considered as constituting a threat to public health and national security.

In this regard, it is important to understand the developments of the 1970s and the dynamics of the cycle of protest and repression as the source of rupture, to understand the contemporary dynamics of street politics in Turkey. In addition it is also important to understand the across time diffusion of several forms of actions and mechanisms that facilitate this diffusion. Future researches addressing these issues would contribute to our understanding of social movements in Turkey. This is why this dissertation should not be considered as an end result but only a beginning of a larger project, which would examine the relationship between changes in the political opportunity structure and social movements in Turkey within a historical perspective.

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APPENDIX 1: Governments of Turkey, 1971-1986.

Period	Prime Minister	Ruling Party
06.03.1970-26.03.1971	Süleyman Demirel (3rd term)	AP
26.03.1971-11.12.1971	Nihat Erim (1st term)	---
11.12.1971-22.05.1972	Nihat Erim (2nd term)	---
22.05.1972-15.04.1973	Ferit Melen	---
15.04.1973-26.01.1974	Mehmet Naim Talu	---
26.01.1974-17.11.1974	Bülent Ecevit (1st term)	CHP
17.11.1974-31.03.1975	Mahmut Sadi Irmak	---
3l.03.1975-21.06.1977	Süleyman Demirel (4th term)	AP
21.06.1977-21.07.1977	Bülent Ecevit (2nd term)	CHP
21.07.1977-05.01.1978	Süleyman Demirel (5th term)	AP
05.01.1978-12.11.1979	Bülent Ecevit (3rd term)	CHP
12.11.1979-12.09.1980	Süleyman Demirel (6th term)	AP
12.09.1980-13.12.1983	Bülent Ulusu	---
13.12.1983-21.12.1987	Turgut Özal (1st term)	ANAP

Source: Compiled from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukumetler.html (accessed on March 19, 2012).

APPENDIX 2: **Political Parties Operated in Turkey, 1971-1986**

Name of Party	Year of Foundation	Position	Reason for Closure	Year of Closure
Milli Güven Partisi	1971	Center-right	Resolution	1973
Cumhuriyetçi Parti	1972	Center-right	Resolution	1973
Milli Selamet Partisi	1972	Political Islam	Military coup	1981
Türkiye Ulusal Kadınlar Partisi	1972	Feminist	Military coup	1981
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi	1973	Center-right	Military coup	1981
Büyük Kuvvet Partisi	1973	*	Resolution	1973
Türkiye Kardeşlik Partisi	1973	Center-left	Resolution	1973
Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi	1974	Socialist	Military coup	1981
Vatan Partisi	1975	Socialist	Military coup	1981
Demokrat Parti	1975	Center-right	Military coup	1980
Türkiye Emekçi Partisi	1975	Socialist	Constitutional Court decision	1980
Türkiye İşçi Partisi	1975	Socialist	Military coup	1981
Sosyalist Devrim Partisi	1975	Socialist	Military coup	1981
Nizam Partisi	1977	Conservative	Military coup	1981
Sosyalist Hareket Partisi	1977	Socialist	*	
Türkiye Sosyal Adalet Partisi	1977	Center-left	Resolution	1978
Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi	1978	Socialist	Military coup	1981
Sosyalist Vatan Partisi	1979	Socialist	Military coup	1981
Hürriyetçi Millet Partisi	1979	Center-right	Military coup	1981
Hür Demokratlar Partisi	1980	Center-right	Military coup	1981
Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi	1983	Nationalist	Resolution	1986
Anavatan Partisi	1983	Center-right	Resolution	2009
Büyük Türkiye Partisi	1983	Center-right	National Security Council decision	1983
Halkçı Parti	1983	Center-left	Resolution	1985
Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi	1983	Center-left	Resolution	1985
Yüce Görev Partisi	1983	Center-left	Resolution	1983
Doğru Yol Partisi	1983	Center-right	Resolution	2007
Yeni Doğuş Partisi	1983	Center-right	Resolution	1984
Yeni Düzen Partisi	1983	Center-left	Resolution	1985
Fazilet Partisi	1983	Center-right	Resolution	1984
Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakar Parti	1983	Nationalist	Resolution	1983
Muhafazakar Parti	1983	Nationalist	Resolution	1985
Bizim Parti	1983	Center-right	Resolution	1983

Refah Partisi	1983	Political Islam	Constitutional Court decision	1998
Türkiye Huzur Partisi	1983	Center-right	Resolution	1983
Huzur Partisi	1983	Center-right	Constitutional Court decision	1983
Bayrak Partisi	1983	Conservative	Resolution	1992
Atılım Partisi	*	*	*	*
Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi	1984	Nationalist	Resolution	1992
Demokratik Sol Parti	1985	Center-left	Active	
Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti	1985	Center-left	Resolution	1995
Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi	1985	Nationalist	Resolution	1993

SELİN BENGİ GÜMRÜKÇÜ

Curriculum Vitae, 2014

CONTACT INFORMATION

Address: İzmir University, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, Gürsel Aksel Bulvarı No:14 Üçkuyular / İzmir 35350 TURKEY

E-mail: bengi.gumrukcu@izmir.edu.tr

EDUCATION

2009-2014 **PhD student, Political Science, University of Zurich**

Dissertation title: "Reconstructing a Cycle of Protest: Protest and Politics in Turkey, 1971-1985"

Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Hanspeter Kriesi

2005-2007 **MA, Public Administration, Dokuz Eylul University**

Major Area: Social and Political Sciences

Thesis title: "The Rise of a Social Movement: Emergence of the Anti-globalization Movements in Turkey"

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşen Uysal

2001-2005 **BA, Public Administration, Dokuz Eylul University**

AREAS OF INTEREST

Social movements, political sociology, Turkish politics, political parties, violence.

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

2014- Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Izmir University.

2007- 2014 Research Assistant, Department of International Relations and the European Union, Izmir University of Economics.

2007- 2008 Project Assistant "*Construction of Social Networks in Political Parties: the Role of Center and Province Leaders in Building Social Networks*", Supported by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) conducted by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşen Uysal.

Visiting Positions

September 2013 Visiting PhD student, Centre for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po, Paris/France.

Jan.-April 2013 Visiting Fellow, Bielefeld Graduate School of History and Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld/Germany.

July-Dec. 2011 Academic Guest, Institute of Political Science, University of Zurich.

PUBLICATIONS

Articles in Journals Indexed by SSCI:

2012 "Positions of Turkish Political Parties on European Integration", **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, (with Prof. Dr. Filiz Başkan), 12 (1): 25-44.

2010 "The Rise of a Social Movement: Emergence of the Anti-globalization Movements in Turkey", **Turkish Studies**, 11 (2): 163-180.

Book Chapters:

2014 (forthcoming) "Europeanization and Political Parties in Turkey" (with Prof. Dr. Filiz Başkan) In ***Europeanization of Turkey: Polity and Politics*** eds. Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin.

Book Reviews:

2013 Review of *Negotiating Political Power in Turkey: Breaking Up the Party,* by Elise Massicard and Nicole Watts, **International Journal of Turkish Studies***,* 19 (1-2) (with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşen Uysal).

PAPERS PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES, PANELS AND SEMINARS

2014 "Alternatif Küreselleşme Hareketlerinden Gezi'ye Protesto Eylemlerinin Uluslararası Dolaşımı", **Sokakta Siyaset. Kamusal Alanda Kolektif Eylemler (Politique dans la rue: Action Collective dans l'espace publique)**, Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir/Turkey, March 17-18, 2014.

2013 "Eylem Repertuvarı: Türkiye'de Sokak Eylemleri, 1971-1981", **13. Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi,** Middle East Technical University, Ankara/Turkey, December 4-6, 2013.

2013 "Social Movements in Turkey in 1970s", **Social Movements: Local and Global Perspectives,** University of Bielefeld, Faculty of History, Bielefeld/Germany, October 25, 2013.

2013 "Europeanization and Euroscepticism in Turkey: Two Sides of the Same Coin", **Europeanization of Turkey: Polity, Politics and Policies,** Department of International Relations, Yasar University and Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Izmir/Turkey, October 24-25, 2013 (with Prof. Dr. Filiz Başkan).

2013 "Protest and Politics in Turkey, 1971-1985", European Sociological Association PhD Workshop, University of Turin, Turin/Italy, August 26-27, 2013.

2010 "Europeanization, Turkish Political Parties and their Perceptions of the European Union", **XIV. International Conference of Young Scholars**, Prague University of Economics, Prague/Czech Republic, May 27, 2010.

2009 "1960 Sonrası Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Sağ: Doktrin ve Hareket" [Turkish Right and Nationalism after 1960: Doctrine and Movement], **Invited Lecture**, Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, Ankara/Turkey, December 22, 2009 (with Doğan Başkır).

2009 "Euroscepticism of Turkish Political Parties" **5th ECPR General Conference**, Potsdam Universitat, Potsdam/Germany, September 10-12, 2009 (with Filiz Başkan).

2009 "Radical Right and Use of Political Violence: the Idealist Hearths in Turkey in the 1970s" **5th ECPR General Conference,** Potsdam Universitat, Potsdam/Germany, September 10-12, 2009.

2008 "The Rise of a Social Movement: Emergence of the Anti-globalization Movements in Turkey" **2nd ECPR Graduate Conference**, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona/Spain, August 25-27, 2008.

2008 "The Rise of a Social Movement: Emergence of the Anti-globalization Movements in Turkey" **13th International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest**, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester/UK, March 17-19, 2008.

ADDITIONAL TRAINING, SUMMER SCHOOLS

2012 "Arab Armies and Democratic Transitions", **IBEI Summer School of the Mediterranean 2012,** Institut Barcelona D'estudis Internacionals

(IBEI), Five day course given by Prof. Dr. Yezid Sayigh, July 16-20, 2012.

2012 "Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Middle East", **IBEI Summer School of the Mediterranean 2012,** Institut Barcelona D'estudis Internacionals (IBEI), Five day course given by Prof. Dr. Ramin Jahanbegloo, July 16-20, 2012.

2012 "Analyzing Political Language"**, The First ECPR Winter School in Methods and Techniques,** The University of Vienna, Department of Methods in the Social Sciences, February 11-18, 2012.

2011 **"**Essentials of Interview-Based Qualitative Research", Workshop by Liz Spenser at University of Zurich, Zurich/Switzerland, October 26-November 1, 2011.

2011 **Berlin Summer School in Social Sciences, Linking Theory and Empirical Research,** WZB and Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Berlin/Germany, July 17-29, 2011.

2008 "Europeanization, Turkish Political Parties and their Perceptions of the European Union" **18th ECPR Standing Group Summer School 'Political Parties and European Politics'**, European University Institute, Florence/Italy, September 8-19, 2008.

AWARDS and SCHOLARSHIPS

2014 Travel Grant, awarded by International Political Studies Association (IPSA), for the 23rd World Congress of Political Science, Montreal/Canada, July 19-24, 2014.

2013 Research Scholarship, awarded by Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie in the framework of the project "*La rue comme lieu d'expression politique*", for a one month research stay at CERI, Sciences Po in September 2013.

2012 Visiting Fellowship, awarded by University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld Graduate School of History and Sociology, for a three months research stay at BGHS from January to April 2013).

2012 Accommodation and Fee Grant, awarded by Institut Barcelona D'estudis Internacionals (IBEI), for IBEI Summer School of the Mediterranean 2012, IBEI, July 16- 20, 2012.

2012 Travel and Accommodation Grant, awarded by European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), for the 1st ECPR Winter School in Methods and Techniques, University of Vienna, Department of Methods in the Social Sciences, February 11-18, 2012.

2010 Research Grant, awarded by Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBİTAK), BİDEB 2214 Program, for a six months research stay at the University of Zurich, Institute of Political Science from July 2011 to January 2012.

2008 Travel Grant, awarded by Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBİTAK), BİDEB 2224 Program, for the 2nd ECPR Graduate Conference, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona/Spain, August 25-27, 2008

LANGUAGES

English (reading, writing and speaking: fluent),

French (reading: intermediate reading skills; writing and speaking: elementary),

German (reading, writing and speaking: elementary).

ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIPS

European Sociological Association

International Political Studies Association